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Chapter 1
Introduction
Most people in Europe take the soundness of their banks and insurers for granted.
They can do so, because the risk management of these institutions is advanced and
there are highly skilled regulators monitoring the institutions on our behalf. As a
result, there were not many bankruptcies of financial institutions in the last decade
in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the challenge for regulators to understand risk in
the financial sector is growing.
The two most prominent trends in the financial sector are the increase in cross-
border business by financial institutions and an increase of risk transfers between
institutions. Numerous banks and insurers offer their products abroad and invest
their assets in multiple countries. Improved risk pricing techniques, together with
an advanced technological infrastructure, support the transfer of risks between insti-
tutions. Firms do so to diversify their risk exposure. However, these developments
did increase the complexity of the risks underlying a bank or an insurer.
The bankruptcy of a financial institution results in losses for consumers and other
stakeholders. Since losses incurred by an institution may have an impact on the
stability of the financial system, the mutual dependence among firms in the financial
sector is the focus of regulation to promote financial stability. This is of particular
importance in the banking sector where the maintenance of its payment and clearing
services crucially hinge on the stability of the entire network of banks. In addition,
financial institutions are regulated to minimize the losses for consumers.
2The primary focus of regulators is to prevent the bankruptcy of individual banks
and insurers. Regulators are interested in the downside risk of the value of assets
and in the unexpected large liabilities of these institutions. Statistically speaking,
they are interested in the lower tail of the return distribution of banks and insurers.
A statistical tool to study the tails of distributions, is known as extreme value theory
(EVT). EVT can be used to estimate the probability of a loss in stock market value
of a bank or insurer, beyond losses observed before.
The secondary focus of regulators is the soundness of the financial system. The mu-
tual relation between institutions may make individual institutions prone to a failure
of a competitor. Financial institutions can be exposed to similar risks, creating a de-
pendence between losses. As a consequence, institutions suffer losses simultaneously.
This may strain the provision of banking and insurance services during crises. The
modeling of dependence between the downside risk of institutions adds additional
insights into the risks facing the financial sector.
Since the expected losses of multiple banks or insurers are of interest, the downside
risk of multiple institutions is investigated. The negative returns of two or more
banks and insurers are modelled, to study the effect of risk diversification. This helps
us to understand the observed dependence between losses of multiple companies.
The modelling of downside risk provides in itself interesting insights. However, it
is even more interesting to compared these models with an empirical evaluation of
the loss distribution of firms in the financial sector. Estimating the downside risk
provides information on the best means to diversify downside risk. Moreover, it
is evaluated whether country risk and sector risk are an important determinant of
downside risk.
The mutual relations within the insurance industry are more limited than in the
banking sector. However, the returns of insurers can also be dependent, because
insurers may hold similar assets and liabilities, which creates a similar risk profile.
Insurers can have the same liabilities because of an exposure to similar clients and
regions. If insurers have invested in the same assets, this can also be a source
of mutual risks. The reinsurance sector is well known for the ability to insure
major catastrophes or the ability to provide cover to insurers against exceptionally
large claims. This way insurers can protect themselves against catastrophic losses.
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However, an exposure of insurers to the same reinsurer is a risk factor they have
in common. The exposure of reinsurers to the same disasters is another source of
common risk.
Dependence within the banking sector is a well known topic in the economic litera-
ture. Banks are the cornerstone of the financial sector. They maintain the payment
system and provide short term liquidity to firms and households as well as longer
term loans. Banks are important for economic growth, since they finance trade and
investments and give people the opportunity to save. The banking sector has gone
through some very serious crises, as for example the savings and loans crisis in the
US. Because of the impact of a banking crisis for real economic activity, this sector
is strictly regulated at the international level by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision.
According to the traditional industrial organization view, the financial sector can
be divided in the following subsectors: the banking sector, the insurance sector and
the reinsurance sector. Moreover, financial conglomerates providing both banking
and insurance services can be considered a subsector. The emergence of financial
conglomerates raises interest in the degree of cross-sector dependence and this issue
is discussed in Chapter 3. The dependence within the insurance sector during crises
is of interest, since little is known about sector wide risk within this sector. Special
attention is devoted in Chapter 4 to the differences between insurance and reinsur-
ance risks. Mergers between banks in the EU raise the interest of policymakers in
the downside risk dependence between banks across different countries in the EU.
Dependence among banks is therefore the subject of Chapter 5.
In Chapter 3 the dependence between the downside risk of European banks and
insurers is analyzed. Since the downside risk of banks and insurers differs, an inter-
esting question from a supervisory point of view is the risk reduction that derives
from diversification within large banks and financial conglomerates. The limited
value of the normal distribution based correlation concept is discussed, and an al-
ternative measure is proposed, which better captures the downside dependence given
the fat tail property of the risk distribution. This measure is estimated and indi-
cates better diversification benefits for conglomerates versus large banks. Chapter
3 is based on joint work with De Vries and Schoenmaker (Slijkerman et al., 2005).
4In Chapter 4 the relation between insurers and reinsurers is studied. Simultaneous
losses of the market value of insurers are modelled and measured, to understand
the impact of shocks on the insurance sector. The downside risk of insurers is
explicitly modelled by common and idiosyncratic risk factors. Because reinsurance
is important for the capacity of insurers, the risk dependence among European
insurers and reinsurers is measured. The results point to a relatively low insurance
sector wide risk and indicate that the dependence among insurers is higher than
among reinsurers.
In Chapter 5 the mutual relations among banks are investigated. The downside risk
of multiple combinations of banks in the EU are modelled and their downside risk
dependence is estimated. An explanation for the joint risks, based on macroeconomic
developments, is provided. The results indicate that in general the dependence
between banks based in the same country is higher and that the dependence did
increase after the introduction of the euro. Evidence shows that the dependence can
be explained by macroeconomic developments.
This thesis therefore offers a number of new insights on the risk diversification
effects of mergers in the financial sector, from both a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. The propositions in the different chapters are innovative, as is the use
of the non-parametric estimator in this context. The use of this estimator and choice
of European data provide us with new results. Moreover, different aspects of the
methodology are explored in the following chapters. The robustness of the results is
shown by sampling in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the dependence among more than
two firms is investigated. In Chapter 5, it is shown how explanatory variables can
be used in this context and it is investigated whether the dependence has changed
over time. Moreover, in the chapters, a different policy question is addressed. The
results are useful for the design of new regulatory policies and can be the input
for future research on the diversification effects of downside risk. The framework
to disentangle the common and idiosyncratic shocks, incurred by multiple firms,
which is presented in Chapter 4, is well suited for future theoretical research. The
non-parametric estimator, which is used to estimate the probability that two firms
realize a simultaneous loss, can be used for future applied research.
The intention of this research is to formulate new theoretical propositions and
present empirical results, which are of interest to policymakers. To keep this work
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concise and to make it accessible to non-academics, some choices have been made.
For example, the degree of dependence between the returns of two firms will be
represented by a probability measure and not by the parameter in a copula, which
is in vogue in academics. Moreover, it is a deliberate choice not to redo a literature
overview on e.g. systemic risk and extreme value theory, since excellent overviews
exist. In this thesis, propositions related to extreme value theory are formulated and
the dependence among firms is estimated in a similar way. Of course, there are other
approaches to model the tails of the distribution of returns. However, the combi-
nation of the propositions and the empirical results, offers an interesting approach,
because the propositions and empirical results are based on similar assumptions. In
the following chapter, a short overview of the literature is given, to show how this
research fits in the broader economic literature.
Chapter 2
Literature on systemic risk
The demise of the LTCM investment fund in 1998 posed a serious threat to the
financial system. Many banks suffered losses because they where exposed to the fund
through loans, investments or counterparty risk. Nowadays, regulators are much
more aware of the risks to the financial system that result from an industry wide
exposure to the same risks. The probability of simultaneous large losses incurred by
multiple financial firms is the main topic of this thesis. This chapter discusses how
this topic relates to the literature.
A natural starting point is the literature on systemic risk in the banking sector,
which discusses the phenomenon of a bank run. To solve the problems associated
with a bank run, deposit guarantee funds were installed and banks where super-
vised. However, there are still important questions to be answered regarding the
stability of the financial system. Regulators and academics e.g. do not fully un-
derstand how risk is distributed within the financial system and there is insufficient
knowledge about the effects and desirability of regulatory measures. When regula-
tors know the risk exposure of the different firms, they can better assess the impact
of shocks to the system. The perspective on financial stability taken in this research
is therefore the risk that multiple institutions fail because of a common risk expo-
sure. When financial institutions are exposed to similar risks, or depositors cannot
identify the extent of the exposure to this risk, multiple institutions may be affected
when this risk materializes. Often such crises are explained by contagion effects. Af-
ter discussing systemic risk, the issues surrounding the estimation of contagion are
introduced. Mergers between financial institutions change the distribution of risks
8within the financial system considerably. The risk diversification possibilities of
mergers are therefore an important topic in this thesis and the question of efficiency
gains following mergers is briefly touch upon. Next, our choice for a risk modeling
approach which is unconditional on the current market environment is motivated.
References are given to the vast literature on the modeling of dependence in the
second moment of returns, the conditional approach. Since it is assumed in this
work that dependence originates from similar risk factors and is therefore in part
an asset side view, the relation of this research with the asset pricing literature is
briefly discussed. However, regulators are not primarily interested in asset pricing
but in the downside risk of institutions and the factors that cause this risk. There-
fore the loss distribution of financial institutions is modeled and estimated. Not
only the downside risk of institutions is of interest, but also the dependence among
firms is modeled. This model provides a theoretic benchmark of the exposure of
financial firms to large losses. It is shown that one can significantly underestimate
the probability of multiple large losses, if an inappropriate statistical model is used.
Before introducing the statistical theory, a broader perspective on systemic risk is
given.
Systemic risk
The objective of supervision is to protect depositors and policyholders and more
broadly to foster financial stability. To this end regulators promote the soundness
of individual institutions and the stability of the financial system. Regulators are
especially interested in the frequency and magnitude of extreme shocks to the sys-
tem, which threaten the continuity of banks and insurers. Statistically speaking
regulators are interested in the lower quantiles of the distribution of returns.
Most of the research on the stability of the financial system has a primary focus on
the stability of the banking sector, due to the importance of the payment and clearing
functions for the real economy. This activity comes as a joint product from the other
banking activities and is a positive externality to the economy. A similar service
does not derive from the insurance activities. Moreover, the type of contracts like a
deposit makes that the banking sector is more fragile than the insurance sector. A
survey of the issue of systemic risk can be found in De Bandt and Hartmann (2002).
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) provides a good overview
of the empirical impact of banking regulation, specifically the 1988 Accord. The
systemic aspects and the potential threat to the financial stability of insurers has
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not gained that much interest. One of the first studies raising this question was
written by the Group of Thirty (1997). More recently Swiss Re (2003b) concluded
that there is ample systemic risk in the reinsurance sector. Even though the stability
of the insurance sector is perhaps of a lesser public concern than the fragility of the
banking sector, the presence of financial conglomerates, nevertheless requires an
assessment of the downside risk derived from both activities. Interestingly, the
academic research on the prudential regulation of the insurance sector is still in its
infancy.
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) give the following definition of systemic risk: ‘Systemic
financial risk is the risk that an event (shock) will trigger a loss of economic value or
confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a substantial portion
of the financial system that is large enough to, in all probability, have significant
adverse effects on the real economy’. Underlying this definition is the idea that
economic shocks may become systematic because of externalities associated with
severe disruptions in the financial system. The authors distinguish direct and indi-
rect channels through which financial firms are linked and which cause the firms to
be interdependent. In the following chapters these dependencies will be investigated.
A classification of the literature on systemic risk can be found in Gorton (1988). He
the discusses the possibility of a business cycle induced systemic crisis. ‘A common
view of panics is that they are random events, perhaps self-confirming equilibria in
settings with multiple equilibria, caused by shifts in the beliefs of agents which are
unrelated to the real economy. An alternative view makes panics less mysterious.
Agents cannot discriminate between the riskiness of various banks because they
lack bank specific information. Aggregate information may then be used to assess
risk, in which case it can occur that all banks may be perceived to be riskier. . . . .
This hypothesis links panics to occurrences of a threshold value of some variable
predicting the riskiness of bank deposits.’ According to Gorton, banking panics can
be either random events or the result of the behavior of agents in the response to
asymmetric information. In his research three causes of an increase in risk are given.
Panics can be caused by extreme seasonal fluctuations, they can originate from the
failure of a large financial institution or can be caused by a recession. According
to Gorton, the causes are not mutually exclusive. A panic may for example be the
result of a bank failure in an economic downturn.
Since the value of assets is related to the business cycle, the idea that a systemic
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crisis can be caused by a similar exposure to risks easily fits within this classification.
In this research, the view is taken that crisis are predominantly caused by a similar
exposure to risks, being e.g. risks relating to the macroeconomy and risks relating
to the value of the assets and liabilities of institutions. However, if multiple banks
realize a loss due to losses on their assets this does not necessarily constitute a panic.
It is simply the result of a similar exposure to risk. De Vries (2005) explicitly models
the dependence among banks, which is the result of a similar exposure to loans. For
a discussion on the causes of interdependence between banks, see also De Nicolo and
Kwast (2002).
The view that systemic risk is caused by a similar risk exposure may also explain
why other financial institutions than banks are affected by a banking panic. The
returns of non-bank financial institutions can be driven by the same risk factors that
drive the risk in the banking sector. As mentioned above, the classic motivation for
the introduction of banking supervision is consumer protection and the prevention
of a bank run. However, there are other reasons for banking supervision since a
bank failure may have negative externalities. A banking crisis may e.g. impact
economic growth, which the government may want to avoid. Regulators can be seen
as delegated monitors, supervising the bank on behalf of depositors and society at
large. Freixas and Rochet (1997) elaborate on these views.
However, as e.g. Danielsson et al. (2002) show, regulation may also aggravate the
risk of the financial system. Most regulations assume that the risk in the financial
system is exogenous. The authors model the feedback effects of trading decisions
on prices and show that risk regulations have the perverse effect of exacerbating
financial instability. An similar approach is taken in Genotte and Leland (1990).
They show that the trading effects of a portfolio insurance strategy may exacerbate
a decline of stock prices. Moreover, the positive pay-off of momentum strategies may
indicate herding behavior, which can be explained by asymmetric information. See
Banarjee (1992) for a simple model on herd behavior. Another approach is taken
by Allen and Gale (2000), who model the interaction of banks, in a setting with
insufficient liquidity.
It is a deliberate choice in this thesis, not to model the interaction between agents,
but to take a reduced form approach. With a reduced form approach the degree
of dependence can be measured among different financial institutions. This is of
interest to regulators. Moreover, the other approaches require to explicitly model the
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behavior of agents and thus knowledge about their information sets and preferences.
A reduced form approach needs less assumptions and is easier to implement.
Contagion
There is a substantial literature examining the extent of contagion in financial mar-
kets. Simultaneous crashes of e.g. stock markets are estimated in this literature.
Some researcher test whether the correlation coefficient during crisis is higher than
during non-crisis times (see e.g. De Nicolo and Kwast (2002)), others apply probit
(Eichengreen et al., 1996) or logistic models (Bae et al., 2003). However, much
research is not precise in the definition of contagion, as is shown in Rigobon (2001)
and Forbes and Rigobon (2002). They define contagion as a significant increase in
cross-market linkages after a shock to one country (or group of countries). According
to this definition there is only contagion if the cross-market comovement increases
significantly after a shock. If there is no significant increase in the comovement,
this suggests that the strong linkages exist in all states of the world. Forbes and
Rigobon prefer to refer to interdependence for these situations. They show that
findings based on an increase in the correlation coefficient during crises are often
the result of heteroscedasticity. After applying a correction for this heteroscedas-
ticity, most evidence for contagion disappears. However, this does not imply that
there are no interdependencies during crises, it only implies that the linkages are
not more severe during a crisis than during non-crisis times. An extensive discus-
sion of the literature on contagion can be found in Hartmann et al. (forthcoming).
They explicitly model simultaneous extreme losses, or interdependencies, in a simi-
lar vain as is done in the following chapters. In this research the interdependencies
during crisis are studied, side-stepping the correlation coefficient. A reduced form
approach is used and the frequency of multiple simultaneous crashes is investigated.
The measure of systemic risk used (the failure measure) can be interpreted as the
probability of joint crashes. When the probability of joint crashes is high, systemic
risk is supposed to be high. The measure is not necessarily contagious in the sense
of an influenza virus spreading around. It is assume that the cause of most simul-
taneous losses is a common exposure to risk, such as the broader macroeconomy or
an exposure to similar assets. Since this research gives an explanation for depen-
dence among banks based on a similar exposure to return factors and assets, a short
overview of the broader literature on asset pricing is given. In this literature the
factor approach is very common.
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Asset pricing
When one takes the perspective that losses at multiple institutions are related be-
cause of a similar exposure to risk, there is a clear link with the asset pricing lit-
erature. The quantification of the relation between risk and return of assets is one
of the main topics in finance. The main paper is the contribution by Markowitz
(1952), who laid the foundations of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Ac-
cording to the CAPM, investors optimally diversify their assets (which results in the
market portfolio) and choose their portfolio risk by a combination of an investment
against the risk free rate and the market portfolio. The resulting optimal portfolio
is said to be mean-variance efficient. Extensions of the CAPM were developed by
Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Rochet (1992) models the effect of regulation in
a CAPM framework and finds that solvency regulation may distort an efficient asset
allocation.
In a way the CAPM helps to understand the dependence among financial insti-
tutions. If banks and insurers optimally diversify their assets and liabilities the
characteristics of these institutions are highly related to the market portfolio. In
Chapter 5 this is investigated more thoroughly. An alternative approach of mod-
eling the relation between risk and return is given by Ross (1976). The so called
Arbitrage Pricing Theorem (APT) provides a more general model than the CAPM
and allows for multiple factors driving the returns of firms. The APT relates the
expected returns of assets to a number of risk factors. However there is not a single
way of identifying these factors. See e.g. Campbell et al. (1997), Brealey and Myers
(2000) or Cochrane (2005) for an overview of the asset pricing literature.
In the early literature on portfolio construction the variance of the portfolio or risk
factors is often a proxy for risk. However, regulators of the financial sector are
primarily interested in the downside risk of institutions and not in the variance of
the returns. The selection of optimal portfolios when the objective of an investor is
to minimize the probability of large losses is discussed in the literature dealing with
the safety first selection criterion, introduced by Roy (1952). It matters however
how the risk of large losses is quantified, since e.g. the assumption that returns are
normally distributed leads to an underestimation of risk.
A basic assumption behind both the CAPM and APT is that the returns of assets
are normally distributed. However, this is often not the case as is described by
Mandelbrot (1963), Campbell et al. (1997) and Jansen and De Vries (1991). In
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this research the fat tail characteristics of returns are explicitly modelled. This
will help to understand the impact of large shocks to multiple institutions. Before
discussing the dependence among multiple firms when their returns are not normally
distributed, it is shown how to classify the tails of univariate return distributions
with the use of extreme value theory.
Now that most of the economic context of this research is shown, we continue with
the statistical context. First, however, the possible efficiency gains of mergers have
to be addressed.
Mergers
In this research the downside risk of multiple financial institutions is investigated
and therefore the risk diversification possibilities of mergers between financial firms.
The question whether firms can improve efficiency by merging is another important
question. It is a relevant topic when answering the question whether firms should
merge. Firms should only merge if there are economies of scale and scope, though
this is not the primary concern of regulators. In this thesis the perspective of a
regulator is taken, whose objective it is to minimize the risk of institutions and of
the financial system. The efficiency benefits of mergers are therefore left aside. See
Brealey and Myers (1996) for a general discussion on the efficiency gains following
a merger and e.g. Berger (2000) for a discussion on the benefits of mergers between
banks and insurers. For a general industrial organization perspective on mergers
see Tirole (1997). An interesting analysis of the benefits of internationalization
strategies in the banking sector is given in Slager (2004).
Methodology
In the second part of this chapter, a short introduction to extreme value theory is
given and references for further reading. First, the difference between the uncondi-
tional risk modeling approach and the conditional approach, is discussed.
Unconditional risk modeling approach
When modeling risk, a regulator may either choose to let the risk limit depend on
the current market environment or choose a risk limit which is less prone to changes
in volatility. Statistically speaking one can take a conditional modeling approach
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or an unconditional approach. In general an unconditional approach is appropriate
for loss forecasts when the investment horizon is relatively long. An advantage of
the unconditional approach is that the risk limits do not change frequently. The
advantage of the conditional approach is that these models are well suited when
there is dependence in the second moment. When studying monthly return series,
conditional volatility is basically absent. The use of GARCH and Stochastic Volatil-
ity models are therefore particularly appropriate for short term risk forecast, as is
needed for e.g. options traders. However, the conditional approach may be com-
putationally difficult, since the large variance-covariance matrices can be complex.
Primarily because regulators take a long term view when safe-guarding the finan-
cial system, an unconditional approach is followed in this research. A conditional
approach can be linked to extreme value theory (EVT), as is shown in Poon et al.
(2001). Moreover, as is shown in De Haan et al. (1989), an ARCH process, which
is a time dependent process, can result in data with independently distributed ex-
tremes. This data can therefore be modelled by an unconditional approach. An
overview on the literature on conditional approaches can be found in McNeil et al.
(2005) or Campbell et al. (1997). Kole (2006) provides a discussion on the relation
between bubbles and subsequent crashes.
Extreme value theory
Extreme value theory studies the limit distribution of the maxima and minima
of return series. These limit distributions are informative about the tail shape
of the underlying distribution. Consider the maximum of a stationary sequence
X1, X2, . . . , Xn of independently and identically distributed random variables with
a distribution function F , Mn = max(X1, X2, . . . , Xn). The probability that the
maximum of the first n variables is below a threshold x is given by
P{Mn ≤ x} = F
n(x).
EVT studies the limit distribution of Mn. One studies under what conditions there
exist suitable normalizing constants an > 0, bn, such that
Fn(
x
an
+ bn)
w
→ G(x),
where G(x) is one of three asymptotic distributions that are defined below and w
stands for weak convergence. The three limiting distribution functions G(x) are
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Type I G(x) = exp(−e−x) −∞ < x < +∞;
Type II G(x) = 0
exp(−x−α)
x ≤ 0,
x > 0, α > 0;
Type III G(x) =
exp(−(−x)α)
1
x < 0, α > 0,
x ≥ 0;
The distributions with a tail which is characterized by a Type III limiting distri-
bution is said to have a bounded support. It is therefore unlikely that this is the
appropriate limiting distribution to model log returns. When the tail is of Type I,
the distribution is characterized by the existence of all moments and belongs to the
type of distribution with exponentially declining tails, such as the normal distrib-
ution. When the higher moments of a distribution do not exist, the distribution
is of Type II and is said to be fat tailed. De Haan (1976) gives a discussion of
the conditions for the convergence of a distribution to a particular type of limiting
distribution. In the following chapters, the sufficient condition for a distribution to
be fat tailed is given, i.e. the property of regular variation. With the help of the
limit distribution of heavy tailed random variables one can study the frequency of
extreme losses without imposing a particular distribution a priori. If a distribution
is of Type II, the tails can be approximated by a first order term identical to the
Pareto distribution, which is well known by economists. The Student-t distribution
with finite degrees of freedom has e.g. a limiting (stationary) distribution which
is fat tailed. See Jansen and De Vries (1991) and McNeil et al. (2005) for an
application of EVT to finance or Embrechts et al. (2003).
Bivariate EVT
In this thesis not only the downside risk of a single firm is modeled, but also the
probability that multiple financial institutions realize a simultaneous loss. Consider
a vector (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . , (Xn, Yn) of i.i.d. random variables with a common
distribution function F (x, y). The i-th ascending order statistic of X (and Y respec-
tively) is denoted with Xi,n such that X1,n ≤ . . . ≤ Xn,n. The pair (Xn,nYn,n) of the
sample of n random variables is below a certain threshold (x, y) with probability
P{Xn,n ≤ x, Yn,n ≤ y} = F
n(x, y).
In a bivariate setting, EVT studies the limit laws for bivariate extremes. In line
with the study of the extremes of a univariate stochastic sequence, one is interested
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under what conditions there exist suitable normalizing constants an > 0, bn, such
that
F n(
xn,n
an
+ bn,
yn,n
cn
− dn)
w
→ G(x, y),
where G(x, y) is a multivariate extreme value distribution. If normalizing constants
can be found such that Fn(x, y) converges to a Type II limiting distribution, F n(x, y)
is called a bivariate extreme value distribution. See Embrechts et al. (2003) or De
Haan and Resnick (1977) for a more extensive overview of the literature.
Statistical analysis of bivariate random variables involves the modeling of the re-
lation between the two random variables. The univariate tail of both X and Y
and the bivariate dependence structure of X and Y have to be modeled. This can
be done by using portfolio theory. According to the APT the returns of firms are
a linear combination of independent risk factors. In this research a similar factor
approach is taken. However, it is assumed that the return factors are fat tailed.
Dependence among firms than originates from the exposure to the same factors.
This characteristic of the economic process is used to validate the assumption of
asymptotic dependence. Because of the heavy tail characteristics of the risk factors,
the bivariate distribution Fn(x, y), where x and y are the returns of two firms, is
of Type II. Since this economic approach gives us the type of limiting distribution,
one can start directly by studying the characteristics of Fn(x, y) by using a non-
parametric estimator. Moreover, the factor approach allows us to investigate the
extent to which the tail dependence between pairs of firms differs as a result of a
different exposure to the risk factors. De Vries (2005) uses a similar approach when
discussing whether the potential for systemic risk is weak or strong. The degree of
systemic risk depends on the tail characteristics of the investments made by banks.
The probability of multiple simultaneous losses is much higher when one takes into
account the fat tail characteristics of returns. This becomes apparent when a dif-
ferent way to characterize heavy tails is used. In a sample of heavy tailed random
variables, the maximum observation dominates all others, such that the sum and
the maximum over a large threshold have approximately the same probability1). A
1One way to characterize heavy tails is by the fact that for a sample of n i.i.d. draws
lim
s→∞
P {max(X1...Xn) > s} / P (
n∑
i=1
Xi > s) = 1.
Thus the sum is almost entirely driven by the maximum of the observations.
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well know result from e.g. the CAPM is, that the idiosyncratic risk factors diversify
away. However, when the returns of the different portfolio items are independently
drawn from the same distribution in the domain of attraction of the Type II extreme
value distribution, this is not necessarily the case because the asset with the largest
return is an important determinant of the return of the portfolio.
In Chapter 3 follows an analysis of the dependence among bank and insurers. In
Chapter 4 the dependence among insurers in the EU is characterized, followed by
an analysis of the dependence among banks in Chapter 5.
Chapter 3
Financial Conglomerates
Since the lifting of the regulatory barriers for mergers between banks and insur-
ers in the US, there has been an ongoing discussion on the appropriate regulatory
framework for financial conglomerates. If the risk profile of insurance activities of
a newly formed conglomerate is different from the risk profile of banking activi-
ties, this gives scope for diversification. Regulators might then allow lower capital
requirements for a conglomerate than for its individual constituent parts. If lower
capital requirements are allowed, this reduces the cost of capital and hence increases
profitability.
As an input for this discussion we investigate the dependence between the downside
risk of European banks and insurers. If the downside dependence between a bank
and an insurer is distinctly different from the dependence structure between two
banks or between two insurers, financial conglomerates require less capital charges
than large banks or insurance companies. Since we analyze risk from the perspective
of a supervisor, we focus primarily on a measure of downside risk and do not use
global risk measures like the variance. In the banking sector this focus on downside
risk is evidenced by the emphasis on the Value at Risk (VaR) methodology. This per-
spective complements other research which takes the perspective from shareholders,
investigating possible economies of scale and scope (e.g. Carow, 2001).
It is a stylized fact that the return series of financial assets are fat tailed distributed
(Jansen and De Vries, 1991). The commonly maintained assumption that returns
are normally distributed therefore underestimates the downside risk. Hence, given
the focus on downside risk, we will not start from this premise and allow for fat tails
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to capture the univariate risk properties. For the multivariate question of downside
risk diversification benefits, the normal distribution based correlation concept is
also of limited value. For example, one can have multivariate Student-t distributed
random variables, which exhibit fat tails, are dependent, but which are neverthe-
less uncorrelated. Research based on the correlation concept, to investigate the
diversification benefits of banks into insurance activities, appears therefore inappro-
priate. To answer the question whether the capital requirements for conglomerates
can be lower than the sum of requirements for large banks, we employ a downside
risk measure which directly evaluates the systemic downside risk in terms of fail-
ure probabilities and losses. This measure is derived from Extreme Value Theory
(EVT), and easily allows for the non-normality.
Financial conglomerates may exploit diversification possibilities between balance
sheet items of banks and insurers. However, current regulation does not allow for
cross hedging. The different entities of a conglomerate are supervised separately
according to sector specific regulation. Since there is no common regulatory frame-
work, capital has a distinct function in both banking and insurance. EU solvency
requirements for insurers do e.g. not depend on credit risk. This makes it difficult to
examine cross-sector risk transfers and may induce regulatory arbitrage. The cur-
rent supervisory framework in banking is based on the Basle 1988 Capital Accord
for the credit book and on the "Amendment to the capital accord to incorporate
market risks" of 1996. The insurance regulation is based on the insurance directives
in the EU and on the Risk Based Capital framework in the US. For the supervision
of financial groups the financial conglomerates directive is in place. New regulation
based on internal risk models for the banking sector is being implemented (Basle
II Capital Accord). For the insurance sector the European Commission is working
on a new regulatory framework, the so-called Solvency 2 project. The tendency
is to tie regulatory capital more closely to Economic Capital models (e.g. Bikker
and Lelyveld, 2002). These models enable financial institutions to allocate capital
optimally, based on an economic concept of risk. If financial conglomerates face a
lower risk, this validates lower capital requirements, which would boost return on
investments.
The objective of supervision is to protect depositors and policyholders and more
broadly to foster financial stability. To this end regulators promote the soundness
of individual institutions and the stability of the financial system. Regulators are
especially interested in the frequency and magnitude of extreme shocks to the sys-
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tem, which threaten the continuity of banks and insurers. Statistically speaking
regulators are interested in the lower quantiles of the distribution of returns.
Most of the research on the stability of the financial system has a primary focus on
the stability of the banking sector, due to the importance of the payment and clearing
functions for the real economy. This activity comes as a joint product from the other
banking activities and is a positive externality to the economy. A similar service
does not derive from the insurance activities. Moreover, the type of contracts like a
deposit makes that the banking sector is more fragile than the insurance sector. A
survey of the issue of systemic risk can be found in De Bandt and Hartmann (2002).
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) provides a good overview
of the empirical impact of banking regulation, specifically the 1988 Accord. The
systemic aspects and the potential threat to the financial stability of insurers has
not gained that much interest. One of the first studies raising this question was
written by the Group of Thirty (1997). More recently Swiss Re (2003b) concluded
that there is ample systemic risk in the reinsurance sector. Even though the stability
of the insurance sector is perhaps of a lesser public concern than the fragility of the
banking sector, the presence of financial conglomerates, nevertheless requires an
assessment of the downside risk derived from both activities. Interestingly, the
academic research on the prudential regulation of the insurance sector is still in its
infancy.
In the empirical section we begin by measuring the riskiness of individual banks
and insurers. We use the reduced form approach of the risk of financial institutions
as analyzed by De Vries (2005) and employed in De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) and
Hartmann et al. (2004). This involves estimating the probability of a crash by using
daily stock price data. We employ estimators from statistical extreme value theory
and avoid correlation based techniques which focus primarily on the central order
statistics. The estimation results for individual firms provide information on the risk
of individual institutions and allows for a cross-sector comparison of individual firm
risk. Our main research question concerns whether the downside risk in the banking
sector differs from the downside risk in the insurance sector. To this end we estimate
the dependence between combinations of firms, both within a sector and across
sectors. If the risk profile of both sectors is different, this creates risk diversification
possibilities for financial conglomerates. To understand the possible differences in
cross-sector risk, we develop an analytical model which helps us to interpret the
tail dependence, in the theory section. This model provides an explanation for the
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differences in dependence between banks and insurers, compared to the dependence
within the same sector.
The early work on the benefits of mergers between banks and insurers was done in
light of the discussion on the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall act in the US (which
forbid bank holding companies to perform insurance activities). For a literature
overview see Laderman (1999) or Estrella (2001). Estrella (2001) applies option
pricing theory to create a measure of failure for a firm and finds that banks and
insurers are likely to experience diversification gains. The literature review of Berger
(2000) suggests that most efficiency gains of mergers appear to be linked to benefits
from risk diversification. A study by Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001) argues that
there is scope for a reduction of 5-10% in capital requirements for a combined bank
and insurance company. Carow (2001) analyses the Citicorp-Travelers Group merger
by an event study approach and finds that investors expect significant benefits from
the removal of regulatory barriers to bancassurance. However, in the meantime this
merger is in the process of breaking up. Laderman (1999) finds that substantial
investments in life insurance underwriting are optimal for reducing the risk of the
return on assets for bank holding companies. Except for Gully et al. (2001) and
Bikker and Lelyveld (2002), most studies focus on U.S. data, as in De Nicolo and
Kwast (2002), and assume that the returns are normally distributed. Our research
is focused on European data and applies extreme value theory, allowing for fat tails.
In the remainder of this paper we first describe the limited value of the correlation
concept and provide another dependence measure. Next we provide an economic
rational for dependence to exist, between different financial institutions. Thereafter,
we explain the methodology, give a description of the data and present the results.
Finally, we summarize our findings and draw some policy conclusions.
3.1 Dependence and correlation
To understand the dependence between two random variables which follow a normal
distribution it is sufficient to know the mean, variance and correlation coefficient to
characterize their joint behavior. The correlation measure itself, however, is often
not an useful statistic for financial data for various reasons. First, economists are
interested in the risk-return trade-off, to which the correlation measure is only an
intermediate step. Boyer, Gibson and Loretan (1997), moreover, noticed that even
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Figure 3.1: Normal distribution underestimates the risk
if the normal model applies, verifying the market speak of increased correlation
coefficients in times of crisis can be illusory. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) show that
not much of a correlation change can be identified around crisis times, by taking
into account the simultaneous increase in variance of the return series.
A second reason for the failure of the normal based correlation measure is that the
return series are clearly non-normal distributed. In Figure 3.1a we have depicted the
daily stock returns of ABN AMRO Bank and AXA since 1992. We estimated the
mean, variance and correlation of these returns and randomly generated returns with
the same parameters assuming a bivariate normal distribution (Figure 3.1b). Project
the observations along the two axes to obtain the univariate properties of the return
series. The difference between the returns and the artificial returns is that in the
latter sample there are no observations larger than 10 percent. The normal model,
in fact, predicts that returns above the 10 per cent occur with a very low probability,
while such returns are in reality quite common. Thus the return distributions exhibit
fat tails. Since regulators are concerned with the extreme losses of value for banks
and insurers, the assumption of normality therefore appears inappropriate.
The third reason as to why the multivariate normal based correlation measure is
inappropriate for our analysis, is that it does not capture very well the dependency
which one observes in the above plots. The true data have most of the extreme out-
comes realized close to the diagonal, and thus occur jointly. In the normal remake,
this is much less the case. To explain how this could be, we provide an example
which is somewhat of an exaggeration, but which provides the key insight very well.
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Figure 3.2: Two Student-t distributed variables
The example builds on the fact that if two random variables are dependent, the
correlation between the variables may nevertheless be zero. In Figure 3.2a, two un-
correlated and independent random variables, qi and ri are shown (based on 10,000
randomly generated Student-t variables with 3 degrees of freedom). In contrast to
Figure 3.2a, where two independent variables are plotted, the variables ai and bi
in Figure 3.2b are made dependent. We formed two portfolio’s, ai = qi + ri and
bi = qi − ri. On the x-axis on finds the sum (ai = qi + ri) of the two Student-t vari-
ables, on the y-axis one finds the difference (bi = qi − ri) between the two random
variables; one can think of the second portfolio being short in the asset with re-
turn ri. The correlation between a and b is zero, but note that there is dependence
between the portfolios in Figure 3.2b as all extremes occur jointly along the two
diagonals. In contrast, if qi and ri are drawn from a normal distribution, ai and bi
are surely independent as they are uncorrelated. In that case a cross plot of ai and
bi would generate a neat circle around zero. This illustrates that the characteristics
of variables which are in the domain of the fat tailed Frechet extreme value distri-
bution differ considerably from e.g. variables which follow a normal distribution.
The sample maxima of these distributions all converge to the Frechet limit, when
appropriately scaled. A typical feature of the Student-t distribution, which is in the
domain of the Frechet, are the extremely high and low observations far away from
the centre. In a sample of heavy tailed random variables, the maximum observation
dominates all others (in such a way that the sum and the maximum over a large
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threshold have approximately the same probability1). This shows in Figure 3.2a as
the larger observations appear along the two axes. In this figure the extreme ob-
servations are located alongside the axes since the probability of a pair of two large
variables is so low. Therefore combinations ai = qi + ri and bi = qi − ri in Figure
3.2b far from the origin are almost entirely driven by either the qi or the ri, placing
the largest observations on the two diagonals (which are essentially a rotation of
the two axes from Figure 3.2a). In other words, the largest observation really dom-
inates over the others and determines the scale and the dependence. Because of the
shortcomings of the correlation measure, we want to use a measure that provides
us with the probability of multiple extreme losses, taking into account that return
series of stock prices are fat tailed.
3.1.1 The linkage measure
Instead of using the correlation measure to capture the dependence between two
variables, we will directly study the probability of an extreme loss of a variable,
conditional on the loss of another variable. Our indicator is therefore a conditional
probability measure. The concern of regulators and risk managers is a simultaneous
loss at the banking division and the insurance division of a financial conglomerate.
More specifically, suppose a regulator wants to know the probability that B > t,
given that A > t and the probability that A < t given that B < t, where A and B are
the stochastic loss returns and t is the common high loss level. A high realization of
a variable should be interpreted as a large loss, so we can focus on positive random
variables for the study of our downside risk. Since we are interested in a crash of
the banking division given the crash of the insurance division and vice versa, we
will condition on either event. Let κ be the number of divisions which crash. We
propose to use the linkage measure from Xin (1992) as the measure of systemic risk
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (A > t) + P (B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t,B ≤ t)
. (3.1)
1One way to characterize heavy tails is by the fact that for a sample of n i.i.d. draws
lim
s→∞
P {max(X1...Xn) > s}
P (
n∑
i=1
Xi > s)
= 1.
Thus the sum is almost entirely driven by the maximum of the observations.
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This measure gives the expected number of divisions which crash, given that one di-
vision crashes. Hartmann et al. (2004) provide further motivation for this measure.
Note that
E[κ|κ ≥ 1]− 1 =
P (A > t,B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t, B ≤ t)
is the conditional probability that both divisions fail, given that there is a failure
of at least one of the divisions. We will use either interpretation, depending on the
context.
Unless one is willing to make further assumptions as in the options based distance
to default literature, it is impossible to pin down the exact level at which a division
fails, or at which supervisors consider the institution financially unsound. For this
reason we do take limits and consider
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1].
Extreme value theory then shows that even though the measure is evaluated in the
limit, it nevertheless provides a reliable benchmark for the dependency at high but
finite levels of t. We also like to note that the measure can be easily adapted in case
failure levels at the divisions are different, in which case the measure is evaluated
along a non 45o line, in the A, B space.
Often a parametric approach is taken to describe dependence and there is a lot
of interest in the use of copula to describe the joint behavior of random variables.
However, when taking a parametric approach, an assumption has to be made on the
appropriate copula. We therefore do not make use of an EVT copula and follow a
non-parametric approach. The connection between the two concepts in the limit is
as follows
lim
t−→∞
P (A > t) + P (B > t)
1− P (A ≤ t, B ≤ t)
= lim
p↑1
2(1− p)
1− C(p, p)
,
where P (A > t) = P (B > t) = 1 − p and C(p, p) is the limit copula. Thus if the
copula is known, the failure measure can be calculated. Kole (2006) discusses the
use of different copulas in this context.
3.2 An economic rationale for dependence
To give a theoretical rationale for dependence between banks and insurers, we give a
stylized representation of the insurance and banking risks, using an elementary factor
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model. The factors are assumed to follow a distribution with non-normal heavy tails.
This provides us with a characterization of the level and degree of dependence.
New financial products enhance the possibilities to transfer risk between and within
financial institutions. We show this may lead to a convergence of the investment
portfolios of banks and insurers. First, we will give examples of this convergence,
followed by a short exposition on the approach taken by financial institutions to
manage this risk. We conclude by capturing the characteristics in a theoretical
model.
The investments of banks and insurers are to a certain degree similar. Both invest
in syndicated loans, have proprietary investments in equity and both hold mortgage
portfolios. This may cause similarities in the risk profile of banks and insurers.
Moreover, the costs arising out of liabilities for banks and insurers are to some
degree similar. Both, for example, sell products with a guaranteed interest rate.
New financial instruments can transform insurance risk to financial investments
(e.g. catastrophe bonds) or can transform default risk to insurance risk, via credit
default swaps. Via securitization of bank loan portfolios, the scope of investments
for insurers is widened.
There are also differences. The interest rate exposure for banks and insurers may dif-
fer, since banks profit from declining interest rates, while it may be more difficult for
life insurers to maintain a healthy profit margin in a low interest rate environment.
On the liability side of banks balance sheets, the deposit contract exposes the banks
to the risk of immediate callability, while insurers do not have such a risk. If we find
that cross-sector dependence is lower than dependence within the two sectors, this
may provide an argument for cross-sector mergers. However mergers are not always
necessary to exploit those advantages, since risks can be traded between firms. For
some risks this might be difficult, since the seller of protection has less information
about the risk it gets than the buyer has. As a starting point for the discussion on
the benefits of cross-sector mergers, we model cross-sector dependence.
Banks and insurers develop risk management models to identify the risk of their
institution. A study by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) gives
an overview of the different risk types that can be found in a financial conglomerate.
Once the aggregate risk by risk type is known, one can look at the dependence
between risk types. The concept of economic capital makes it possible to measure
the degree of risk taking. Although the distribution function of the risk types differ,
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the economic capital framework sets a common standard in terms of a confidence
interval in the cumulative loss distribution within a specific time horizon.
Findings by Oliver, Wyman & Company (2001) suggest that the largest benefits of
diversification are obtained within a specific risk type, are smaller at the business
line level and are getting even smaller across business lines. The current regulatory
framework, which is designed for specific (sectoral) business lines, does not reflect
possible diversification opportunities between banks and insurers. The predominant
risk is often the primary focus of the current regulation. Internal risk models, which
are increasingly used in modern regulation, are better fit to allow for diversification
possibilities.
We focus on a semi-reduced form approach at the risk level of an institution. This
implies that we do not form a complete structural model explaining the full strategy
of agents, since we are primarily interested in the resulting risk. Of importance is the
interdependency between institutions. We first model dependence theoretically and
subsequently turn to an empirical evaluation. The model is related to the Arbitrage
Pricing Theorem of Ross (1976). Suppose the risk of all firms in the financial sector
can be decomposed into three elements. Firms face a common component of risk
(macro risk), an insurance or bank sector specific risk (sector risk) and firm specific
risk. We therefore assume total firm risk to be the sum of the financial market
risk, F ; risk within a sector, A and B; and firm specific risks, Yi and Zj. A high
realization of a variable should be interpreted as a large loss, so we can focus on
positive random variables for the study of our downside risk. This way we can turn
the study of minima into the study of maxima, which permits a more expedient
presentation.
The fat tail assumption for the loss distribution boils down to the assumption that
the tails exhibit power like behavior, as in the case of the Pareto distribution. For
ease of presentation we assume that the entire loss distribution is Pareto distributed.
But we emphasize that the results carry over to all distributions which exhibit
regular varying tails, such as the Student-t distribution. Assume that the downside
risk of the independent stochastic portfolio items (A,B, F, Yi, Zj) are (unit scale)
Pareto distributed on [1,∞)
P (A > t) = P (B > t) = P (F > t) = P (Yi > t) = P (Zj > t) = t
−α, (3.2)
where t is the threshold loss level which we are interested in. In the following we
investigate the dependence between two financial firms or divisions, depending on
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the interpretation. We distinguish two cases, investigating dependence within a
sector and across sectors. The analysis of the theoretical risk exposures helps us to
interpret the dependence between the tail risk of the different firms. Understanding
this downside risk is desirable from a policy perspective, since it points to the benefits
and limits of cross-sector risk sharing.
3.2.1 Same sector dependence
Before we can proceed, we need to introduce some theoretical tools. The probability
of a large loss for a combination of risk factors when these exhibit a power like
distribution, is given by Feller’s convolution theorem (1971, VIII.8). This theorem
holds that if two independent random variables A and B satisfy (3.2), then for large
t the convolution has probability
P (A+B > t) = 2t−αL(t),
and where L(t) is slowly varying (i.e. lim
t−→∞
L(at)/L(t) = 1, for any a > 0). The
theorem implies that for large failure levels t, the convolution of A and B can be
approximated by the sum of the univariate distributions of A and B. All that counts
for the probability of the sum is the (univariate) probability mass which is located
along the two axes from the points onward where the line A+B = t cuts the axes.
The probability that the convolution of A and B is larger than t, for large t, is
therefore
P (A+B > t) = 2t−α + o(t−α). (3.3)
Consider the dependency from two financials within the same sector. We use a styl-
ized model of the downside risk of banks and insurers to analyze the tail dependence
between two companies. To this end define the equity returns of a company in the
banking sector Gi or the insurance sector Hj as a portfolio of risk factors consisting
of the following elements:
Gi = F +B + Yi and Hj = F +A+ Zj,
where F is broad financial market risk and A and B are the sector risks, which are
similar for all firms within a sector. Bank and insurance specific risk is defined by
Yi and Zj. Using Feller (1971, VIII.8), for sufficiently large t the probability that
firm i has a return larger than t, P (Gi > t), is the sum of the probabilities that the
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individual portfolio factors are larger than t. Since the portfolio consists of three
items, the probability of a crash of an individual company therefore reads
P (F +B + Yi > t) = 3t
−α + o(t−α). (3.4)
Suppose one is interested in the probability that two banks crash, simultaneously.
The joint probability of a crash between two banks is equal to
P (G1 > t,G2 > t) = P (F +B + Y1 > t, F +B + Y2 > t) = 2t
−α + o(t−α). (3.5)
This result can again be obtained from Feller’s convolution theorem by the following
argument. Note that the two portfolio inequalities F+B+Y1 > t and F+B+Y2 > t,
when satisfied simultaneously, only have the points above t along the F + B axis
in the portfolio in common2, but not any point along the Y1 or the Y2 axes. This
implies that for large t
P (F +B + Y1 > t, F +B + Y2 > t) ≈ P (F +B > t) = 2t
−α + o(t−α) (3.6)
where the last equality directly follows from Feller’s theorem. The probability of a
joint crash among two insurers is similar, P (H1 > t,H2 > t) ≈ 2t
−α. The relative
magnitudes of these probabilities become clear in the empirical section, where we
calculate the risk for cross-sector dependence.
3.2.2 Cross-sector dependence
In this paragraph we investigate the probability of a simultaneous crash in two
different sectors. Since the sector risk for the two companies is different, there are
less common components (factors) in the portfolio of the two firms. The probability
of a joint crash of an insurer and a bank is lower, by the assumption that the sector
specific portfolio items are independent,
P (G1 > t,H1 > t) = P (F +B + Y1 > t, F +A+ Z1 > t) ≈ t
−α + o(t−α).
This probability can also be derived using Feller’s convolution theorem. When the
portfolio inequalities F +B+Y1 > t and F +A+Z1 > t hold simultaneously, there
is only probability mass of order t−α above t along the F axis in common, and no
2Note that sum of F and B can be treated as one variable.
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P (Gi > t,Gj > t) 1− P (Gi ≤ t, Gj ≤ t)
Gi = F +B + Yi
Gj = F +B + Yj
2t−α 4t−α
P (Gi > t,Hj > t) 1− P (Gi ≤ t,Hj ≤ t)
Gi = F +B + Yi
Hj = F +A+ Zj
t−α 5t−α
A,B, F, Yi and Z are Pareto distributed
Table 3.1: Cross-sector dependence
mass of this order along the (B+Y1) and (A+Z1) axes. This implies that for large
t
P (F +B + Y1 > t, F +A+ Z1 > t) ≈ P (F > t) = t
−α + o(t−α). (3.7)
In Table 3.1 the probabilities of cross-sector and same sector risk are summarized.
It is interesting to note that the probability of a joint crash of two companies differs
considerably depending on cross-sector or within sector combinations.
To evaluate cross-sector dependence and dependence within the same sector ana-
lytically with the linkage measure, we need to substitute for the probabilities in
the numerator and denominator of (3.1). The probabilities for the numerator are
given in (3.4). By using our previous assumptions on the risk components of indi-
vidual banks and insurers, we can calculate the denominator. The probability that
both firms face a return smaller than or equal to t, i.e. P (G1 ≤ t, G2 ≤ t) can be
calculated by using the complement 1−P (G1 ≤ t, G2 ≤ t). If we examine the com-
plement, for sufficiently large t, we have the probability that at least one company
has a return larger than t. A company has a return larger than t if F,A,B, Yi or Zj
is larger than t. The complement 1 − P (G1 ≤ t, G2 ≤ t) is therefore equal to the
sum of the probabilities that an individual portfolio component is larger than t. The
complement 1− P (G1 ≤ t, G2 ≤ t) is approximately equal to 4t
−α, since 4 different
portfolio items (F,B, Y1 and Y2) each have the probability of t
−α to be larger than
t. In Table 3.1 the complement 1− P (G1 ≤ t, G2 ≤ t) for two firms from a similar
sector and two firms from a different sectors are given.
To obtain the conditional risk of a crash of two firms, we substitute 1 − P (G1 ≤
t, G2 ≤ t) in the linkage measure. The conditional expectation of a crash of two
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firms in the same sector is given in (3.8)
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = lim
t−→∞
P (Gi > t) + P (Gj > t)
1− P (Gi ≤ t,Gj ≤ t)
=
6
4
. (3.8)
The conditional expectation is much higher in the case of same sector dependence
than in the case of cross sector dependence. The conditional expectation of a crash
of two firms in different sectors is only
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = lim
t−→∞
P (Gi > t) + P (Hj > t)
1− P (Gi ≤ t,Hj ≤ t)
=
6
5
. (3.9)
In the second part of this chapter we estimate the linkage measure. The dependence
among financial institutions in the same sector and among institutions in different
sectors, will be estimated. If the dependence estimates are higher within a sector
than across sectors, this can be explained by the difference in risk between the
insurance sector and banking sector, A and B. If cross-sector dependence is similar
to the dependence within a sector than it is plausible that the risk in the banking
sector is similar to the risk in the insurance sector, A = B.
3.2.3 Dependence and the normal distribution
It is interesting to note that the dependence in the tail disappears if we assume that
the factors, A,B, F, Yi and Zj are standard (independently) normally distributed.
Note that normality immediately implies that Gi, Gj ,Hi and Hj are all correlated. If
we assume that the returns on the individual projects exhibit heavy tails as before,
there is dependence in the tails and the linkage measure will be larger than one,
even in the limit. However, even though there is positive correlation, if the returns
of both Gi and Hi follow a bivariate normal distribution there is no dependence
between firms for large values of t, or
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = lim
t−→∞
P (Gi > t) + P (Gj > t)
1− P (Gi ≤ t, Gj ≤ t)
= lim
t−→∞
P (Gi > t) + P (Hj > t)
1− P (Gi ≤ t,Hj ≤ t)
= 1.
The proof for this result is similar to the proof of proposition 2 in De Vries (2005)
and follows directly from the general result by Sibuya (1960). Therefore, under
the assumption of normality, there is asymptotic independence between all possible
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combinations of firms, being banks or insurers. This explains why Figure 3.1a differs
so much from Figure 3.1b, especially in the North-East and South-West corner, since
the remake in Figure 3.1b is based on the assumption of normality. The disappear-
ance of the dependency in the tail area is not unique for the normal distribution.
The same holds for the assumption of exponentially distributed portfolio items.
To study whether there is dependence in the limit, we will compare our dependence
estimates with estimation results of a bivariate normal model for the returns of the
two firms in the empirical section. First we present the univariate and bivariate
estimators.
3.3 Estimators
3.3.1 Univariate estimators
Extreme value theory studies the limit distribution of the (joint) maxima or min-
ima of (return) series, as the sample size increases without bound. To study the
minimum, we change the sign of the returns. Suppose that Xi is an independent
and identically distributed random variable with cumulative distribution function
F (x). This variable exhibits heavy tails if F (x) far into the tails has a first order
term identical to the Pareto distribution (see Appendix). We want to determine the
probability that the daily stock return of a bank or insurer is lower than a prespec-
ified loss level xvar, where the subscript refers to Value at Risk. To estimate this
probability, we use the inverse quantile estimator from De Haan et al. (1994)
p̂ =
m
n
(
Xm+1
xvar
)α̂(m)
, α̂(m) =
1
m
m∑
j=0
ln
(
Xj
Xm+1
)
. (3.10)
This probability estimate depends on the tail index α estimator (based on the m
highest order statistics), the number of excesses m, the m + 1-th order statistic
Xm+1, the sample size n and the level xvar, which is the level which we estimate the
return series to exceed. In our case xvar is determined at 25%. Estimation details
are given in the Appendix. For the confidence interval of the quantile estimator we
use the property that in the limit the estimator is normally distributed.
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3.3.2 Multivariate estimation
In this paragraph we explain the estimator of the linkage measure (3.5). To develop
an estimator for the linkage measure, note that
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t)
1− P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t)
= 1 +
P (min[X1, X2] > t)
P (max[X1,X2] > t)
, (3.11)
where P (min[X1,X2] > t) is the probability that the minimum of X1 and X2 is above
the threshold t, and P (max[X1, X2] > t) is the probability that the maximum of
both random variables exceeds t. Both probabilities can be easily estimated. In the
Appendix we show that this estimator captures the limiting dependence between two
heavy tailed random variables. According to theory, the tail dependence between
two dependent variables which follow a Student-t distribution is much higher than
the dependence between two dependent variables which follow a normal distribution.
Since we evaluate the limit behavior of (3.11), we take t close to the boundary of the
sample and use t = 0.075. We obtain a confidence band by the Jackknife resampling
procedure and show that our results do not change much if we omit a large number
of observations (see Appendix).
3.3.3 Data
Our sample consists of the ten largest European banks and the ten largest European
insurers. These firms were selected on the basis of balance sheet criteria such as
the amount of customer deposits and life and non-life premium income. Insurers
can provide both life insurance and non-life insurance (e.g. property and casualty
insurance). We use daily data from January 1992 until December 2003. A precise
description of the dataset is given in the Appendix.
3.4 Empirical results
In this section we present the estimates of the downside risk of individual firms and
the dependence between firms. First we present the univariate risk for banks and
insurers, next we present the dependency estimates between firms.
3. Financial Conglomerates 35
Probability Probability
(Xi  <  -0.25) * 260 (Xi  <  -0.25) * 260
Banks Insurers
HSBC 0.0037 ROYAL & SUN 0.0482
RBS 0.0064 AEGON 0.0584
UBS 0.0142 AVIVA 0.0161
BARCLAYS 0.0068 PRUDENTIAL 0.0237
BSCH 0.0081 LEGAL & GENERAL 0.0020
BBVA 0.0186 ALLEANZA 0.0070
DEUTSCHE BANK 0.0089 SKANDIA 0.0501
ABN AMRO 0.0072 GENERALI 0.0121
UNICREDITO 0.0150 AXA 0.0153
STD CHARTERED 0.0168 ZFS 0.1073
Average 0.0106 0.0340
Median 0.0085 0.0199
Table 3.2: Univariate loss probabilities
3.4.1 Univariate results
Suppose one is interested in the probability of a loss of market value of 25% or more
in a single day. Since these probabilities are very small, we scaled these up by a
factor of 260, so that the probabilities can be interpreted as the probability that in a
year there is a day with a loss of 25%. The estimated probabilities are given in Table
3.2. From the averages of the different sectors it is clear that insurers are more risky
than banks. The average in the banking sector is 0.0106, in the insurance sector the
average probability is 0.034. In other words, about once per thirty years there is a
day on which an insurer loses 25% of its equity value. For banks this is only once
per century. Within the different groups there are however large deviations from the
sector means. The results for the banking sector range from 0.0037 to 0.0186. The
results for the insurance sector are between 0.0020 and 0.1073. We formally test
our null-hypothesis that both groups have the same general distribution by using
the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney signed ranks test. The probability that the equality
hypothesis is valid is 0.064. We therefore reject the null-hypothesis and conclude
that insurers are more risky than banks. Further evidence for this result can be
found in Table 3.8 in de Appendix. Although the normal model underestimates
risk, the results also indicate that insurers are more risky than banks.
Using (3.14) from the Appendix, one can calculate a confidence band. Results are
given in Table 3.3. In this table we use a threshold loss of 15%3. Given the limited
3Here we do not multiply the probabilites with 260, so as to guarantee that the probabilities
are between 0 and 1.
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Lower Probability Upper
Firms Bound Xi  <  -0.15 Bound Hill
HSBC 0.00005 0.00012 1.00000 4.14
RBS 0.00010 0.00020 1.00000 4.06
UBS 0.00015 0.00028 0.00478 3.23
BARCLAYS 0.00009 0.00019 1.00000 3.89
BSCH 0.00012 0.00024 0.01360 3.98
BBVA 0.00020 0.00037 0.00304 3.23
DEUTSCHE BANK 0.00012 0.00023 0.01908 3.75
ABN AMRO 0.00011 0.00023 0.04766 4.09
UNICREDITO 0.00018 0.00033 0.00346 3.43
STD CHARTERED 0.00020 0.00038 0.00297 3.49
ROYAL & SUN 0.00055 0.00092 0.00276 3.14
AEGON 0.00059 0.00097 0.00281 2.86
AVIVA 0.00021 0.00038 0.00297 3.57
PRUDENTIAL 0.00027 0.00049 0.00263 3.28
LEGAL & GENERAL 0.00004 0.00009 1.00000 4.85
ALLEANZA 0.00010 0.00019 1.00000 3.87
SKANDIA 0.00078 0.00125 0.00309 3.66
GENERALI 0.00012 0.00024 0.01274 3.21
AXA 0.00022 0.00042 0.00281 3.82
ZFS 0.00095 0.00148 0.00334 2.50
Table 3.3: Loss probabilities and confidence bands
amount of data, even at this loss level several upper bounds of the confidence bands
are equal to 1. The difference between the point estimator and the upper bound of
the interval is larger than the difference between the point estimator and the lower
bound. This is also a result of a relatively small sample size (n).
The estimates are derived by assuming that the tails of the return distributions are
heavy tailed. Since we study events that have a high impact, but which material-
ize at a very low frequency, our estimated probabilities may at first sight appear
very small. To put these probabilities in perspective, recall the Figures (3.1a) and
(3.1b), which showed a huge discrepancy between the normal distribution and the
empirical distribution. Suppose one calculated the loss probabilities for HSBC and
ZFS (respectively the first and last company) from Table 3.3 under the assumption
of normality. This gives 1.5 ∗ 10−15 and 8.6 ∗ 10−11 for respectively HSBC and ZFS.
These figures are much lower than 0.00012 and 0.00148. The entire Table 3.3 is
recalculated under the assumption of normality and is given in the Appendix in
Table 3.8.
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Mean Median
Bank Insurer Bank Insurer
Bank 0.1038 0.0744 0.095 0.069
Insurer 0.0744 0.1170 0.069 0.107
E[κ|κ ≥ 1]− 1
Table 3.4: Summary non-parametric estimation results
3.4.2 Multivariate results
Is cross-sector dependence between banks and insurers lower than dependence be-
tween two firms within the same sector? Since we have 10 banks and 10 insurers
in our dataset, we have results for 45 possible combinations of banks, 45 possible
combinations of insurers and 100 possible combinations between banks and insurers.
In Table 3.4 the estimation results for the 190 possible combinations are summa-
rized. The results for all 190 combinations are given in the Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11,
in the Appendix. The results of the multivariate estimation in Table 3.4 indicate
that cross-sector dependence between banks and insurers is lower than dependence
between two firms within the same sector. The average probability that two banks
crash, given that one crashes is 10.3%. For insurers this probability is 11.7%, which
is not very different. The probability that an insurer crashes given that a bank
crashes or that a bank crashes, given that an insurer crashes is 7.4%. This is much
lower than the 10.3% in the banking sector. This indicates that in general depen-
dence is lower for cross-sector combinations. We formally test the null-hypothesis
that cross-sector dependence is similar to the dependence within the same sector,
by using the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney signed ranks test. The probability that the
hypothesis is not rejected is 0.004% if we test whether dependence among banks is
similar to dependence between banks and insurers. We conclude that the risk profile
of the two groups is different. Using the same test procedure, we can also find that
the probability that the risk for combinations of insurers is equal to combinations
of insurers and banks is only 0.003%. Thus the dependence between banks and
insurers is also lower than the combinations of insurers.
On the firm level, there are sizable deviations from the average risk within the sector.
Results for specific combinations of firms given in the Tables 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. The
largest conditional probability of a crash of two firms is 37.5% and it involves two
Spanish banks (Table 3.9). Since 37.5% is much higher than the sector average of
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Mean
Bank Insurer
Bank 0.0082 0.0063
Insurer 0.0063 0.0133
E[κ|κ ≥ 1]− 1
Table 3.5: Estimation results (bivariate normal model)
10.3%, it makes considerable difference which firms merge. A possible explanation
for this high probability are the common exposure of the two Spanish banks to risks
in Spain and Latin America.
We have also calculated (3.1), assuming a bivariate normal distribution function for
the returns. The results are given in the Tables 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14. A summary
is given in Table 3.5. The results indicate that the dependence between banks and
insurers is also lower than the dependence among other combinations. This indi-
cates that our main empirical result is robust. However, once again it is clear that
the assumption of a normal distribution function for the returns underestimates the
downside risk. The conditional probability of a second crash for the combination
of HSBC and RBS is 0.083, while estimation based on normality gives 0.0044. Our
measure therefore predicts that the conditional probability of a double crash is ap-
proximately 20 times higher for this combination than the normality based measure.
For the pair Aviva and AEGON, the estimate based on normality gives 0.0134. This
is a factor 8 lower than 0.111. Thus the normal based measure gives a completely
different view on the tail dependence and essentially rules out the possibility of a
joint crash. Estimates taking into account the fat tails are of an entirely different
order and appear to be more in line with the facts, since we do observe joint failures
repeatedly.
To illustrate the dimension of the result of 37.5% conditional crash probability for
the two Spanish banks, one can also calculate the conditional expected number of
failures κ in (3.1) under the assumption of independence
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t)
1− (P (F1 ≤ t) ∗ P (F2 ≤ t))
= 1 +
1
1
0.0038
+ 1
0.0035
− 1
= 1.0018.
The number 1.0018 is considerably smaller than 1.375. It is therefore clear that
there is quite a bit of dependence in the tails. This exercise delivers similar results
for other combinations of firms.
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ROYAL & SUN - AEGON
1.194 1.225 1.257
AEGON - AVIVA
1.097 1.111 1.125
RBS - STD CHARTERED
1.056 1.091 1.100
RBS - LEGAL & GENERAL
1.000 1.000 1.000
BSCH - BBVA
1.357 1.375 1.400
BSCH - LEGAL & GENERAL
1.063 1.063 1.071
Left and right the bounds of the 90% confidence interval are given,
in the central column the point estimator.
Table 3.6: Multivariate results and 90% confidence bands
Table 3.6 reports the confidence bands for a number of the linkage measure estimates.
The bounds of the confidence interval do not deviate considerably from the point
estimator and are of the same order. The Jackknife procedure behind the confidence
bands is given in the Appendix. In the central column one finds the point estimator
of (3.15). In the left and right column one finds the 90% confidence interval. In
the case of the combination of BSCH and Legal and General, the point estimator of
(3.15) hits the lower bound. This is the result of the quite limited sample, of only
12 years of daily data, which is small if one studies bivariate dependence. Another
interesting observation is that the conditional expectation of a combined crash for
the combination of RBS and Legal and General is zero. This stems from the fact
that there are no joint losses of 7.5% or larger for these companies. In this case the
point estimator defaults to the lower bound and the resampling based construction
of the confidence bands collapses.
3.5 Conclusion
The downside risk dependence between insurance and banking risks investigated
in this paper is indicative for the risk of a financial conglomerate. A financial con-
glomerate may provide scope for risk diversification across the banking and insurance
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books. This may lower capital requirements and enhance the efficiency of the finan-
cial services sector. Alternatively, one could also imagine that the downside risk of
a conglomerate is actually larger, due to diseconomies of scope.
To measure the scope for diversification, we first investigated the uses of the normal
distribution. We showed that the normal distribution strongly underestimates the
downside risk, since the return series of financial assets are fat tailed distributed.
Given the focus on downside risk, we therefore allow for fat tails. Both for the uni-
variate risks and the multivariate downside risks this gives a much better description
of the downside risk than the normal approximation.
To understand the possible differences in cross-sector risk, we develop an analytical
model in the theory section, which helps to interpret the tail dependence between
banking and insurance risks. It provides an explanation for the dependence structure
between banking and insurers. Given this structure, the model explains the differ-
ences between the dependence among firms within an industry and the dependence
among firms from different sectors.
In the empirical section we first measure the riskiness of individual banks and in-
surers. This involves estimating the probability of a crash by using daily stock price
data. The estimation results for individual firms provide information on the risk of
individual institutions and allows for a cross-sector comparison of individual firm
risk. The estimation results for individual firms point to the conclusion that banks
are less risky than insurers. If we take into account the low probability of a crash,
both banks and insurers may be considered as safe.
The main research question concerns whether the downside risk in the banking sector
differs from the downside risk in the insurance sector. To this end we examine the
dependence between combinations of firms, both within a sector and across sectors.
We find that risk dependence between a bank and an insurer is significantly different
from the dependence structure between two banks or between two insurers. The
average probability that two banks crash, given that one crashes is 10.3%. For
insurers this probability is 11.7%, which is not very different. The probability that
an insurer crashes given that a bank crashes or that a bank crashes, given that an
insurer crashes is 7.4%. This is much lower than the 10.3% in the banking sector.
This indicates that in general dependence is lower for cross-sector combinations.
The theoretical model gives an explanation for the lower dependence between banks
and insurers. Apparently, there is a different downside risk for the sector specific
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risks for insurance and banking. This relatively low cross-sector dependence implies
a smaller impact of financial conglomerates on systemic risk. It follows that capital
requirements for financial conglomerates could be set below the sum of the capital
requirements for the banking and insurance parts.
The Basle II capital framework does not take into account these diversification
benefits. We recommend to explore the properties of risk diversification by financial
conglomerates in future work on capital requirements (the Basle III agenda). If
lower capital requirements can be justified from a prudential point of view, this may
enhance social welfare.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Data selection
Since it is common for financial companies in Europe to exploit a broad portfolio of
activities in banking and insurance, it is difficult to construct a dataset of companies
pursuing pure banking or insurance strategies. Moreover, some activities as for
example the provision of mortgages, are common for all companies in both banking
and insurance. In this section we will explain when we define a company being a
bank or an insurer.
We distinguish three different categories: banks, insurers (combining property&casualty
and life insurance business) and financial conglomerates. The dataset contains com-
panies from Europe (the EU and Switzerland). First, we have taken the largest
firms by market capitalization in the following sectors from Datastream: banking,
life insurance, insurance and other financial. Since we could not find the Datastream
criteria for sector selection, we made our own classification of these companies based
on their annual accounts over 2002.
To be able to make a distinction between insurers and banks, we collected the
following balance sheet items: ‘customer deposits’, ‘technical provisions’ and ‘life-
insurance risk born by the policy holder’. We suppose that those broad items are
unique for specific sectors. The item ‘customer deposits’ is typical for banks, since
they borrow money from the public. The item ‘technical provisions’ is typical for
insurers, since it represents the size of provisions for future insurance claims. An-
other item typical for life insurance is ‘life-insurance risk born by the policy holder’,
which represents provisions for future claims of life insurance policies. The three
items were added up and we represented the customer deposits as a percentage of
this sum of balance sheet items. When the percentage of deposits is larger than
90% we define a firm as a bank. When the sum of ‘technical provisions’ and ‘life-
insurance risk born by the policy holder’ represented as a percentage of the sum of
all three items is larger than 90%, we define a firm as an insurer.
Furthermore we want to get an indication of the main activity of the insurers. We
made a distinction between property and casualty insurers and life insurers and
collected data on the net premium income of insurers. The net premiums are the
gross premiums written minus reinsurance cover. Since an insurer might choose to
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Bank
HSBC 0.98 0.02
RBS 0.96 0.04
UBS 1.00 0.00
BARCLAYS 0.95 0.05
BSCH 1.00 0.00
BBVA 1.00 0.00
DEUTSCHE BANK 0.98 0.02
ABN AMRO 0.97 0.03 0.78 0.22
UNICREDITO 1.00 0.00
STD CHARTERED 1.00 0.00
Insurer
GENERALI 0.00 1.00 0.65 0.35
AXA 0.00 1.00 0.70 0.30
AEGON 0.03 0.97 0.96 0.04
AVIVA 0.00 1.00 0.75 0.25
PRUDENTIAL 0.06 0.94 0.98 0.02
ZFS 0.00 1.00 0.30 0.70
LEGAL & GENERAL 0.00 1.00 0.94 0.06
ALLEANZA 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00
ROYAL & SUN 0.00 1.00 0.82 0.18
SKANDIA 0.08 0.92 0.99 0.01
Table 3.7: Selected data
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P(Xi<-0.15) P(Xi<-0.15)*260
HSBC 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000040
RBS 0.00000000000113 0.00000000029305
UBS 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
BARCLAYS 0.00000000000030 0.00000000007759
BSCH 0.00000000000041 0.00000000010585
BBVA 0.00000000000002 0.00000000000468
DEUTSCHE BANK 0.00000000000001 0.00000000000167
ABN AMRO 0.00000000000001 0.00000000000277
UNICREDITO 0.00000000004858 0.00000001263127
STD CHARTERED 0.00000000006859 0.00000001783248
ROYAL & SUN 0.00000000503413 0.00000130887418
AEGON 0.00000000003063 0.00000000796488
AVIVA 0.00000000000205 0.00000000053240
PRUDENTIAL 0.00000000000330 0.00000000085795
LEGAL & GENERAL 0.00000000000096 0.00000000024929
ALLEANZA 0.00000000000434 0.00000000112779
SKANDIA 0.00000116611496 0.00030318989027
GENERALI 0.00000000000000 0.00000000000000
AXA 0.00000000004009 0.00000001042234
ZFS 0.00000000008602 0.00000002236395
Table 3.8: Univariate probability assuming normal cdf
buy reinsurance cover for some lines of business, we argue that the net premium
income gives the best information whether an insurer is active in life insurance
or in property and casualty insurance. The life-insurance premium income was
represented as a percentage of the total premium income.
We use data from 1992-2003, since in 1992 Basle I came into effect and because
of data availability. Data is on a daily basis. Firms which are part of a larger
conglomerate, like Winterthur which is a holding of Credit Suisse, are excluded.
Some firms are omitted because the available data series is too short.
3.6.2 Assuming normality
To highlight the limits of the assumption of normality for the return distribution, we
have calculated the risk of a loss of more than 15% on a given day for the different
firms by using the normal distribution. The results can be found in Table 3.8.
These normal based probabilities are way below the corresponding extreme value
distribution based fat tail hypothesis estimates from Table 3.3.
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3.6.3 Univariate estimation
Extreme value theory studies the limit distribution of the maximum or minimum of
a single return series. To study the minimum, we change the sign of the returns. Let
Xi be an independent and identically distributed random variable with cumulative
distribution function F (x). This variable exhibits heavy tails if F (x) far into the
tails has a first order term identical to the Pareto distribution, i.e.
F (x) = 1− x−αL(x) as x→∞,
where L(x) is a slowly varying function such that
Lim
t−→∞
L(tx)
L(t)
= 1, x > 0.
It can be shown that the two previous conditions are equivalent to
Lim
t−→∞
1− F (tx)
1− F (t)
= x−α, α > 0, t > 0.
The coefficient α is known as the tail index and gives the number of bounded mo-
ments of the distribution. When a distribution has finite endpoints or exponentially
decaying tails (like the normal and lognormal distributions), it fails the property of
regular variation and all moments are bounded.
We estimate α with the Hill (1975) estimator:
γ̂ = 1/α̂ =
1
m
m∑
j=0
ln
(
Xj
Xm+1
)
, (3.12)
where the parameter m equals the number of highest order statistics. The number m
has to be selected such that the Pareto approximation of the tail is appropriate. We
select the threshold by the bootstrap method proposed in Danielsson et al. (2001),
which is also based on the Hill estimator. An alternative estimator can be found in
Huisman et al. (2001). In Figure 3.3 the Hill plots for four firms are given. In a Hill
plot one varies the threshold s or alternatively m, and plots γ̂ from (3.12) against
s (or m). In the Hill plots of Figure 3.3, where γ̂ is plotted against m, one sees
considerable variation if one uses only the very top order statistics. Subsequently
using more order statistics one notices some plateaus. Increasing m even further,
the Hill plots all appear to be moving down. This is a result of the bias which kicks
in when one uses too many central order statistics. Using too few order statistics
causes the variance to dominate. Somehow one has to sail between these two vices.
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Figure 3.3: Hill plots for 4 firms
The next question is which threshold s (or m) should be selected? We choose m in
such a way as to minimize the mean square error (mse), following Danielsson et al.
(2001). This involves creating elaborate subsample bootstraps. Mean square error
plots for four firms are given in Figure 3.4. The plots indicate that a minimum is
reached around m = 50. Since similar plots appear for all the series, we fixed m at
50 for all our γ̂ estimates.
The objective of our investigation is to determine the probability that the daily
stock return of a bank or insurer is lower than a prespecified probability level, xvar.
To estimate this probability, we use the inverse quantile estimator from De Haan et
al. (1994),
p̂ =
m
n
(
Xm+1
xvar
)γ̂(m)
. (3.13)
This estimator depends on the inverse tail index γ, the number of higher order
statistics m, the m+1-th order statistic Xm+1, the sample size n and the level xvar.
In our case xvar is chosen at 25%.
For the calculation of the confidence interval of this estimator we use the property
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of convergence of the estimator to normality in large samples. To calculate the 90%
confidence interval for equation (3.13), we use the following from De Haan et al.
(1994),
m1/2
log( xt
xp
)
(
p̂
p
− 1) ∼ N(0, α2). (3.14)
We rewrite this to obtain the lower bound and the upper bound of the 90% confidence
interval for p
p̂
1.65α̂f√
M
+ 1
< p <
p̂
−1.65α̂f√
M
+ 1
where f = log(
xt
xp
).
The 90% confidence intervals for xvar > 0.15 are given in Table 3.3, in the main
text.
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Figure 3.4: MSE 4 firms
3.6.4 Multivariate estimation
In this section we elaborate on the bivariate estimation technique employed in the
paper. We first rewrite the linkage measure, turn it into an estimator and subse-
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Figure 3.5: Conditional expectation, simulated data
quently show how the estimator performs on simulated data en real data.
From elementary probability theory we know that P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t) = 1 −
P (max[X1, X2] > t) and P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t) = P (max[X1, X2] > t) +
P (min[X1, X2] > t). One can therefore rewrite the conditional expectation as follows
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t)
1− P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t)
= 1 +
P (min[X1,X2] > t)
P (max[X1, X2] > t)
.
The estimation of the probability of multiple crashes can thus be reduced to the
estimation of two univariate probabilities. This greatly facilitates the empirical
analysis, since one can proceed on basis of the previously described univariate esti-
mation methods for the minimum and maximum return series. We use the notation
Pmin for P (min[X1, X2] > t) and the corresponding notation for the maximum. If
the tail index α is identical for the minimum (αi) and maximum (αa) series, we
obtain the following non-parametric estimator4
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = 1 +
P̂min
P̂max
. (3.15)
In the following we show that this estimator captures the low dependence of a bi-
variate normal distribution, in comparison to the high dependence in the tails of a
bivariate Student-t distribution. To this end we generate two times 5000 observa-
tions, based on the normal and Student-t distribution, with 3 degrees of freedom.
4Using E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = 1+
Mmin
n
(
XM+1
xp
)α̂
i(m)
Mmax
n
(
XM+1
xp
)α̂
a(m)
= 1+ Mmin
Mmax
, which shows that the estimator reduces
to a simple counting procedure for the minima and maxima.
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We draw q and z from a normal distribution and define a = q + 0.7z. The cor-
relation between a and z is therefore 0.7. This correlation pattern corresponds to
the correlation which is present in Figure 3.1. However, the dependence in the tails
between a and z is non-existent. This is also what the estimator (3.15) indicates,
as can be seen in Figure 3.5a. The threshold t is depicted on the x-axis, the linkage
estimator is on the y-axis. High values for t are on the left side. On sees that the
dependence is low in the tails, i.e. for high values of t, but increases while going
into the center of the distribution, when t decreases.
Next, we generate q and z from a Student-t distribution, with 3 degrees of freedom
and define a = q + 0.7z. The estimation results for the dependence between a and
z can be found in Figure 3.5b. Contrary to the normal distribution, for large values
of t (on the left side of the Figure), there is dependence. This is exactly what one
would expect on basis of the theory.
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Figure 3.6: E[κ|κ ≥ 1] for ABN AMRO Bank and AXA
In Figure 3.6 we show the estimation results for real empirical data. The results
of estimator (3.15) for the combination of ABN AMRO Bank and AXA looks very
similar to the results of the Student-t simulation in Figure 3.5. E[κ|κ ≥ 1] is depicted
at the y-axis. The threshold t is on the x-axis. Large t are on the left, where t is
taken from the sorted, joint set of returns of AXA and ABN AMRO Bank. The
value at the x-axis is the rank of t in this joint sample. On the left side of the graph
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the variance is high, because there are few extremely large returns. The other side
of the graph is relatively stable and there is not much variation. The interesting
feature of this graph is however that for large t, E[κ|κ ≥ 1] is not zero. This is
exactly what is in the generated graph for the bivariate Student-t distribution. The
conditional probability of a simultaneous crash in normal distributed data is zero,
for large t.
The calculation of the confidence interval is based on resampling. We use a Jack-
knife procedure. To this end we divided the data in 20 blocks of 156 observations.
We then apply estimator (3.15) 20 times, each time leaving one block of 156 ob-
servations out of the time series. To obtain the confidence band, the highest and
lowest estimation results were removed, the next highest and lowest provide the 90%
confidence interval. The point estimator is estimated using the full sample.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2.000 1.083 1.083 1.077 1.000 1.000 1.083 1.071 1.000 1.056
2 1.083 2.000 1.125 1.188 1.056 1.050 1.125 1.053 1.059 1.091
3 1.083 1.125 2.000 1.118 1.118 1.167 1.125 1.111 1.059 1.091
4 1.077 1.188 1.118 2.000 1.111 1.100 1.056 1.167 1.118 1.042
5 1.000 1.056 1.118 1.111 2.000 1.375 1.056 1.167 1.267 1.136
6 1.000 1.050 1.167 1.100 1.375 2.000 1.050 1.095 1.235 1.125
7 1.083 1.125 1.125 1.056 1.056 1.050 2.000 1.111 1.000 1.091
8 1.071 1.053 1.111 1.167 1.167 1.095 1.111 2.000 1.111 1.130
9 1.000 1.059 1.059 1.118 1.267 1.235 1.000 1.111 2.000 1.143
10 1.056 1.091 1.091 1.042 1.136 1.125 1.091 1.130 1.143 2.000
Table 3.9: Banks vs Banks, t=0.075, Real data
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 1.037 1.036 1.056 1.053 1.000 1.125 1.019 1.143 1.045 1.030
2 1.100 1.097 1.043 1.087 1.000 1.077 1.055 1.083 1.167 1.147
3 1.100 1.063 1.143 1.087 1.000 1.077 1.074 1.083 1.167 1.083
4 1.097 1.094 1.190 1.130 1.000 1.154 1.113 1.077 1.160 1.111
5 1.063 1.061 1.042 1.040 1.063 1.000 1.035 1.000 1.074 1.081
6 1.091 1.028 1.038 1.037 1.000 1.063 1.034 1.067 1.069 1.050
7 1.138 1.063 1.091 1.087 1.000 1.077 1.074 1.083 1.077 1.083
8 1.167 1.161 1.238 1.227 1.059 1.067 1.071 1.071 1.111 1.108
9 1.065 1.030 1.043 1.042 1.067 1.077 1.036 1.000 1.037 1.054
10 1.083 1.053 1.034 1.069 1.048 1.111 1.016 1.056 1.063 1.071
Table 3.10: Banks vs Insurers, t=0.075, Real data
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 2.000 1.225 1.182 1.143 1.107 1.074 1.106 1.037 1.229 1.125
12 1.225 2.000 1.111 1.242 1.032 1.034 1.138 1.036 1.333 1.196
13 1.182 1.111 2.000 1.192 1.100 1.111 1.143 1.056 1.097 1.154
14 1.143 1.242 1.192 2.000 1.150 1.105 1.140 1.053 1.207 1.122
15 1.107 1.032 1.100 1.150 2.000 1.000 1.018 1.000 1.040 1.057
16 1.074 1.034 1.111 1.105 1.000 2.000 1.038 1.286 1.091 1.061
17 1.106 1.138 1.143 1.140 1.018 1.038 2.000 1.019 1.172 1.179
18 1.037 1.036 1.056 1.053 1.000 1.286 1.019 2.000 1.095 1.030
19 1.229 1.333 1.097 1.207 1.040 1.091 1.172 1.095 2.000 1.195
20 1.125 1.196 1.154 1.122 1.057 1.061 1.179 1.030 1.195 2.000
Table 3.11: Insurers vs Insurers, t=0.075, Real data
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 1.0044 1.0032 1.0074 1.0039 1.0051 1.0036 1.0064 1.0012 1.0096
2 1.0044 2 1.0016 1.0241 1.0061 1.0045 1.0044 1.0069 1.0036 1.0088
3 1.0032 1.0016 2 1.0026 1.0033 1.0054 1.0086 1.0097 1.0010 1.0011
4 1.0074 1.0241 1.0026 2 1.0057 1.0054 1.0045 1.0083 1.0039 1.0105
5 1.0039 1.0061 1.0033 1.0057 2 1.0793 1.0098 1.0181 1.0057 1.0059
6 1.0051 1.0045 1.0054 1.0054 1.0793 2 1.0104 1.0188 1.0046 1.0037
7 1.0036 1.0044 1.0086 1.0045 1.0098 1.0104 2 1.0178 1.0032 1.0033
8 1.0064 1.0069 1.0097 1.0083 1.0181 1.0188 1.0178 2 1.0049 1.0042
9 1.0012 1.0036 1.0010 1.0039 1.0057 1.0046 1.0032 1.0049 2 1.0049
10 1.0096 1.0088 1.0011 1.0105 1.0059 1.0037 1.0033 1.0042 1.0049 2
Table 3.12: Banks vs Banks, t=0.075, Bivariate normal
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1 1.0013 1.0023 1.0032 1.0033 1.0030 1.0014 1.0007 1.0013 1.0026 1.0024
2 1.0075 1.0073 1.0131 1.0100 1.0091 1.0033 1.0024 1.0012 1.0094 1.0093
3 1.0007 1.0025 1.0016 1.0019 1.0014 1.0012 1.0005 1.0024 1.0031 1.0038
4 1.0081 1.0079 1.0140 1.0139 1.0126 1.0032 1.0020 1.0017 1.0105 1.0082
5 1.0044 1.0130 1.0077 1.0072 1.0054 1.0063 1.0038 1.0024 1.0187 1.0126
6 1.0028 1.0100 1.0051 1.0052 1.0040 1.0051 1.0021 1.0046 1.0126 1.0083
7 1.0022 1.0081 1.0040 1.0049 1.0035 1.0036 1.0020 1.0028 1.0092 1.0073
8 1.0034 1.0204 1.0088 1.0087 1.0060 1.0053 1.0027 1.0045 1.0158 1.0105
9 1.0063 1.0081 1.0049 1.0052 1.0034 1.0183 1.0061 1.0036 1.0112 1.0095
10 1.0120 1.0084 1.0090 1.0098 1.0073 1.0034 1.0065 1.0007 1.0114 1.0096
Table 3.13: Banks vs Insurers, t=0.075, Bivariate normal
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
11 2 1.0175 1.0200 1.0175 1.0112 1.0047 1.0158 1.0007 1.0190 1.0249
12 1.0175 2 1.0134 1.0184 1.0095 1.0092 1.0117 1.0022 1.0465 1.0399
13 1.0200 1.0134 2 1.0317 1.0221 1.0050 1.0041 1.0016 1.0147 1.0128
14 1.0175 1.0184 1.0317 2 1.0321 1.0063 1.0048 1.0019 1.0214 1.0131
15 1.0112 1.0095 1.0221 1.0321 2 1.0030 1.0024 1.0012 1.0114 1.0091
16 1.0047 1.0092 1.0050 1.0063 1.0030 2 1.0033 1.0166 1.0119 1.0088
17 1.0158 1.0117 1.0041 1.0048 1.0024 1.0033 2 1.0004 1.0128 1.0146
18 1.0007 1.0022 1.0016 1.0019 1.0012 1.0166 1.0004 2 1.0027 1.0019
19 1.0190 1.0465 1.0147 1.0214 1.0114 1.0119 1.0128 1.0027 2 1.0442
20 1.0249 1.0399 1.0128 1.0131 1.0091 1.0088 1.0146 1.0019 1.0442 2
Table 3.14: Insurers vs Insurers, t=0.075, Bivariate normal
Chapter 4
Insurance Sector Risk
The financial stability of the global insurance sector was a major concern for regu-
lators following the losses of the September 2001 WTC collapse. At the same time,
the investment income arising out of the assets of insurers declined, due to low in-
terest rates and a declining stock market during the recession at the time. In this
chapter the downside risk dependence of multiple insurers is studied. Similarities in
sector wide risk exposure are measured using daily stock price returns of European
insurers and reinsurers.
An explanation for a similar exposure to very large losses is provided, based on the
idea that multiple insurers carry similar risks. Insurance companies can e.g. be
exposed to similar insurance risk on the liability side, due to reinsurance practices
which spread the same risk across companies. This common exposure can also arise
because of an exposure to similar macroeconomic variables, like interest rates or
inflation on the asset side. The effect of risk diversification on downside risk is
modelled and estimated for individual companies and for the sector as a whole.
Risk diversification may reduce the risk of individual insurance companies, but the
risk profiles of multiple insurers becomes more similar due to this diversification.
Hence, systemic risk may increase due to risk sharing. For the design of optimal
regulation, it matters if regulators have to deal with sector wide risk or firm specific
risk. When firms are exposed to the same risks, during a crisis all insurers realize
losses on either their assets or liabilities. The capacity of the insurance sector can
therefore be at risk and may need to be enhanced. Moreover there is an increasing
interest in the effects of a loss of insurance capacity on real economic activity. A
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better understanding of sector wide downside risk can contribute to this impact
assessment.
Since insurers want to limit and diversify their risk exposure they protect themselves
by reinsurance contracts. Reinsurers provide insurers protection against major losses
and the bankruptcy of a reinsurer might expose insurers to unforeseen losses. Rein-
surance can be provided by both reinsurance companies, by other insurers and by
the capital markets. It is the primary responsibility of insurers to have a sound
reinsurance risk management strategy. Regulators are interested in the mutual rela-
tions between insurers and reinsurers. The Financial Stability Forum (2002) e.g. is
concerned about the impact of the collapse of a major reinsurer on insurance com-
panies. The degree of such dependence between insurers and reinsurers is therefore
measured.
The banking sector is also exposed to problems within the insurance sector. Insurers
may sell credit protection to banks, via credit default swaps. In practice the reverse
occurred more frequently and contributed to the woes of the insurance sector dur-
ing the last recession, while the banking sector was more or less unaffected. The
dependence between banks and insurers is investigated in detail in Slijkerman et al.
(2005). Systemic concerns for the banking sector have a higher relevance than for
the insurance sector. Bank failures have a public externality because of the mainte-
nance of the payment system by banks. The specificity of the deposit contract also
creates a (negative) public externality, due to the possibility of a drain of liquidity
due to a bank failure. The stability of the reinsurance sector is nevertheless of a
public concern, since the bankruptcy of a major reinsurer may reduce the capacity of
the insurance sector and therefore have real consequences. However, the literature
on systemic risk in the insurance sector is still in its infancy. Geluk and De Vries
(2005) analyze the asymptotic dependence among reinsurers. This interdependency
not withstanding, the insurance sector is less fragile and does not have the same
importance to the real economy as the banking sector.
The OECD (2004) writes that the insurance sector has an important role to play
in the real economy. For a lot of economic activities insurance is mandatory or
necessary to contain the investment risk. Airlines, for example, have to insure
their airplanes. Construction companies want to insure their property. A possible
shortage of the capacity to provide insurance is therefore a concern of regulators.
In this chapter the impact of insufficient insurance cover on real economic activity
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is not explicitly quantified, but the possibility of sector wide losses in the insurance
sector is analyzed. The consequences of a loss in insurance cover are briefly discussed
in the following.
Before the collapse of HIH Insurance in March 2001, it was the second biggest
insurer in Australia. According to Buchanan et al.(2003), the collapse of HIH made
reinsurance premiums rise globally. Moreover, housing construction in Australia
was affected, since builders where deprived of insurance cover at HIH Insurance and
had to find replacement coverage. (See Vaughan, 2004) Approximately half of the
doctors in Australia lost malpractice insurance and thousands of small businesses
lost liability coverage.
The WTC attack also caused problems with insurance cover for e.g. property dam-
age, aviation liability, business interruption and life liability. This had the strongest
impact on aviation and transport, but also on manufacturing, energy, real estate
and construction. The OECD (2004) reports that according to the Bond Market
Association, 10 per cent of the commercial mortgage-backed securities market has
been suspended or cancelled due to issues of terrorism insurance. These examples
highlight the importance of the insurance sector for the broader economy. Inter-
estingly, the academic research on the prudential regulation of the insurance sector
is still in its infancy. Apart from policy papers and research by risk managers and
actuaries, there is little economic theory on the optimal regulation of this sector. In
this chapter a possible explanation for joint losses of insurance companies is given,
as a start.
In this work the tail dependence between stock returns of insurers and reinsurers is
studied and the extent of sector wide downside risk is investigated. The observation
that the distribution of stock prices for insurers is fat tailed is explicitly taken into
account and the relative importance of market risk is modelled. The model helps to
understand the impact of adverse shocks which negatively affect multiple insurers.
Finally, the breadth of downside risk in the insurance sector and in the reinsurance
sector is measured. If the downside risk of a loss in market value in the two sectors
is the same, this points to similarities in the risks exposure, possibly resulting from
similar assets or similar liabilities holdings across insurance firms.
If sector risk is important, the dependence between companies will be high. Dur-
ing crisis, multiple insurers may realize losses on their assets or liabilities. Losses
in insurance capacity during crises can cause insufficient supply of insurance cover.
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This lack of insurance capacity may have an adverse impact on economic activity.
It is therefore important that new capital can easily enter the insurance sector. Ca-
pacity can, for example, be enhanced by increasing the use of the capital markets
as a source of insurance cover, or through institutional arrangements in which gov-
ernments provide part of the insurance cover, when private insurance cover is not
available.
In the remainder of the paper the EU insurance sector is described. Next, an in-
tuitive explanation for the mutual dependence between insurance companies is pro-
vided and subsequently this dependence is explicitly modelled. Finally, the degree
of dependence between the different sectors is estimated and conclusions are drawn
from the empirical investigation.
4.1 EU insurance
The European insurance market is the second largest in the world, after the US and
accounts for 30% of world premium income. Moreover, the two largest reinsurers
(Swiss Re and Munich Re) are European based. Therefore it is interesting to take
a European perspective. The market share of the largest companies is increasing, as
the result of consolidation. The five largest insurers in EU countries hold on average
close to 50% of life insurance income and close to 40% of non-life insurance income,
according to the CEA (2004). Most insurance companies offer both life and non-
life products. In 1991 collected premiums for life and non-life were balanced, but
nowadays the life insurance sector is relatively larger. Most European companies
are mixed insurers and offer both life and non-life insurance. Some companies like
AEGON, ING, Zurich Financial Services and Prudential have a sizeable US business,
or have a large banking business, like ING and Allianz. This fits in the trend of the
emergence of insurance companies with a global presence and insurers with multiple
business lines, to make use of economies of scale and scope. The insurance sector
is growing due to new products and demand for additional pension products. The
expectation is that the life insurance market in most countries will grow, because
most countries reform their pension systems. Notably the UK and the Netherlands
already have large life insurance markets. It is also likely that there will be more cross
border business in the EU, due to the integration of the financial markets because
of the introduction of the euro and an increasing harmonization of regulation.
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Before September 11 insurance markets were characterized by low prices for rein-
surance and excess capacity. Investment income was driving the results of insurers.
In 2001 the insurance sector was hit on both the asset side, due to falling stock
prices, and the liability side, due to the costs of September 11. According to Swiss
Re (2005) European insurers made larger investments in equity than American in-
surers, but the investments in equity by insurers were lower in 2004 than in 1999.
This indicates that insurers have become less willing to take investment risk on their
balance sheets.
The importance of the capital markets for the provision of insurance is growing. In
some cases it may be difficult for firms to buy insurance cover, since it is hard for
insurers to estimate the expected losses. This may be due to a lack of information
on the number of accidents and the costs which are incurred by the firms, but also to
moral hazard, leading to higher claims than expected. With the help of the capital
markets large firms can self insure their risks with the use of insurance captives.
Firms pay premiums to a separate legal entity, owned by the firm (the captive),
and create a financial buffer for insurance losses. Capital markets or insurers may
provide liquidity if losses occur before the firms made sufficient savings.
Besides the capital market, governments can also help to alleviate the impact of
(natural) catastrophes. In a lot of countries governments recognized the difficulties
to obtain insurance cover for certain types of risks. They have set up public pri-
vate insurance schemes to insure e.g. natural catastrophes and terrorism risk, as is
described by the OECD (2004).
The EU insurance sector is regulated with separate directives for life and non-life
insurance. The most important elements of this regulation are the requirements on
the technical provisions, investment rules, solvency requirements, accounting rules
and criteria for home country control and the provision to provide cross border
business. There is a proposal for new regulation for the EU reinsurance sector. The
Solvency II project aims to modernize insurance regulation, taking into account
actual risks of insurers in the calculation of solvency requirements, similar to the
revamp of the Basle accords for banks. However, insurance sector regulation does
not explicitly take into account the need for sufficient insurance capacity during
crisis times. In the following it is explained why this capacity may be at risk.
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4.2 Risk diversification and financial fragility
In this section an explanation for downside risk dependence between insurers is given.
A reduced form approach is followed to determine this downside risk. Following the
Efficient Market Hypothesis, the stock price of insurers should reflect the value of
companies. Changes in stock prices are therefore the result of changes in value of
assets and liabilities. In a competitive environment it stands to reason that firms
with similar assets and liabilities, make similar profits and show similar returns. At
the level of our study, these returns are random. Therefore, the degree of dependence
one finds between the different returns, depends on the specific nature of the shocks
and the economic structure of the assets and liabilities. A presumption of normality
gives e.g. quite a different result than the presumption that the returns of assets
and liabilities follow a Student-t distribution. But the specific network structure of
the insurance sector is also a contributing factor.
4.2.1 Explaining dependence
The intuition for the existence of dependence among insurers is provided in the
following. The mutual dependence among insurance companies may originate from
a similar exposure to similar assets and to similar liabilities. Swiss Re (2003b) gives
an description of the main assets of insurers. These include the following items:
shares, investments in bonds and investment funds, real estate and technical reserves
held by reinsurers. If companies have similar assets, they will have a similar risk
profile. If insurance companies invest e.g. in the same stocks and bonds or (credit)
derivatives, they are exposed to the same shocks which adversely affect the value
of investments. However, little is known about the exact assets insurers invest in.
This may indicate a lack of transparency in the European insurance sector. Since
insurers started to act as sellers of credit protection, this gained special attention of
supervisors and the issue is studied extensively by the Joint Forum (2005).
Insurers do not only invest in similar assets, but may also participate in similar lia-
bilities, insurance risk in particular. It is possible for insurers to provide reinsurance
and in this way participate (proportionally) in the insurance portfolio of other in-
surers. Another important development is the securitization of insurance risk (IAIS,
2003). Insurers can transfer their insurance portfolio and expected premium income
to a legal entity which manages these liabilities. In this way other investors can par-
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ticipate in the same insurance risks. Catastrophe bonds are an example of insurance
risk which is transferred to the capital market. Another possible source of risk is the
long term interest rate. A particular problem for life insurers is that their profitabil-
ity depends for an important part on the long term interest rate developments. A
decreasing long term interest rates poses problems for the non-hedged liabilities. A
low long term interest rate environment poses problems for new production. When
the level of the short term interest rate is close to the long term interest rate, the
benefits for customers of long term insurance contracts over short term savings are
limited. Since the interest rate risk might be similar for all life insurers, one may
expect that most life insurers are affected by an interest rate move in a similar way.
On the contrary, if it is found that there is a low dependence between insurers, this
indicates that the firms invest in different assets and liabilities.
Other risks which may be similar for insurers are the risk of changes in the legal and
regulatory environment and fraud. New jurisprudence can increase the unexpected
liabilities for insurers and new regulation may increase costs on a sector wide basis.
By modelling the dependence among firms explicitly, new insights are obtained on
the degree of similarities in downside risk. Before the model and the estimation
results are presented, the univariate firm risk is investigated. The distributions of
the stock price returns of individual insurers exhibit fat-tails. This characteristic
is explicitly taken into account when modelling and estimating dependence among
firms.
4.2.2 Heavy tails and dependence
It is a stylized fact that stock returns are heavy tailed, rather than exhibiting an
exponential type tail as under normality. This is e.g. extensively documented by
Jansen and De Vries (1991). Moreover there is considerable evidence that the risk
exposure of non-life insurers is even heavier tailed, see e.g. Embrechts et al. (1997).
First an introduction to the heavy tail characteristics of the univariate return series
is given, because this theory is the basis for our multivariate modelling.
Extreme Value Theory (EVT) studies the limit distribution of the maxima or minima
of return series. These limit distributions are informative about the tail shape of
the underlying distribution. With the help of this limit distribution, one can study
the frequency of extreme losses without imposing a particular distribution a priori
62 4.2. Risk diversification and financial fragility
(like a Student-t or Pareto). Our approach is therefore semi-parametric (as only
the tail area of the distribution is parametrized). For ease of presentation, we work
with positive variables and take the negative of the minima. It is assumed that
Xi is an independent and identically distributed random variable with cumulative
distribution function F (x). This variable exhibits heavy tails if F (x) far into the
tails has a first order term identical to the Pareto distribution, i.e.
F (x) = 1− x−αL(x) as x→∞,
where L(x) is a slowly varying function such that
Lim
t−→∞
L(tx)
L(t)
= 1, x > 0.
It can be shown that the two previous conditions are equivalent to
Lim
t−→∞
1− F (tx)
1− F (t)
= x−α, α > 0, t > 0.
The coefficient α is known as the tail index and gives the number of bounded mo-
ments of the distribution. When a distribution has finite endpoints or exponentially
decaying tails (like the normal and lognormal distributions), it does not fit the
property of regular variation and all moments are bounded. Because of the Pareto
characteristics of the tails of the empirical return distribution, our theoretical model
is based on the Pareto law. Before we model dependence, we will first present the
measure of dependence which we will use.
4.2.3 A measure of dependence
The most frequently used measure of dependence is the correlation measure. How-
ever, regulators are interested in the likelihood of losses and the correlation measure
does not provide information on probabilities, without knowledge of the marginal
distributions. The correlation measure is only an intermediate step in the calcula-
tion of probabilities given a specific multivariate distribution. If two variables e.g.
follow a bivariate normal distribution, their joint behavior can be characterized by
using the correlation measure. One disadvantage of the correlation measure is that
there can be dependence in the data, while the correlation is zero (see Slijkerman
et al., 2005). Forbes and Rigobon (2002) moreover, show that changes in the corre-
lation measure over time are difficult to interpret if the variance of variables is not
constant over time.
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The correlation measure is therefore bypassed and a measure is used which is based
on the probability of multiple shocks to the financial system. Our indicator is a
conditional probability measure. Regulators and risk managers are concerned with
a simultaneous loss at multiple insurers, given the losses at one insurer. More
specifically, suppose a regulator wants to know the probability that F1 > t, given
that F2 > t and the probability that F2 > t given that F1 > t, where F1 and F2
are the stochastic loss returns and t is the common high loss level. Since we are
interested in a crash of an insurer given the crash of another insurer and vice versa,
we will condition on either event. Let κ denote the number of insurers which crash.
We propose to use the failure measure of Xin (1992) as the measure of systemic risk.
In two dimensions it reads
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (F1 > s) + P (F2 > s)
1− P (F1 ≤ s, F2 ≤ s)
. (4.1)
The failure measure is the conditional expectation of the number of insurance com-
panies that crash, given that there is at least one crash. Hartmann et al. (2004)
give a further motivation for this measure. Note that
E[κ|κ ≥ 1]− 1 =
P (F1 > t, F2 > t)
1− P (F1 ≤ s, F2 ≤ s)
(4.2)
is the conditional probability that both firms fail, given that there is a failure of at
least one of the firms. We will use either interpretation, depending on the context.
Unless one is willing to make further assumptions, as in the options based distance
to default literature, it is impossible to pin down the exact level at which a firm
fails, or at which supervisors consider the institution financially unsound. For this
reason we do take limits and consider
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1].
Extreme value theory shows that even though the measure is evaluated in the limit,
it nevertheless provides a useful benchmark for the dependency at high but finite
levels of t. We also like to note that the measure can be easily adapted in case
failure levels at the companies are different. In that case the measure is evaluated
along a non 45o line.
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By making different assumptions regarding the distribution of the returns of the
firms, we can study how the conditional failure probability (4.1) changes as a re-
sult of an increasing exposure of firms to common risks. We present a model of
tail dependence, assuming that the returns of insurers follow a heavy tailed mul-
tivariate distribution. If the returns follow a process with innovations which have
a distribution with exponentially declining tails, large shocks occur with very low
frequency and a large loss of multiple insurers is highly unlikely. However, if the
stochastic process of losses is fat tailed, large losses may occur more often and may
be difficult to diversify away. De Vries (2005) provides a detailed analysis of the
differences between exponentially distributed returns and returns which follow a fat
tailed distribution.
We already provided potential explanations for simultaneous losses at insurance
companies. Because of a similar exposure to some risks, we suppose that all insur-
ers carry sector risk. We do not model the individual sources of this risk explicitly,
but investigate a reduced form model, which is basic to many models in finance.
The returns of individual firms are partly driven by the stochastic variable A, which
captures sector risks, both on the asset side as well as on the liability side. Different
factors contribute to this sector risk. The variable A is the sum of possible com-
mon shocks, such as changes in interest rates and the exchange rate and common
insurance risk exposures.
The returns by firms are also driven by a firm specific factor Ii, which is not related
to the sector risk. Our model is therefore related to the factor model of Ross (1976).
We assume total firm risk to be the sum of industry specific risk, A and firm specific
risk, Ii. Firm specific risk arises out of losses on assets and liabilities for firm i,
which are not incurred by other firms in the industry. For now, it is assumed that
the downside risk of the common stochastic variable A and firm specific variable Ii
are independently Pareto distributed with unitary scale
P (A > t) = P (Ii > t) = t
−α, t ǫ [1,∞), (4.3)
where t is the loss quantile of interest. A high realization of a variable should be
interpreted as a large loss, so we can focus on positive random variables for the
study of our downside risk. In the following we first investigate how the dependence
between two firms changes if we change the relative importance of the common
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componentA. We thus analyze the effect of an increase in the importance of common
factors. Secondly, a model with multiple firms is analyzed.
4.3.1 Downside risk and dependence
We start by calculating the downside risk of an individual insurer, which is needed
in the numerator of our risk measure (4.1). The returns of the insurance companies
follow the sum of the common factor A and the idiosyncratic factor Ii in the following
way
F1 = A+ I1 and F2 = A+ I2. (4.4)
The probability of a large loss for a combination of risk factors when these exhibit
a power like distribution, is given by Feller’s convolution theorem (1971, VIII.8).
This theorem holds that if two independent random variables A and Ii satisfy (4.3),
then for large t the convolution has probability
P (A+ Ii > t) = 2t
−αL(t),
and where L(t) is slowly varying (i.e. lim
t−→∞
L(at)/L(t) = 1, for any a > 0). The
theorem implies that for large failure levels t, the convolution of A and Ii can be
approximated by the sum of the univariate distributions of A and Ii. All that counts
for the probability of the sum is the (univariate) probability mass which is located
along the two axes from the points onward where the line A+ Ii = t cuts the axes.
The probability that the convolution of A and Ii is larger than t, for large t, is
therefore
P (A+ Ii > t) = 2t
−α + o(t−α). (4.5)
If the returns of a firm follow (4.5), the numerator in (4.1) is therefore approximately
equal to 4t−α.
To obtain the denominator of (4.1), we have to determine the probability that the
firms do not all have a return smaller than t. The probability that all firms have a
return smaller than t is denoted by P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t). If we examine the complement
1−P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t), this gives the probability that at least one firm realizes a return
exceeding t. Since the returns of firms follow the specification in (4.4), common or
idiosyncratic shocks can cause the returns of one of the firms or both firms to be
large. Following the convolution theorem, we can approximate the probability of
a large loss by the sum of the probabilities of a common shock or an idiosyncratic
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shock. Since we have two firms, we can take the sum of the probability that A > t,
the probability that I1 > t and the probability that I2 > t (t being large). For
two firms which follow the specification in (4.4) this sum of probabilities is equal to
3t−α + o(t−α), or
lim
t−→∞
1− P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t)
3t−α
= 1.
We can now make our measure of systemic risk (4.1) operational. The conditional
expectation of a crash of two firms, given that one firm crashes, follows once we
substitute the theoretical probabilities in the failure measure (4.1). For large t,
E[κ|κ ≥ 1]
lim t→∞
= lim
t−→∞
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t)
1− P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t)
=
2t−α + 2t−α
3t−α
=
4
3
. (4.6)
As a point of reference, note that the value of the failure measure ranges between 1
and 2. The measure equals 1 under complete independence while it equals 2 in case
of complete dependence. The measure therefore gives the expected number of firms
that crash, conditional on at least one crash. In a bivariate setting we can derive the
probability of two crashes, given one crash, by subtracting 1 of the failure measure.
Note that one firm crashes for sure, since we condition on this.
The result 4/3 indicates that given a loss of one of the two firms, the expected
probability of two crashes is 33% (= 4/3 − 1). In this example either one or two
firms crash, but if one firm crashes, on average 1 out of 3 times both firms crash.
We provide some other stylized examples in the Appendix and show that dependence
increases if an extra common risk component is added. We also calculate dependence
in a stylized example with three firms to understand the dependence among multiple
firms. In a setting with more than two firms (n > 2) the failure measure can range
from 1 to n. However, we show in the following that it is highly unlikely that
the failure measure will be equal to n. First, we calculate that the assumption of
normally distributed risk factors gives different results.
4.3.2 Dependence and normality
In the previous section we investigated the tail dependence in case the common and
idiosyncratic risk factors are fat tailed distributed. Under this assumption we find a
higher dependence than under the assumption of normally distributed risk factors.
In a bivariate normal setting, there is no dependence between extreme losses of two
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insurers, even if the returns of the two companies are correlated. This is interesting,
since the assumption of normality is frequently made. If A and Ii in (4.4) follow
independent standard normal distributions the failure measure will converge to 1,
for large t
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = lim
t−→∞
P (Fi > t) + P (Fj > t)
1− P (Fi ≤ t, Fj ≤ t)
= 1.
The proof is similar to proposition 2 in De Vries (2005). A high correlation between
two return series is therefore not equivalent to high tail dependence. Note that
the correlation coefficient is often not an useful statistic for financial data. The
correlation measure is used as an intermediate step in the calculation of a bivariate
conditional probability. If two random variables follow a normal distribution it
is sufficient to know the mean, variance and correlation coefficient to characterize
their joint behavior. However, the measure is not appropriate to describe the joint
behavior of two fat-tailed distributed variables.
4.3.3 Downside risk and the market model
So far we have relied on specific examples to show the extent of downside risks among
multiple firms, depending on the number of firms and the number of market shocks.
We now present a more general form of firm returns in which we let the number of
firms approach infinity. Similar to the market model of Sharpe (1964), where the
risk of a firm is determined by market risk and idiosyncratic risk, a factor model is
specified. The common risk factor A is premultiplied by a constant β, which denotes
the relation between the returns of a firm and market risk. Downside risk of a firm
is driven by the common risk factor and idiosyncratic risk in the following way
Fj = βjA+ Ij , (4.7)
where β determines the relative impact of sector risk on the risk of a firm. If β is
low or close to zero, this indicates that the risk of a firm is not driven by sector risk
but by idiosyncratic risk factors. A high β, indicates that the risk of firms is to a
large extend driven by the common factor.
We examine the probability that a firm faces a shock arising out of common risk
factors. If the probability of a market shock follows a unit Pareto distribution i.e.
P (A > t) = t−α, where t ǫ [1,∞), the probability that an individual firm is hit by
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a shock, for large t, is equivalent to
Pr(βjA > t) = Pr(A >
t
βj
) = βαj t
−α.
We assume that the probability of an idiosyncratic shock Ij follows a Pareto distri-
bution scaled with a factor ij ,
P (Ij > t) = ijt
−α
Since the risk of a large loss for a single firm is the sum of the risk of a market shock
and the firm specific shock, following Feller’s convolution theorem, this is equal to
Pr(Fj > t) = (ij + β
α
j )t
−α.
This is still pretty much like (4.5), except that we now have risk factors with non
unitary scales. We extend the analysis to n firms, where the returns of each firm is
driven by market risk and idiosyncratic risk. In this way the limit behavior of the
failure measure can be studied for a large number of firms. We present a general
form of the failure measure for multiple firms
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = lim
t−→∞
(P (F1 > t) + ...+ P (Fn > t))
1− P (F1 ≤ t, ...., Fn ≤ t)
. (4.8)
First, we evaluate (4.8) assuming a stylized form of the firm returns. We assume
β1 = β2 = ... = βn = 1 and i1 = i2 = ... = in = 1. In this case, the failure measure
converges to two, for a large number of firms and for large shocks.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose the returns of the firms follow Fj = βjA + Ij, where
P (βjA > t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α, t ǫ [1,∞). If βj = 1 ∀ j, ij = 1 ∀ j, then, for t
large, the failure measure (4.8) converges to 2, as n increases.
Proof. To derive the numerator of the failure measure, the individual firm risk can
be premultiplied by the number of firms. The denominator can be decomposed as
the sum of the different factors which determine the returns of the firms, according
to Feller (1971). Examine 1 − P (F1 ≤ t, ..., Fn ≤ t), which is the probability that
at least one firm realizes a return larger than t. The factors which can cause a
loss at a firm are the idiosyncratic risk factors and the common risk factor. The
probability on at least one firm with a large loss can be approximated by the sum of
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the probabilities of a large idiosyncratic shock (which gives the probability that at
least one firm experiences such a shock), and the market shock. An individual firm
faces a large market shock with probability βαj t
−α and a large idiosyncratic shock
with probability ijt
−α. The probability of the market shock inducing one of the
firms to fail is equal to (max[β1, ..., βn])
α)t−α, since the market risk of the firm with
the highest β has the most effect on violation of Fi ≤ t, i = 1, .., n. The probability
that one of the firms is affected by an idiosyncratic shock is equal to (i1+ ...+in)t
−α.
The denominator of (4.1) thus reads
1− P (F1 ≤ t, ...., Fn ≤ t) = ((i1 + ...+ in) + (max[β1, ..., βn])
α)t−α.
If we substitute these probabilities in the failure measure (4.1) we find that for large
t
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
(i1 + ...+ in) + (β
α
1 + ...+ β
α
j )
(i1 + ...+ in) + max[β
α
1 , ..., β
α
n]
. (4.9)
Now use the assumption that βj = 1 ∀ j and ij = 1 ∀ j and let the number of firms
become unbounded to conclude the proof
E[κ|κ ≥ t]
lim t→∞
= 1 +
βα1 + ...+ β
α
n −max[β
α
1 , ..., β
α
n]
(i1 + ...+ in) + max[β
α
1 , ..., β
α
n]
= 1 +
n− 1
n+ 1
≈ 2, for n large. (4.10)
We have thus proved that if one firm realizes a large loss, at most the loss of one
other firm is expected, even though the number of firms is large. The failure measure
will only be equal to the number of firms in the absence of idiosyncratic risk. If βj
∀ j is equal to 1 and there is no idiosyncratic risk, i.e. ij = 0 ∀ j, the measure
equals n. If the parameter ij denoting the idiosyncratic risk of the firms is equal
to a 1 for all firms and there is no market risk, i.e. βj = 0, the measure converges
to 1. A value of 1 for the failure measure indicates that the returns of the insurers
are asymptotically independent. In these last, stylized examples there is either no
dependence or full dependence.
The focus of this paper is the degree of sector risk in the insurance sector. The de-
pendence is determined by the relative impact of common and idiosyncratic shocks.
The previous assumption of βj and ij being equal to 1 is very stylized. We therefore
rewrite (4.9) for the average of the betas raised to the power α,
_
βα = 1
n
∑n
j=1 β
α
j and
average idiosyncratic risk,
_
i = 1
n
∑n
j=1 ij. In the following proposition we investigate
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the degree of dependence after rewriting (4.9) for average market risk and average
idiosyncratic risk.
Proposition 4.2 Suppose the returns of the firms follow Fj = βjA + Ij, where
P (βjA > t) = β
α
j t
−α, P (Ij > t) = ijt−α, t ǫ [1,∞), then, for t large, the failure
measure (4.8) converges to 1 +
_
βα
_
i
as n increases, where
_
βα = 1
n
∑n
j=1 β
α
j and
_
i =
1
n
∑n
j=1 ij (assuming the βj and ij are bounded).
Proof. Rewrite the failure measure (4.9) for the average common factor, βj, and
average idiosyncratic risk factor,
_
i . For a large number of firms and for large shocks
this reads
lim
n−→∞
(
E[κ|κ ≥ t]
lim t→∞
)
= lim
n−→∞
_
i +
_
βα
_
i +max[βα1 , ..., β
α
n]/n
= 1 +
_
βα
_
i
. (4.11)
The ratio of
_
βα/
_
i gives the relative importance of market risk and idiosyncratic
risk for the occurrence of multiple large losses. If the average idiosyncratic risk is
relatively small, the dependence among firms will be high. If the average beta is
small, the failure measure will converge to a 1, which implies asymptotic indepen-
dence. If the failure measure returns a 1, the returns of the firms are asymptotically
independent. A value for the failure measure around 2 (when estimated for a large
number of firms) implies that a firm is exposed to idiosyncratic shocks and common
shock with roughly the same order, i.e. for large n and t, E[κ|κ ≥ t] = 1+
_
βα/
_
i ≈ 2
and therefore
_
βα =
_
i , following (4.11). If the returns of the firms are highly depen-
dent, the failure measure is larger than 2. This corresponds with a large
_
βα and a
comparatively small
_
i in (4.11). A value between 1 and 2 implies that idiosyncratic
shocks are more frequent than common shocks. A value larger than 2 implies that
common shocks are more frequent.
We show in the following section that the measure provides information on the
relative importance of common risk factors and idiosyncratic risk factors for the
riskiness of the sector.
4.3.4 Model interpretation
Regulators of the insurance sector are concerned with the stability of the financial
sector. They are therefore interested in the degree of dependence among insurers.
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If insurers carry the same risks, it is likely that multiple insurers are affected by
large losses and that losses in their market value are dependent. We discuss how
the model relates to high or low dependence between the losses of the insurers.
If insurers hold different assets and liabilities, the dependence among insurers will
be low, since it is unlikely that multiple firms are hit by a loss on shared liabilities
or assets. In this case idiosyncratic risk is the most important source of risk. If the
idiosyncratic risk dominates over market risk, the failure measure will be between 1
and 2.
Vice versa, if most of the assets and liabilities of insurers are the same, the depen-
dence among insurers is high. The exposure to market risk is high and the common
risk factor is the most important source of risk. The failure measure will therefore
be larger than 2, as was shown in (4.11). A high dependence may be the result
of risk diversification. Because of risk diversification, insurers are exposed to the
same risks. Implicitly, the failure measure gives information on similarities in the
risk exposure between insurers. This is interesting, since the risk exposure can be
regulated to reduce the industry wide dependence.
If the estimation of the dependence indicates that the failure measure (4.8) is smaller
than two, this implies that idiosyncratic risk is the most important source of risk.
If the failure measure estimates indicate that dependence is high, i.e. larger than
two, market risk is the dominant risk factor. This framework can therefore help to
understand the impact of market risk on the downside risk of multiple insurers. An
improved understanding of the impact of market risk can help to design appropriate
regulatory policy, as is argued in the following.
When risk in the insurance industry is largely driven by common risk factors, regula-
tors may deem the dependence among insurers as being too high. They can reduce
the dependence by reducing the common exposures of insurers. The benefit of a
lower dependence is that, more often, losses will be isolated to single firms. The
probability of multiple simultaneous losses of insurers is therefore reduced. Losses
will be contained to single insurers, since the insurers have a different risk profile.
If an individual insurer goes bankrupt, other insurers may remain solvent. They
can take over the clients of the bankrupt insurer, reducing the economic impact
of a bankruptcy. However, a disadvantage of reducing the common exposure is a
reduction of risk diversification possibilities for insurers. If regulators want insurers
to be exposed to different risks, insurers are constraint in the investment and insur-
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ance risks they take. The probability that an individual firm faces a large loss can
therefore be increased by this policy, since the exposure to specific risk factors may
be higher. When the exposure to common factors is reduced, risks are less often
shared by multiple insurers, with the benefit of a reduced industry wide risk.
If there is a high sector risk, the capacity of the insurance sector during crises can be
a concern. As mentioned before, the insurance industry had a shortage of capacity
following the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in 2001. Following such events,
the capacity of the insurance sector has to be augmented. There are two sources
of insurance cover outside the commercial insurance sector: the capital market and
public insurance pools.
A straightforward way to increase the capacity of the insurance sector is to make
an extensive use of the capital market. An important element of insurance products
is the provision of liquidity. When the insured suffers losses, capital is needed to
repair the damage. This liquidity can be provided by capital markets via innovative
products. The idea behind these products is that investors provide liquidity in
exchange for a predetermined number of payments from the insured to investors.
The insured can use this liquidity in case of predescribed events. The reinsurance
industry has a broad range of solutions to transform insurance risk to investment
products. The capital markets can e.g. be used by firms which have difficulties
finding insurance cover. These firms can create a separate insurance entity to which
they pay premiums. The capital markets provide liquidity in the case of an event,
for which they receive a return, paid for by the premiums. In this way firms reduce
their dependence on external insurance companies. See Swiss Re (2003a) for a more
extensive discussion on risk transfers. If there is a high degree of sector risk, i.e.
the failure measure is larger than two, regulators may encourage firms to exploit
the capital markets for their insurance needs. By being less dependent on insurance
companies, firms are less exposed to fluctuations in the premiums they pay, which
can be the result of the changing capacity of the insurance industry.
Following the 9/11 disaster insurers and other investors realized huge losses on their
investments. Insurers where at the time not able to raise sufficient funds to restore
the capacity of the insurance sector immediately. Moreover, insurers had difficulties
to estimate the future impact of terrorism. Since the exclusion of terrorism risk from
insurance policies was not desirable, the insurance industry in The Netherlands
asked the government to join an initiative for a terrorism insurance pool, which
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would provide insurance cover against terrorism risk of up to 1 billion euros. The
advantage of such a pool is that it gives certainty on the level of insurance to residents
and firms. An advantage for the government is that it receives insurance fees and
that the maximum loss for the government is clear up-front. This way the impact
on the government budget of disasters is limited. See Schilperoort (2002/2003) for
a more extensive discussion.
If the common exposure of insurers is low, the sector wide dependence among insur-
ers is relatively low. A low dependence corresponds to a relatively high idiosyncratic
risk of insurers. A high idiosyncratic risk for insurers can be a reason to study the
prudential regulation at the firm level. Regulators may e.g. want to reduce the
risk of individual insurers, by encouraging them to diversify their exposure, or by
demanding a higher solvency at the firm level.
4.4 Measuring dependence
For our estimation approach we follow the approach of Hartmann et al. (forthcom-
ing). The empirical return series for each firm i are denoted with Xi,t, where the
subscript t denotes the tth element of the sample of returns. We take the negative
of the empirical observations. Let Qi,t represent the t-th ascending order statistic
of Xi,t, with t = 1, ..., T , such that Xi,1 > ... > Xi,T and p = t/T , where p is the
probability corresponding to the empirical loss quantile Qi,t. We are interested in
the losses occurring with a small probability. This probability p corresponds to a
high threshold Qi,var (the Value at Risk or stress test level) for each firm i, above
which losses occur with the probability p. We derive the extreme loss quantile Qi,var
corresponding to the probability p using the empirical distribution of the returns
Xi,t. Since the empirical distribution is firm specific, the stress test level Qi,var
corresponding to the probability p differs for each firm
p = P {X1,t > Q1,var} = ... = P {Xi,t > Qi,var} = ... = P {Xn,t > Qn,var} . (4.12)
We are interested in the expected number of firms that crash, conditional on the
crash of at least one firm,
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
np
1− P (X1 ≤ Q1,var, ...,Xn ≤ Qn,var)
. (4.13)
If n = 2 this measure reduces to the bivariate measure in (4.1). The measure
gives us the expected number of institutions that crash (κ) given that at least one
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institution crashes, i.e., has a return exceeding Qi,var, where Qi,var is the quantile
from the empirical distribution corresponding to the probability p in (4.12). In the
denominator of (4.13) we therefore have different thresholds {Q1,var, ..., Qn,var}. For
estimation purposes it is convenient if we premultiply the empirical returns with
Q1,var/Qi,var,
p = P {Xi > Qi,var} = P
{
Q1,var
Qi,var
Xi >
Q1,var
Qi,var
Qi
}
= P {Q1i,varXi > Q1,var} , (4.14)
where Q1i,var = (Q1,var/Qi,var). This way we can rewrite the denominator of (4.13)
as
1− P (Q1i,varX1 ≤ Q1,var, ..., Q1n,varXn ≤ Q1,var).
This is equivalent to
P (max[Q1i,varX1, ..., Q1i,varXn] > Q1,var).
This probability corresponds to the quantile Q1,var of the empirical distribution
function of the maxima, which is equivalent to max[Q1i,varX1, ..., Q1n,varXn]. Since
we evaluate the limit behavior of (4.13), we take Q1,var close to the boundary of
the sample and use the 10th largest order statistic of the return series Xi. As a
result, the probability in (4.12) corresponds to 10 divided by the sample size, N . In
the Appendix we indicate the robustness of the procedure, using a higher or lower
number of order statistics.
We consider the dependence among pairs of firms and the dependence among blocks
of 4 and 8 firms, i.e. n = 2, 4 and 8. In the bivariate setting we apply a different
estimation approach. The probability that two firms realize a large loss on a given
day is estimated. For the bivariate estimates, the variables are not scaled according
to 4.14. The advantage of this approach is that the estimates are straightforward to
interpret, since the estimates return the probability that the second firm of a pair
realizes a large loss. We deem a daily loss larger than 7.5% as being a large loss.
In the bivariate setting, the failure measure returns the probability that two firms
realize a loss larger than 7.5%, given that one firm realizes a loss of 7.5%. For the
multivariate estimates we have to scale the variables as in (4.14) to be able to take
the maximum in the denominator. See the Appendix for estimation details for the
bivariate estimation.
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4.5 Empirical results
In this section the dependence among insurance firms is measured. We estimate
dependence between firms within the insurance sector and within the reinsurance
sector. As a benchmark, we estimate dependence between large oil companies and
the dependence between firms from entirely different sectors. The motivation for
these benchmarks is given in the following. We present the estimated dependence
among pairs of firms and the dependence among multiple firms.
4.5.1 Empirical benchmark
A benchmark is needed to interpret the estimated degree of dependence between
insurers. We need a benchmark for dependence among firms in a sector with a
high degree of dependence and a benchmark for the dependence among firms which
are unrelated. The value of oil firms depends heavily on the price of oil. We
therefore expect to find a high degree of dependence among oil firms. This sector is
therefore the benchmark for a sector with high dependence. If dependence within
the insurance sector is of the same magnitude, it is plausible that the returns of
insurers are driven by a common factor, which is comparable to the price of oil in
the oil sector.
We also estimate the dependence among firms from different sectors. This gives the
value for the failure measure in case the returns of the firms are not driven by sector
risks. This way we can compare the estimation results for the insurance sector with
estimation results for a sector with high dependence and with results for firms from
different sectors. The firms used for the estimation of the dependence across the
different sectors are given in Table 4.5 in the Appendix.
4.5.2 Independence
Suppose that the marginal returns of two insurers are independently distributed and
rewrite the failure measure (4.1) under this assumption. Under the assumption of
independently distributed returns for the firms, the denominator of the failure mea-
sure is equal to 1− (P (F1 ≤ t) ∗ P (F2 ≤ t)). The failure measure for independently
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distributed returns then reads
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t)
1− (P (F1 ≤ t) ∗ P (F2 ≤ t))
. (4.15)
By estimating the univariate probabilities P (Fi > t), and calculating (4.15) as if
the returns are unrelated, we obtain yet another benchmark to judge the amount of
dependency. Note that
lim
t−→∞
=
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t)
1− (P (F1 ≤ t)P (F2 ≤ t))
= 1,
but at finite loss levels this measure is larger than 1 since 2(1−p)
1−p2 =
2(1−p)
(1−p)(1+p) =
2
1+p
>
1, where p = P (F1 ≤ t).
The univariate probability of an extreme loss in (4.12) can be derived from the
empirical distribution function. This probability is substitute for in the failure
measure
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t)
1− (P (F1 ≤ t) ∗ P (F2 ≤ t))
=
20/2739
1− ((2729/2739)2)
= 1.0018.
If the marginal returns of two insurers are independently distributed, the conditional
probability of a simultaneous crash is close to 0 (1.0018 − 1). Hence the 0.0018
probability provides a lower bound benchmark.
4.5.3 Data
The dataset starts in January 1995 and ends in June 2005, because of data avail-
ability. The sample size N of daily data is equal to 2739. In the EU there are 4
reinsurers with stock price data available for the full sample. The selected 8 insurers,
independent firms and oil firms are given in Table 4.5. For the estimation of the
dependence among 4 firms, only the first 4 firms in Table 4.5 are used.
4.5.4 Dependence among pairs of firms
The failure measure in a bivariate setting provides the conditional probability of a
crash of two firms. We estimate the bivariate conditional probabilities of all possible
combinations of insurers, all combinations of reinsurers and combinations of insurers
and reinsurers. In Table 4.1 we report the averages of the estimates, the pair wise
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Insurers Reinsurers
Insurers 0.18 0.13
Reinsurers 0.13 0.12
Table 4.1: Average bivariate dependence (no scaling)
estimates can be found in Table 4.6 in the Appendix. From Table 4.1 we see that the
average probability that two insurers realize an extreme loss, given the extreme loss
of one of the two insurers is on average 18%. The probability that two reinsurers
realize a large loss, given the large loss of one of the two reinsurers is equal to
12%. The dependence among insurers is thus higher than the dependence among
reinsurers. The dependence among insurers and reinsurers is 13% and lower than
the dependence among insurers. All values are much larger than the benchmark
lower bound of 0.0018, indicating that there is considerable asymptotic dependence.
Since the value for the insurance companies is much larger, we therefore conclude
that the systemic risk in the insurance sector differs from the systemic risk in the
reinsurance sector.
Even though both sectors deal with insurance, the interdependencies are higher in
the insurance sector. This is somewhat surprising, given that the reinsurers take on
risk from the different insurers. These risks are concentrated at reinsurance com-
panies. Apparently, the connectedness stems from other sources of risk, such as
investment risk, which may be more similar among insurers. Since most insurers
invest in cash and equities, large movements in interest rates or equity prices should
have an impact on the investment portfolio of insurance companies. An alterna-
tive explanation may be that the idiosyncratic risk of reinsurers is higher than the
idiosyncratic risk of insurers. It is likely that the insurance liabilities of the four
reinsurers is different. Losses caused by e.g. a natural catastrophe will therefore
have a different impact on the reinsurance companies. If the stock price of a rein-
surer reacts to this large insurance loss, the stock price decline is unrelated to the
stock price movement of other reinsurers.
Apart from the average dependence within the different sectors, the average depen-
dence for an individual company is given below. For individual firms, the conditional
probability of a loss, given the loss of another firm, differs considerably from the
sector averages. Since there are 8 insurers and 4 reinsurers in the dataset, we can es-
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Firm mean prob. Firm mean prob.
ALLIANZ 0.17 MUNICH RE 0.16
ING 0.23 SWISS RE 0.13
GENERALI 0.08 HANNOVER RE 0.13
AXA 0.18 SCOR 0.10
AEGON 0.17
AVIVA 0.14
PRUDENTIAL 0.16
ZFS 0.14
Table 4.2: Bivariate dependence (no scaling)
Insurers Insurance/Reinsurance Firms
1.905 1.739 1.290
1 ≤ E[κ|κ ≥ 1] ≤ 8
Jan. 1995 - June 2005
Table 4.3: Dependence among 8 companies
timate the bivariate conditional failure probability for each firm in combination with
11 other firms. This bivariate dependence is estimated and the average probability
of a loss for a firm is reported in Table 4.2.
The interpretation of the bivariate probabilities is the probability that one of the
two firms crash, given that the other crashes. If e.g. an insurer or reinsurer realizes
a large loss, the probability that ING also realizes a loss is on average 23%, which
is the highest probability in the table. If an insurer or reinsurer realizes a large loss,
the probability that Generali also realizes a loss is low, on average 8%. A possible
explanation for this result is that ING has more risk factors in common with other
insurers than Generali. These common risk factors can be related to e.g. country
risk and the riskiness of individual business lines.
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4.5.5 Dependence among multiple firms
Our main research question concerns the sector wide dependence between insurance
and reinsurance companies. We therefore do not only estimate the downside risk
dependence among pairs of firms, but also among multiple firms. First, we estimate
the dependence among eight firms. However, there are only four reinsurers and four
oil firms in the dataset. Secondly, we therefore estimate the dependence among four
firms to obtain the dependence among reinsurers and oil firms.
Dependence among eight firms
Recall that the failure measure returns the expected number of firms that crash,
given the crash of one firm and is not smaller than 1. If there are eight firms, the
failure measure can be at most equal to eight. The failure measure is estimated
among 8 insurers and 8 firms from different sectors. Moreover, we are interested in
the dependence between reinsurers. Since we have only 4 reinsurers, we estimate
the dependence measure among a set of 4 reinsurers and 4 insurers, together a set
of 8 firms. The results are presented in Table 4.3.
The dependence among the eight insurance firms is higher (1.905) than the depen-
dence among the 8 firms from the different sectors (1.290). Dependence among the
set of 4 insurers and 4 reinsurers (1.739) is thus lower than the dependence among
insurers. This result supports the findings from the bivariate estimates. However,
we can now interpret these results with the theoretical model which we developed
in the previous section.
We use Proposition 2 to interpret the estimation results and argue that the impact
of market shocks is of the same magnitude as the impact of idiosyncratic shocks. An
estimate of 1.905 implies that the ratio of
_
βα/
_
i is close to but smaller than 1. The
estimate of 1.739 implies that the ratio of
_
βα/
_
i is smaller than 1. This indicates
that the impact of idiosyncratic risk in the reinsurance sector is larger than in the
insurance sector.
The explanation for the larger impact of idiosyncratic risk in the reinsurance sector
is that the risk exposure of reinsurers is more heterogenous than the risk exposure
of insurers. Dependence can arise out of the same investments or out of the same
insurance risks. Possibly the insurance risks of reinsurers differ to a larger extent
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Insurers Reinsurers Oil Firms
1.481 1.333 1.538 1.053
1 ≤ E[κ|κ ≥ 1] ≤ 4
Jan. 1995 - June 2005
Table 4.4: Dependence among 4 companies
than the insurance risks in the insurance sector. Since we do not have information
on the insurance portfolio of the companies, it is difficult to validate this expla-
nation. Another possible explanation is that the investment risks in the insurance
sector are more alike than in the reinsurance sector. This may originate from the
interest rate risk of life insurance policies, which is a relatively large risk for direct
insurance companies. Another possibility is that the equity investments made by
(life) insurance companies may be larger than the equity investments made by rein-
surers. Losses on the stock market may therefore have a larger impact on insurers.
If regulators deem the sector risk as high, these possible explanations offer a starting
point for regulators to reduce the dependence among firms, by reducing the common
risk exposures.
Dependence among firms from different sectors is lower than the dependence in the
insurance sector, since the estimated dependence among eight firms is only 1.290.
The idiosyncratic risk is the most important risk factor for the firms from different
sectors and is a factor 3.45 times bigger (
_
βα = 3.45
_
i , since
_
βα/
_
i = 0.29). The
common factors
_
βα are clearly of importance for the risks in the insurance sector.
Dependence among four firms
We also estimate the dependence among four firms. The estimates are given in
Table 4.4. The failure measure estimate for four insurers is 1.481. The estimate
of the dependence among four firms from different sectors is 1.053. It is clear that
dependence in the tails is much smaller for firms from different sectors than among
insurance companies. An extreme negative return of one of the firms from unrelated
sectors is almost unrelated to the losses of the other firms. The downside risk
dependence between four reinsurance companies is 1.333. This is lower than the
dependence among insurers. Dependence among the tail risk of large oil companies
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(1.538) is of the same order as dependence in the insurance sector, and much higher
than among the independent firms. Sector risk in the insurance sector is therefore
of the same magnitude as sector risk in the oil sector.
The 1.481 estimate for the block of 4 insurers implies that idiosyncratic risk is
very relevant. For large n and t, the failure measure is equal to 1 plus the ratio
of the average market risk and the average idiosyncratic risk for the insurers, i.e.
E[κ|κ ≥ t] = 1 +
_
βα/
_
i = 1.481. Since the ratio is smaller than 2, idiosyncratic risk
appears more important than market risk. Since the expected number of firms from
different sectors realizing a loss is equal to 1.053, which is close to 1, it is evident
that there are hardly any common risk factors causing joint losses.
The tail dependence among firms from different sectors is very low. Even though
the firms are from different sectors, they can be exposed to similar risks. The stock
market crash of September 11, 2001 had an impact on all stock prices. Such broad
macro shocks could have resulted in a higher dependence in stock prices among
the firms from the different sectors. The failure estimator could have returned a
higher value than the estimated 1.053. But given that it does not, idiosyncratic risk
appears to be the dominant risk factor.
In a way it is remarkable that the dependence among reinsurers is lower than among
insurance companies. Since reinsurers provide insurance against major catastro-
phes, they can receive claims arising out of the same (natural) catastrophe, such as
hurricanes. However, it seems that these simultaneous losses are smaller than we
expected.
One can argue that the dependence within the oil sector should be relatively high,
since the results of oil companies are driven by changes in oil price. The oil price has
a major impact on profits and losses for companies in the oil sector. Even though
it is difficult to point at a single factor causing the dependence among insurers,
such as the oil price for oil companies, there should be a similar explanation for
the dependence among insurers. The estimates are larger in the eight firm setting,
than the estimates in the four firm setting. The expected number of insurers that
crash, given the crash of one insurer, increases from 1.481 to 1.905, in the eight firm
setting. However, the increase is limited, if we consider that the maximum possible
value for the failure measure doubled from 4 to 8.
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4.6 Conclusion
There is an increasing interest in the impact of extreme losses of insurers for the
stability of the financial system. To this end the downside risk dependence between
the losses of insurance companies is investigated. We provide an explanation for
a similar exposure to losses, based on the idea that multiple insurers carry similar
risks.
For the design of optimal regulation, it matters if regulators have to deal with sector
wide risk or firm specific risk. When firms are exposed to similar risks, all insurers
realize losses on either their assets or liabilities, during a crisis. We model and
estimate the effect of risk diversification on downside risk for the insurance sector.
The probability that multiple insurers realize a loss is relevant for our understanding
of insurance sector risk. We therefore define a conditional failure measure based on
the expected number of firms that crash, conditional on a large loss of one firm
and estimate this measure. Moreover, the impact of market risk and idiosyncratic
risk on the expected number of firms that crash is investigated. We proof that the
measure converges to the ratio of idiosyncratic and common risk factors. This ratio
is therefore an indicator for the importance of sector risks.
Insurers limit and diversify their risk exposure by reinsurance contracts. We inves-
tigate the dependence among reinsurers, to discover whether risk in the reinsurance
sector is similar to insurance risks. When the dependence between pairs of firms is
investigated, we conclude that reinsurance sector risk differs from insurance sector
risk.
The conditional failure measure is also estimated to understand dependence in the
insurance sector. It is found that common risk factors are an important source
of risk in the insurance sector and to a smaller extent in the reinsurance sector.
Idiosyncratic risk is relatively important for the reinsurance sector.
Dependence in the insurance sector is of the same order as in the oil sector. This
implies there is a similar factor driving the returns in the insurance sector as in the
oil sector. Tail dependence is relatively high in the insurance sector, when compared
to a portfolio of stocks from different sectors.
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4.7 Appendix
4.7.1 The Failure measure with multiple factors or firms
Downside risk and the two factor model
The dependence between firms is higher if the common return component A is
more important. To show this, suppose that the returns of individual firms are
driven by two different kinds of common factors A1 and A2. These two different
common risk factors can for example arise out of a similar investment risk and
similar insurance liabilities. The return specification for the individual firms now
reads F1 = A1 +A2 + I1. The univariate firm risk Pr(F1 > t), for large t is equal to
Pr(F1 > t) = 3t
−α + o(t−α), (4.16)
which is the sum of the probability of a loss of one of the three factors in the
firm specification, following the convolution theorem. We showed before how we
calculate the denominator of the failure measure, 1 − P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t). Since we
have 4 elements in the specification of the returns of the individual firms which can
cause a loss (A1, A2, I1, I2), the sum of the probabilities that one of these factors
causes a loss will be equal to 4t−α + o(t−α). When we substitute this and (4.16) in
(4.1), the dependence measure reads for large t
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
2(3t−α)
4t−α
=
6
4
. (4.17)
Thus the dependence increases if an extra common risk component is added.
Downside risk: three firms in a single factor model
To understand the dependence among multiple firms, we give a theoretical exposition
of dependence in a setting with three firms. In a setting with more than two firms
(n > 2) the failure measure can range from 1 to n. When the returns of a firm
follow the specification in (4.4), the firm can crash due to a market shock A or a
firm specific shock Ii. The failure measure in a setting with 3 firms then reads
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = lim
t−→∞
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t) + P (F3 > t)
1− P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t, F3 ≤ t)
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=
3(2t−α)
4t−α
=
6
4
, (4.18)
which is in between 1 and 3. The value of the failure measure (4.18) equals the value
in a setting with two firms and three risk drivers as in equation (4.17). However,
since (4.18) is calculated for a setting with three firms, the measure can be higher
than two. This is not possible if there are only two firms. The result of 6/4 in (4.18)
is therefore relatively low, while it is relatively high in (4.17).
4.7.2 Data
The companies used for the estimation of dependence within the different sectors
and between pairs of insurers and reinsurers are given in Table 4.5.
4.7.3 Bivariate estimation
In this section we elaborate on the bivariate estimation technique employed in the
paper. We first rewrite the failure measure and turn it into an estimator.
From elementary probability theory we know that P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t) = 1 −
P (max[X1, X2] > t) and P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t) = P (max[X1, X2] > t) +
P (min[X1, X2] > t). One can therefore rewrite the conditional expectation as follows
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t)
1− P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t)
= 1 +
P (min[X1, X2] > t)
P (max[X1,X2] > t)
. (4.19)
The estimation of the probability of multiple crashes can thus be reduced to the
estimation of two univariate probabilities. This greatly facilitates the empirical
analysis, since one can proceed on basis of the previously described univariate esti-
mation methods for the minimum and maximum return series. We use the notation
Pmin for P (min[X1, X2] > t) and the corresponding notation for the maximum. If
the tail index α is identical for the minimum (αi) and maximum (αa) series, we
obtain the following non-parametric estimator
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = 1 +
P̂min
P̂max
. (4.20)
In Slijkeman et al. (2005) we show that (4.20) can be calculated using a simple
counting procedure for the minima and maxima. We must take t large, since we
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INSURERS REINSURERS OIL FIRMS INDEPENDENT FIRMS
ALLIANZ MUNICH RE BP RD SHELL
ING SWISS RE TOTAL SAP
GENERALI HANNOVER RE RD SHELL L’OREAL
AXA SCOR REPSOL TELEFONICA
AEGON BMW
AVIVA NOKIA
PRUDENTIAL BASF
ZFS PHILIPS ELECTRONICS
Table 4.5: Selected firms
are interested in the limit behavior of (4.19). We take t equal to 7.5%, since this
corresponds to a value at the bound of the sample. The estimated dependence
among all possible combinations are given in Table 4.6.
4.7.4 Multivariate results for different quantiles
For the estimation of the dependence we have to determine a threshold Q1,var. For
the estimation of the dependence among 4 and 8 firms, the threshold corresponding
to the 10th largest order statistic of the univariate return series Xi was selected. In
this section we present the estimation results for a higher and lower threshold, Q1,var.
The returns corresponding to the 5th, 20th and 30th order statistic are taken as a
threshold. This threshold is subsequently taken for the estimation of (4.13). The
results for the dependence among 4 firms are given in Table 4.7, the results for the
dependence among 8 firms are given in Table 4.8. When the dependence is estimated
for a higher threshold (i.e. larger losses), this dependence is a bit lower, but remains
of the same order. When the dependence for a lower threshold is evaluated, this
no longer corresponds to the dependence among extreme returns. The 30th largest
return in 10 years can hardly be considered as an extreme return. Even for this
lower threshold however, the conclusions on the relative importance of sector risks
for the different sectors do no change considerably. Thus our procedure appears
robust against the threshold selection.
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ALLIANZ 1.00 0.29 0.11 0.24 0.17 0.19 0.22 0.15 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.17
ING 0.29 1.00 0.06 0.26 0.38 0.26 0.29 0.16 0.32 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.23
GENERALI 0.11 0.06 1.00 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.13 0.12 0.05 0.08
AXA 0.24 0.26 0.14 1.00 0.31 0.09 0.19 0.21 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.18
AEGON 0.17 0.38 0.03 0.31 1.00 0.11 0.23 0.19 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.11 0.17
AVIVA 0.19 0.26 0.05 0.09 0.11 1.00 0.19 0.15 0.19 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.14
PRUDENTIAL 0.22 0.29 0.05 0.19 0.23 0.19 1.00 0.12 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.16
ZFS 0.15 0.16 0.06 0.21 0.19 0.15 0.12 1.00 0.07 0.26 0.07 0.10 0.14
MUNICHRE 0.22 0.32 0.05 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.07 1.00 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.16
SWISSRE 0.12 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.26 0.12 1.00 0.13 0.04 0.13
HANNOVERRE 0.07 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.19 0.13 1.00 0.12 0.13
SCOR 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.12 1.00 0.10
Table 4.6: Bivariate conditional expectation t=0.075
Order statistic of Q1 Insurers Reinsurers Oil Firms
5 1.538 1.333 1.333 1.053
10 1.481 1.333 1.538 1.053
20 1.600 1.379 1.600 1.159
30 1.690 1.412 1.500 1.212
1 ≤ E[κ|κ ≥ 1] ≤ 4
Jan. 1995 - June 2005
Table 4.7: Dependence among 4 companies
Order statistic of Q1 Insurers Insurance/Reinsurance Firms
5 1.739 1.600 1.250
10 1.905 1.739 1.290
20 2.133 1.928 1.404
30 2.222 2.069 1.538
1 ≤ E[κ|κ ≥ 1] ≤ 8
Jan. 1995 - June 2005
Table 4.8: Dependence among 8 companies
Chapter 5
Country Risk in Banking
To promote financial stability in the EU it is important to understand the mutual
dependence between financial institutions. Understanding these linkages can help
with the design of appropriate policies to contain shocks and to prevent the financial
system from collapsing. Especially the dependence between institutions during crisis
times can reveal information about the resilience of the financial system over time.
In this chapter the dependence between the daily stock price returns of banks in
times of crisis is studied. The dataset consists of banks from multiple EU countries.
The degree of dependence between pairs of banks within six countries is estimated
and these estimates are compared to the dependence between banks from different
countries. A major risk driver for banks is the macroeconomy and the interest rate
in particular. It is therefore studied how the dependence relates to the macroeco-
nomic environment and it is investigated whether the dependence between banks
did change since the beginning of the EMU.
As is documented by e.g. Campbell et al. (1997) and others, the empirical distri-
bution of stock prices features heavy tails. That is to say, extremely large losses
(and gains) do occur much more frequently, than if the returns were normally dis-
tributed. Therefore, a methodology has to be used, which takes into account the
fat tail property of stock prices. Research based on normally distributed returns
understates the downside risk of both individual banks and the banking system as
a whole.
An important concern for regulators of the financial system is systemic risk. The
following definition of systemic risk is used in De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) and Group
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of Ten (2001): ‘Systemic financial risk is the risk that an event (shock) will trigger
a loss of economic value or confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty
about, a substantial portion of the financial system that is large enough to, in
all probability, have significant adverse effects on the real economy’. Containing
systemic risk is important for regulators because of the adverse effects of a crisis
on the real economy. This research aims to quantify the degree of systemic risk by
investigating the mutual dependence among banks.
A large literature argues that systemic risk originates from the interbank exposure.
Theoretic models are presented in Allen and Gale (2000) or Rochet and Tirole
(1996). They model explicitly the interbank market for deposits. Banks may face a
liquidity shortage due to the collapse of another bank. Gorton (1988) argues that
the business cycle is an important determinant for the risks in the banking system.
However, the mutual dependence among banks can originate from other sources of
risk. Banks involved in securities trading, are exposed to the well functioning of the
infrastructure of the stock exchange and to risks related to clearing and settlement.
Other common exposures which may create systemic risks are the impact of new
accounting rules and new regulation. Liquidity shortage or macro risks are therefore
not the only risks to which banks are simultaneously exposed.
In this chapter it is argued that the business cycle is an important determinant of
the health of the banking system. Therefore, the relation between extremely large
losses in the market value of banks and the broader market index is quantified. The
broader market index is taken as a proxy for the strength of the economy. It is argued
that the downside risk dependence between banks may arise from an exposure to
similar risks. Banks own similar assets and liabilities and the risks of their assets
and liabilities may be highly related. All banks e.g. borrow money at the deposit
market. Banks are therefore exposed to interest rate risk. Since banks provide loans
to firms, they all carry credit risks. Credit risk is highly related to the stance of the
economy. If multiple banks are indirectly exposed to the state of the economy, this
creates dependence. When loans are concentrated in the same industry or country,
this also creates dependence. Because of these similar exposures to credit risk and
interest rate risk, it is plausible that banks have similarities in their risk profile.
The assumption that the returns of banks are normally distributed understates the
downside risk of individual banks and the dependence among bank returns within
the banking system. The fat tail property of the stock price returns of individual
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banks therefore has to be taken into account. This is important, since the effects
of diversification are different under normality than under the assumption of fat
tailed distributed returns. When studying the dependence between extreme losses,
the correlation measure, which is so intimately related to the normal distribution,
is often inappropriate. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) elaborate on the shortcomings of
the correlation measure and show a caveat of applying this measure. In Slijkerman
et al. (2005) we show that the normal distribution underestimates the risk of daily
losses of banks’ market value.
The effects of financial sector consolidation are especially interesting in case of Euro-
pean banks, because the introduction of the common currency now exposes banks to
the same monetary environment. Boot (2003) discusses the financial sector consol-
idation in Europe. Before EMU, the monetary environment for banks was different
from country to country. The introduction of the euro introduced the same interest
rate and term structure to all participating countries. Therefore, the interest rate
risk for all banks has become equal. Moreover, it created opportunities for banks
to offer products across borders and to diversify the lending portfolio with loans to
foreign companies. Due to this, one would expect the dependence between banks in
the eurozone to increase. However, the dependence between banks from the same
country might decrease due to the possibility to diversify the lending portfolio across
the euro area. Kremers et al. (2003) discuss the supervisory approach to financial
conglomerates and the risks posed by them.
In the theory section the downside risk dependence between banks in the EU is ana-
lyzed, to understand the effects of risk diversification on downside risk. The returns
of individual banks are modelled by a multifactor model and it is studied whether
the dependence between banks in the same country is higher than the dependence
between banks from different countries. It can be show that the dependence between
banks from neighboring countries is lower than the dependence among banks within
a country. As a result of mergers, individual banks become more diversified, but
the banking system in general may become more vulnerable to a systemic shock.
Subsequently, the aggregate risk of banks is estimated. The value of banks is ap-
proximated by their total market value, on a daily basis. It is shown empirically
that the dependence structure within the banking industry changes if we leave out
macroeconomic risk factors. The dependence originates from common shocks to the
banking sector, affecting multiple banks in a specific country. Moreover, it is found
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that the dependence increased since the start of the European Monetary Union.
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) estimate the dependence among banks in the US. They
find that the degree of interdependency among large and complex banking organi-
zations did increase over time. According to De Nicolo and Kwast, interdepencies
arise because banks are exposed to similar risks. A similar exposure of banks to
risks may for example originate from a similar exposure to the inter-bank loan mar-
ket or from a similar exposure to counterparty risk. The increase in the degree of
interdependencies implies that also the potential for a systemic crisis did increase.
Their research is highly related to this research, except for the fat tail aspect. Gor-
ton (1988) investigates the relation between banking crises and the macroeconomy,
and finds that the macroeconomy is an important explanatory variable for banking
crises. This finding is relevant for our research since it implies that crises are not
random events. Crises are caused by a slowdown in the economy which results in
a lower discounted value of firms and therefore of the assets held by banks. This
supports the view that the dependence among banks originates from an exposure
to similar risk factors, such as the growth of the macroeconomy.
Most of the literature applies an event study for the relation between bank per-
formance and loan quality. For example Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) study the
stock price reaction of banks to the Brazilian default. They do not find investor
contagion in reaction to Brazil’s debt moratorium. Smirlock and Kaufold (1987)
study the effect on banks of the Mexican default and find that financial markets
could asses the degree of exposure of banks to Mexican loans. Some authors have
studied the dependence between banks in the EU. There are indications that the
dependence between banks within the different countries in the EU is higher than
the dependence between banks across borders (see e.g. Moerman, 2005). De Bandt
and Hartmann (2002) discuss the literature on systemic risk more extensively. The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999) provides a good overview of the
empirical impact of banking regulation, specifically the 1988 Accord.
The difference with earlier work is that in this research a model is provided to
analyze the probability of extreme events. We focus on the tails of the distribution
and specifically investigate the effects of macroeconomic shocks. The results indicate
that the dependence did change since the beginning of the EMU. This result differs
from findings by Hartmann et al. (forthcoming), who also apply extreme value
theory. However, they test whether a parameter of the model does change over time,
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while in this research, a change over time of the conditional failure probabilities is
investigated.
In the following, a theoretical model is presented, which provides the rational for the
estimations. Next, the dependence measure is described, followed by the estimation
of the dependence between banks. Subsequently, the relation between dependence
and macroeconomic risk is analyzed and the effects of the EMU are investigated.
5.1 Downside risk of individual banks
As an introduction to the analysis of multivariate dependence among banks, the
characteristics of heavy tailed variables are presented in the context of univariate
bank risk. Extreme value theory studies the limit distribution of the (joint) maxima
or minima of (return) series, as the sample size increases without bound. To study
the minimum, we change the sign of the returns and focus on the loss returns in
the positive domain. Suppose that Xi is an independent and identically distributed
random variable with cumulative distribution function F (x). This variable exhibits
heavy tails if F (x) far into the tails has a first order term identical to the Pareto
distribution, i.e.
F (x) = 1− x−αL(x) as x→∞, (5.1)
where L(x) is a slowly varying function such that
Lim
t−→∞
L(tx)
L(t)
= 1, x > 0. (5.2)
It can be shown that the two previous conditions are equivalent to
Lim
t−→∞
1− F (tx)
1− F (t)
= x−α, α > 0, t > 0. (5.3)
The coefficient α is known as the tail index and indicates the number of bounded
moments of the distribution. When a distribution has finite endpoints or exponen-
tially decaying tails (like the normal and lognormal distributions) it fails (5.3) and
all moments are bounded. A high realization of a variable should be interpreted
as a large loss, so we can focus on positive random variables for the study of our
downside risk.
In the following, the downside risk for twenty European banks is quantified. The
dataset comprises the three largest banks in Germany, Spain, The Netherlands, Italy
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and the UK, as well as two large French banks. The dataset contains the banks for
which daily data are available since January 19921.
The probability is estimated that the daily stock return of a bank is lower than a
prespecified probability level, xvar. To estimate this probability, we use the inverse
quantile estimator from De Haan et al. (1994)
p̂ =
m
n
(
XM+1
xvar
)α̂(m)
, α̂(m) =
1
m
m∑
j=0
ln
(
Xj
Xm+1
)
. (5.4)
This probability estimate depends on the tail index estimator α (based on the m
highest order statistics), the random number of excess m, the sample size n and the
threshold level xvar.
If a bank loses a quarter of its market value on a given day, this raises serious
concern about its viability. In our case xvar is somewhat arbitrarily chosen at 25%.
Estimation details are given in the Appendix. In line with Slijkerman et al. (2005),
we choose m = 50. The univariate risk for the banks can be found in Table 5.1.
The results give an indication of the probability of a loss larger than 25% for an
individual bank. The average probability is 0.0108, or about one day per 100 years.
The probabilities range from 0.0018 (twice every 1000 years) for BPE to 0.0321
(three times in 100 years) for ING. The risk of Fortis and ING is larger than the risk
for other banks. This may be the result of the relatively high risk of the insurance
division. In this section we described the fat tail property of individual banks. Our
main research question however concerns the importance of macro factors for the
degree of dependence between banks. In the following section, the importance of
country risk for the downside risk of different combinations of banks is analyzed.
5.2 Dependency Measure
For the stability of the financial system it is desirable that extreme losses of a single
bank are well contained and do not cause losses at other banks. Financial sector
regulation aims at preventing the collapse of individual institutions, but is also
designed to contain the impact of financial crisis to a limited number of institutions.
1There are three exceptions: HSBC, BNP Paribas and SPI. The start of the data series of these
banks can be found in Table 5.8 in the Appendix. There is no third large French bank with data
available from 1992 onwards.
5. Country Risk in Banking 93
Probability Probability
(Xi  <  -0.25) * 260 (Xi  <  -0.25) * 260
RBS 0.0064 BNP 0.0135
HSBC 0.0031 SOCIETE GENERAL 0.0080
BARCLAYS 0.0062 DEUTSCHE BANK 0.0081
BSCH 0.0075 COMMERZBANK 0.0197
BBVA 0.0116 HYPOVEREINSBANK 0.0099
BPE 0.0018 UNICREDITO ITALIANO 0.0139
ING 0.0321 BANCA INTESA 0.0075
ABN AMRO 0.0068 SAN POALO IMI 0.0054
FORTIS 0.0218
Table 5.1: Downside risk of individual banks
To this end the probability of simultaneous losses at multiple banks is quantified.
To understand the impact of losses at a specific bank on other banks, the expected
probability that the stock market value of a bank crashes can be measured, given
the crash of a competitor. Let F1 and F2 be the stochastic returns on banks’ equity
and t be the common high loss level. The conditional expectation of a loss at two
banks, given the loss at one bank is of interest. We therefore want the probability
that F2 > t, given that F1 > t and the probability that F1 > t given that F2 > t,
where F1 and F2 are the stochastic loss returns and t is the common high loss level.
Since we are interested in a crash of a bank given the crash of another bank and vice
versa, we will condition on either event. Let κ denote the number of banks which
crash. The failure measure of Xin (1992) is used as the measure of systemic risk. In
two dimensions it reads
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (F1 > t) + P (F2 > t)
1− P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t)
. (5.5)
The failure measure is the conditional expectation of the number of banks that
crash, given that there is at least one crash. Hartmann et al. (2004) give a further
motivation for this measure. Note that
E[κ|κ ≥ 1]− 1 =
P (F1 > t, F2 > t)
1− P (F1 ≤ t, F2 ≤ t)
(5.6)
is the conditional probability that both firms fail, given that there is a failure of at
least one of the firms. We will use either interpretation, depending on the context. A
stylized model of the univariate risk of banks will be used, to derive the probabilities
needed to analyze the dependence with the failure measure (5.5).
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5.3 Country risk
As Gordon (1988) showed, the business cycle is an important determinant of the
risks to which banks are exposed. Since the riskiness of loans made by banks is
to a large extent determined by the business cycle of a specific country, the risk
exposure of banks within this country might be similar. The risk diversification
benefits that can be derived from mergers between banks within a given country are
limited, according to this view.
However, the benefits following a merger between banks within a country can be
higher, since there might be more possibilities to cut costs or to improve returns,
because of monopoly rents. An interesting analysis of the benefits of internation-
alization strategies is given in Slager (2004). Since we take the perspective of a
regulator in this research, we focus on the benefits of risk diversification that can be
derived from mergers within a given country compared to mergers across borders.
Some intuition is given by presenting two graphs, which show the performance of
three major banks in Spain (Figure 5.2) and Germany (Figure 5.3). From these
figures it is clear that in general the performance of the Spanish banks since January
1999 (BSCH +26%, BBVA +7% en Banco Popular +80%) is much better than the
performance of the German banks (Commerzbank -33%, HypoVereinsbank -62%).
Over the sample period the Spanish economic performance was quite well, while the
German economy slowed down. Deutsche Bank however increased in value (+42%).
Deutsche Bank is a large international bank with income from the trading portfolio.
We argue that the profits of banks are related to the macroeconomy, because the
quality of their credit is related to the performance of the economy. Firms can
strengthen their balance sheets in an economic upturn, which implies a solid loan
quality for banks. During a recession the loan quality will deteriorate. Macroeco-
nomic developments are therefore the source of a common risk factor in the loan
books of banks, based in the same country.
Another common risk factor is the level of interest rates. There is a close relation
between interest rates and the macroeconomy. According to economic theory, the
real interest rates are high if the growth rate of the gross domestic product in a
country is high. Moreover, the level of the interest rate and the difference between
short term and long term interest rates is an important determinant of the income
for banks. If interest rates increase, the public is willing to save more (ceteris
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paribus), since they receive a higher return on their savings. A declining interest
rate encourages firms to borrow more (c.p.). The difference between the short term
and long term interest rates affects the profitability of banks, because banks borrow
against the short term rate and provide loans to firms against the longer term rate.
The short term interest rate is set by central bankers. There is therefore a direct
relation between interest rate risk and monetary policy. One would therefore expect
that there exists a relation between monetary policy and the riskiness of banks,
because banks are affected by changes in interest rates. The beginning of the EMU
provides an interesting natural experiment. The hypothesis that the dependence
between banks increases if they start to operate in a similar monetary environment
can be investigated, by estimating the dependence between banks before and after
the introduction of the single currency. This test provides an important insight into
the relation between economic integration and downside risk dependence between
banks.
De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) show for the US that the correlation between the
stock returns of banks did change over time, due to financial sector consolidation.
We would therefore expect that also the dependence among European banks did
increase.
5.4 Modelling dependence
In this section the degree of dependence among banks is modelled. The degree
of risk diversification between banks from the same country or from neighboring
countries will be analyzed. This improves our understanding of the effect of mergers
on systemic risk.
In the following, stylized, model, the dependence between financial institutions is
analyzed by explicitly taking into account the common risk exposure of banks. The
approach is similar to the Arbitrage Pricing Theorem (APT) of Ross (1976). Ac-
cording to the APT, the rate of return on a particular security is affected by several
risk factors. Assume that two banks, indexed by i = 1, 2, are exposed to three
different sources of risk. Suppose that the returns of a bank (Bi) are driven by
three independent random variables: a broad measure for financial sector risk (F ),
country risk (Cj, where j = 1, 2, denotes the country) and firm specific risk (Ii).
For the downside risk of the returns of the banks, losses larger than t in the tail of
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the distribution are of interest. Suppose that the three sources of risk (F , Cj and
Ii) follow a unit scale Pareto distribution on [1,∞), i.e.
P (F > t) = P (Ci > t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α. (5.7)
We study the dependence between large losses in the tails of distributions. The
tail of a broad class of heavy tailed random variables, such as the Student-t distri-
bution, can be approximated by the Pareto distribution. The result obtained for
the Pareto distribution therefore carry over to all random variables which exhibit
regular varying tails. Since the returns of the banks follow the sum of the three
sources of risk
Bi = F + Cj + Ii, (5.8)
it turns out that the tails of the return distribution of the banks are to a first order
also Pareto distributed. The probability of a loss for a sum of random variables with
Pareto tails is given by Feller’s convolution theorem (1971, VIII.8). The convolution
theorem states that the probability of a large loss for a combination of variables
which follow a power like distribution, satisfies
lim
t−→∞
P (B1 > s)/3t
−α = 1. (5.9)
For large losses (t large), the theorem thus holds that the convolution of F , Cj and
Ii can be approximated by the sum of the univariate distributions of F , Cj and
Ii. All that counts for the probability of the sum is the (univariate) probability
mass which is located along the three axes from the points onward where the plane
F +Cj + Ii = t cuts the axes. The probability that the convolution of F , Cj and Ii
is larger than t, given 5.7, is therefore
P (B1 > s) = 3t
−α + o(t−α), (5.10)
for large t. It is assumed that the size of the univariate risk is equal for all banks.
However, the dependence between the banks is not always equal, since the banks
may be exposed to a different country risk, Cj.
5.4.1 Dependence within a country
In this section, we investigate the dependence between extreme losses for banks
within the same country. We compare the probability that two banks realize a
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large loss with the probability that a merger of the two banks realizes a large loss.
By comparing the likelihood of a loss of the merged bank with a simultaneous loss
at two autonomous banks, we can quantify the effect of mergers on systemic risk.
Systemic risk is defined as the failure of all banks in the banking system, being one
or two banks in this stylized example. If the risk of failure of the merged bank is
lower than the risk of a simultaneous failure of two autonomous banks, regulators
may induce banks to merge, to lower the system’s risk. However, if mergers do not
reduce the risk, regulators may favour a setting with two autonomous banks.
First, consider the probability of a simultaneous large loss for two banks. The
probability that both bank B1 and B2 realize a loss larger than t equals
P (F + C1 + I1 > t, F + C1 + I2 > t) = 2t
−α + o(t−α), (5.11)
for t large. This result follows from Feller’s convolution theorem. When the two
portfolio inequalities F +C1+ I1 > t and F +C1+ I2 > t hold simultaneously, only
the probability mass above t along the F + C1 axis in the portfolio is in common,
but no mass along the I1 or the I2 axes. Note that the sum of F and C1 can be
treated as one variable. The probability that F + C1 is larger than t, for large t, is
equal to 2t−α + o(t−α).
We will now investigate the risk that a merged bank realizes a large loss. We can
compare this probability with the probability of a simultaneous loss of two banks. If
the probability that a merged bank realizes a large loss is higher than the probability
of a simultaneous loss at the two autonomous banks, this implies that the risk of a
breakdown of the financial system is higher following a bank merger. We have to
take into account that the loss that can be incurred by a merger bank can be twice
as large, since it has a capital buffer which is the sum of the two banks. We therefore
calculate the probability P (B1+B2 > 2t). Consider the sum of returns of two banks
within the same country. The returns of the merged bank B = B1 +B2 are driven
by the factors F,C1, I1, I2. Following the convolution theorem, the probability of a
large loss for this merged bank can be approximated by the sum of the probabilities
of a large loss of the individual risk factors. The likelihood of a large loss for the
merged bank therefore reads, for t large
P (2F + 2C1 + I1 + I2 > 2t) = 2(1 + 2
−α)t−α + o(t−α), (5.12)
where
P (2F + 2C1 > 2t) = P (F + C1 > t) = 2t
−α
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and
P (I1 + I2 > 2t) = 2(2
−αt−α),
since
P (I1 > 2t) = P (I2 > 2t) = (2t)
−α = 2−αt−α.
We can now formulate our first proposition.
Proposition 5.1 If the two banks B1 and B2, from the same country, merge, the
probability that this merged bank realizes a large loss is larger than the probability
of a simultaneous large loss at the two autonomous banks, i.e. P (B1 + B2 > 2t) >
P (B1 > t,B2 > t), where B1 = F +C1+ I1 and B2 = F +C1 + I2 with P (F > t) =
P (Ci > t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α.
Proof. Evaluate whether P (B1 + B2 > 2t) > P (B1 > t,B2 > t). It follows from
(5.11) and (5.12) that the probability of a simultaneous loss at the two banks is
lower than the probability of a loss at the merged bank.
An explanation for this result is that larger banks do increase systemic risk since
losses are no longer isolated to a single small bank. In a merged bank losses affect the
profitability of the entire holding company, including the profit making divisions.
Losses reduce profitability at the holding level of the merged bank and are not
contained to smaller divisions or banks. If there are two separate banks and one of
the banks realizes an extreme loss, this has on average a much more limited effect
on the other bank. Due to a common exposure, modelled with F and C1, there
can be simultaneous losses at the two separate banks. However, the idiosyncratic
loss Ii now only affects a single bank. On the contrary, if the two banks merge the
idiosyncratic losses I1 and I2 do have an impact on the total value of the merged
entity.
5.4.2 Dependence across borders
Next, consider the probability of a simultaneous large loss for two banks when the
banks are based in a different country. We analyze the probability of an extreme loss
of two banks, Pr(B1 > t,B2 > t) when the country risk for the two banks, C1 and
C2, differs. If the country risks in the portfolios are independent, the probability
that both banks realize a loss larger than t is smaller than in the previous setting.
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The only source of risk which can generate a simultaneous loss for the two banks is
the broad measure of financial risk F . Following the convolution theorem, only the
mass above t along the F axis contributes to the probability of a simultaneous loss.
Thus for large t
P (F + C1 + I1 > t, F + C2 + I2 > t) = t
−α + o(t−α). (5.13)
We also analyze the probability of a loss for a cross-border merger, consisting of two
banks from a different country. The probability of a loss for this merged bank may
be lower since the new bank may benefit from country risk diversification. The risk
of the merged bank B is determined by the independent risk factors F,C1, C2, I1, I2.
Following Feller, the probability of a large loss for B equals
P (2F + C1 + C2 + I1 + I2 > 2t) = (1 + 4/2
α)t−α + o(t−α), (5.14)
for t large. However, regulators are not only concerned with the risk of a single
institution, but also with the stability of the financial system. We argue that the
financial system is relatively stable if the probability that multiple institutions fail
at the same time is relatively low. In the following proposition we describe the
impact on systemic risk of a merger between a domestic bank and a foreign bank.
Proposition 5.2 If the two banks B1 and B2, from different countries, merge, the
probability that this merged bank realizes a large loss is larger than the probability
of a simultaneous large loss at the two autonomous banks, i.e. P (B1 + B2 > 2t) >
P (B1 > t,B2 > t), where B1 = F +C1+ I1 and B2 = F +C2 + I2 with P (F > t) =
P (Ci > t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α.
Proof. Evaluate whether P (B1 + B2 > 2t) > P (B1 > t,B2 > t). It follows from
(5.14) and (5.13) that the probability of a simultaneous loss at the two banks is
lower than the probability of a loss at the merged bank.
Since the probability of a large loss for the merged bank is larger than the probability
of a simultaneous loss at the two banks, this implies that also cross-border bank
mergers do increase systemic risk. The explanation for this result is again that
larger banks do increase systemic risk since losses are no longer isolated to a single
bank. A merged bank can absorb losses which are larger than the losses at a single
bank. However, it is more likely that the merged bank realizes a loss larger than
2t, than that two single banks realize a loss larger than t, at the same time. The
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stability of the financial system does therefore not necessarily benefit from bank
mergers. However, when the risk of the merged bank is compared to the probability
of a loss of an individual bank, the merged bank is less risky.
Corollary 5.3 The probability that a merged bank realizes a large loss is lower than
the probability that a single bank realizes a large loss, for mergers within a country
and across borders, i.e. P (B1+B2 > 2t) < P (Bi > t), where Bi = F +Cj + Ii with
P (F > t) = P (Ci > t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α and α > 1.
Proof. Verify that (5.14) is smaller than (5.10) and that (5.12) is smaller than
(5.10).
Note that this holds as long as diversification pays, i.e. as α > 1. The benefit of a
merger is therefore that it reduces the risk of an individual firm. The downside of
bank mergers is that they may increase systemic risk.
Are these useful propositions in real life? The following example may clarify this.
Consider a country with small independent banks, which provide loans to farmers
and other local businesses. When some large clients go bankrupt, this has severe
consequences for the small bank. From the perspective of the bank, risk will be
reduced by a merger with another small bank. This is what is stated in the corol-
lary above. However, from the perspective of systemic risk, these mergers are not
beneficial and a supervisor may prefer many small banks. The bankruptcy of a
small bank does not pose a threat to the system. Moreover, the probability of a
simultaneous loss at two banks is low, when this risk is compared to the probability
of a large loss for the merged bank. The idea is that shocks can be sufficiently large
to drag down a very large banking institution. In a setting with many small banks,
only one bank will be affected. If banks do merge and create larger institutions, a
rough trader e.g. can ruin this combined entity. If an institution is smaller, trading
losses are contained to the smaller entity.
It can also be shown that the probability of a large loss for a merged bank is lower
if the merging entities are based in different countries.
Proposition 5.4 The probability that a merged bank realizes a large loss is lower if
the two merging banks are based in different countries than if the two merging banks
are based in the same country, i.e. P (B1 + B2 > 2t) < P (B1 + B3 > 2t), where
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Single Bank Merged Bank Simultaneous loss
P (Bi > t) P (Bi +Bj > 2t) P (Bi > t,Bj > t)
Bi = F + C1 + Ii
Bj = F + C1 + Ij
3t−α 2(1 + 2−α)t−α 2t−α
P (Bi > t) P (Bi +Bj > 2t) P (Bi > t,Bj > t)
Bi = F + C1 + Ii
Bj = F + C2 + Ij
3t−α (1 + 4/2α)t−α t−α
C1, C2, Ii, Ij and F are Pareto distributed, the smaller order terms are omitted
Table 5.2: Summary of theoretical results
B1 = F +C1+ I1, B2 = F +C2+ I2 and B3 = F +C1+ I3with P (F > t) = P (Ci >
t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α and α > 1.
Proof. Verify that 5.14 is smaller than 5.12, i.e. verify that P (2F+C1+C2+I1+I2 >
2t) < P (2F + 2C1 + I1 + I3 > 2t). This is the case since 1 + 4/2
α < 2(1 + 2−α),
because 1 < 2/2α with α > 1.
In this subsection we have shown that the different types of mergers have a different
probability of failure. A summary of the theoretical results is given in Table 5.2. It
is clear that mergers reduce the probability of failure, since the risk of a merged bank
is lower than the risk of a single bank. However, the probability of a simultaneous
loss at two single banks is lower than the probability of a large loss at the merged
bank. This indicates that a regulator may prefer two small banks instead of a larger,
merged bank. In the following we show how the modeling approach can be used to
understand how joint losses effect the failure measure (5.5). The results of this
theoretical approach can subsequently be used to interpret the empirical estimates
of this measure.
5.4.3 Conditional crash
We can now characterize the systemic stability with the measure (5.5) by using
the probabilities from the previous two sections. For the numerator of the failure
measure, we need the probability that an individual bank realizes a large loss. We
already have this probability in (5.10). The denominator can be decomposed in
the sum of the probabilities that one of the variables which determines the return
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of a bank is larger than t, following Fellers convolution theorem. If we examine
1 − P (B1 ≤ t,B2 ≤ t), we have the probability that both banks do not have a
return smaller than t. This is the case if either a common shock or an idiosyncratic
shock occurs, i.e. if F > t, if C1 > t, if I1 > t or if I2 > t. For two firms
from the same country, with the stochastic returns following the specification in
(5.8), 1 − P (B1 ≤ t, B2 ≤ t) is therefore equal to 4t
−α + o(t−α), the sum of the
probabilities that one of these four factors generates a loss.
We can substitute the probabilities in the failure measure and approximate the value
for this measure for large t, by
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (B1 > t) + P (B2 > t)
1− P (B1 ≤ t,B2 ≤ t)
=
2(3t−α)
4t−α
=
6
4
.
To obtain the limit value for the failure measure if the two banks are based in
different countries, we only have to recalculate the denominator. The numerator is
identical to the setting with two banks from the same country. Examine 1−P (B1 ≤
t, B2 ≤ t), the probability that two banks do not have a return smaller than t. This
is the case if either a common shock or an idiosyncratic shock occurs, i.e. if F > t,
if C1 > t, if C2 > t, if I1 > t or if I2 > t. The denominator of the failure measure is
therefore equal to 5t−α + o(t−α) and the measure reads
lim
t−→∞
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (B1 > t) + P (B2 > t)
1− P (B1 ≤ t,B2 ≤ t)
=
2(3t−α)
5t−α
=
6
5
.
This measure gives the conditional expectations of a crash of two banks, given the
crash of one bank, when the banks are based in different countries. The conditional
expectation that a second bank will crash is smaller if the two banks are from
different countries, than if the two banks are based in the same country (6/5 <
6/4). Therefore, systemic risk in the EU should be lower than in the individual
member states, since the country risk between the EU countries differs. However,
if the country component Cj becomes similar in the EU, this diversification benefit
decreases. The explanation for a convergence of country risks can be the introduction
of the euro, which introduced a common monetary policy to the eurozone. As a
result, the interest rate risk for the banks in the participating countries became
similar, reducing the difference in the country risk factor, Cj.
5. Country Risk in Banking 103
5.4.4 Exchange of portfolio’s
An interesting issue from the perspective of systemic risk are the implications of
risk sharing arrangements between banks on downside risk. Banks can e.g. reduce
part of the risk on their loans to firms by buying credit default swaps. As a result,
the seller of the swaps is exposed to the default of similar firms. Risk sharing can
also be the result of the provision of syndicated loans by banks. Banks may reduce
the risk related to the provision of large loans to firms by providing the loans in
a syndicate. A common risk exposure is the result from the participation of the
banks in the syndicate. In this section we provide a stylized model of risk sharing
arrangements. Risk sharing works, since it reduces risk at an individual firm level.
Consider the case that the banks B12 and B21 exchange half of their portfolios. Now
we have two banks, B12 and B21, the returns of which are specified in the following
way
B12 = B21 = 1/2(F + C1 + I1) + 1/2(F + C1 + I2).
The probability of a large loss for one of the two single banks is equal to
P (2F + 2C1 + I1 + I2) > 2t) = 2(1 + 2
−α)t−α + o(t−α), (5.15)
for t large2. Interestingly, this does reduce the probability of the failure of an
individual institution, since (5.15) is smaller than (5.10), if α > 1. However, risk
diversification does not reduce the probability of a systemic breakdown, i.e. P (B1 >
t,B2 > t) is not reduced.
Proposition 5.5 Risk sharing by banks does increase the probability of a simul-
taneous loss at two banks, i.e. P (B12 > t,B12 > t) > P (B1 > t,B2 > t), where
B12 = B21 = 1/2(F+C1+I1)+1/2(F+C1+I2), B1 = F+C1+I1 and B2 = F+C1+I2
with P (F > t) = P (C1 > t) = P (Ij > t) = t
−α.
Proof. Verify that (5.15) is larger than (5.11).
Since the portfolios of the two banks are equal, both banks realize a large loss if
one of the two banks realizes a large loss. The probability of such a loss is given
in (5.15). The probability of a systemic breakdown in (5.15) can be compared with
the probability of a systemic breakdown if the banks did not share their portfolios.
2Note that P (B1 > t,B2 > t) = P (B1 > t) = P (B2 > t) if B1 = B2.
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This probability is presented in (5.11). The latter probability of a systemic crisis is
smaller than the probability of a systemic crisis if the banks do swap their portfolios.
It follows that the probability of a systemic breakdown is therefore increased by risk
diversification by banks. This is in line with results from De Vries (2005).
5.5 Data and estimation
The dataset consists of 17 banks from 6 EU countries, using daily data from 1992
to 2004. All are supervised according to the Basle Capital Accord and EU banking
directives.
If the returns of banks would follow a bivariate normal distribution, the estima-
tion of (5.5) is straightforward, since then only the first two moments have to be
estimated. However, the empirical returns of asset prices often do not follow a
normal distribution. Multivariate extreme value theory deals with estimators for
(5.5) in case the univariate returns are fat tailed. Regulators are interested in the
actual probability of multiple, simultaneous crashes. We argue that to this end, a
non-parametric approach is well suited.
Of interest to us is the dependency among large losses, i.e. high levels of t. Therefore
the probability is measured that two losses are larger than the specified level t. We
apply a non-parametric estimator for the failure measure
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (X > t) + P (Y > t)
1− P (X ≤ t, Y ≤ t)
= 1 +
P (min[X,Y > t])
P (max[X, Y > t])
, (5.16)
where P (min[X1, X2] > t) is the probability that the minimum of X1 and X2 is
above the threshold t, and P (max[X1, X2] > t) is the probability that the maximum
of both random variables exceeds t. Both probabilities can be easily estimated
using (5.4). In the Appendix we show that this can be done in one swap and that
this estimator captures the limiting dependence between two heavy tailed random
variables. Since we evaluate the limit behavior of (5.16), we take t close to the
boundary of the sample and use t = 0.05. A simultaneous daily loss, larger than
this threshold of 5%, reflects a substantial loss for banks.
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5.5.1 Dependence over time
To see whether the dependence between banks did change following the introduction
of the euro, we estimate the failure measure before and after the introduction of the
euro. However, if the dependence is higher after the introduction of the euro, this
is not necessarily caused by the common currency. Nevertheless, it is interesting to
know, whether dependence does change over time. The failure measure is estimated
for the period January 1992 until June 1998 and for the period January 1999 until
December 2004. In January 1999 the euro was introduced and in the months before
investors already anticipated this. We therefore decided to end the sample in June
1998. As a result the sample before the introduction of the euro and after the
introduction has the same size.
A characteristic of the data is that the standard deviation of the returns is different
in the two periods. In line with this, the maximum loss in the two samples is of
a different size. If the threshold t is taken close to the bounds of the sample in
the low variance subsample, this threshold does not correspond to the bounds of
the high variance subsample. We therefore choose to evaluate the failure measure
for different values of t in the two samples. Since the largest losses after January
1999 are larger than the largest losses before 1999, using the same threshold t in the
second period results in the estimation of dependence less far into the tails in this
period. We take a value for t corresponding to the 20th largest ranked observation
of RBS in both samples. The threshold for the estimation of joint losses is equal to
0.03897 before 1999 and equal to 0.05854 after January 1999. If the probability of
joint losses is estimated when moving t to the core of the distribution, dependence
will in general be higher. Since we estimated the dependence at the same quantile of
the distribution, differences in dependence between the two subsamples are therefore
not related to differences in the threshold t. Transforming the observations in the
two samples to the same scale does return similar results.
5.5.2 Controlling for country risk
As argued above, an important determinant of the risk of banks is the country risk.
We introduced the failure measure as a risk measure to understand the dependence
between large losses of banks. To control for the dependence generated by country
risk, a two step procedure is followed. First, we regress the return series of banks
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on a measure of the macroeconomic developments within a country. This way, the
country component and the firm specific component can be disentangled. Secondly,
we estimate the dependence between the idiosyncratic returns of banks, which can
not be explained by this country specific component. Since a large sample is a re-
quirement for the investigation of infrequent events, a large sample of daily data is
used to estimate the dependence among banks. Unfortunately, a lot of macroeco-
nomic variables are not available on a daily basis. However, stock market indices
provide a good indicator of future firm profits and the stance of the economy. If
we have a measure for changes in the future profits of firms, we have a measure for
the riskiness of the loans of these firms, which are provided by banks. According
to Merton (1974) there is a direct link between the value of equity of firms and the
riskiness of the debt of those firms. The national stock index therefore provides a
good indicator of the riskiness and profitability of a bank loan portfolio.
Suppose the single factor model applies. This gives the following definition of the
stock price returns of banks
Bit = biMct + Iit, (5.17)
where the dependent variable Bit represents the log daily returns of bank i at time t.
The explanatory variable Mit represents the macroeconomic stance of the economy
and Iit represents firm specific risks of firm i at t. The variable Mct can be seen
as the sum of the factors F and Cj in the theoretical section. For the empirical
evaluation of (5.17), we use the MSCI country indices of the different countries3.
We estimate (5.17) by least squares. This setup provides the basis for the empirical
evaluation of the common behavior of Bit and Bjt.
5.6 Dependence estimates
We first estimate (5.5) for all possible combinations of the 17 banks in our sample.
This estimate provides information on the dependence between the different banks
and a first indication of the relative importance of country risk. The dependence
between banks from the same country, such as Deutsche Bank and Commerzbank
may e.g. on average be higher than the dependence between e.g. Deutsche Bank
and HSBC, where the latter banks are from Germany and the UK.
3Note that the MSCI indices contain financial firms. This represents the fact that financial
firms have cross-share holdings.
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Domestic EU Domestic EU
UK 0.15 0.14 France 0.44 0.22
Spain 0.21 0.15 Germany 0.25 0.16
Netherlands 0.35 0.18 Italy 0.15 0.14
Table 5.3: Domestic and EU dependence among firms
The results are summarized in Table 5.3. In the table the average conditional prob-
ability of a loss for combinations of banks within a country is presented (domestic
dependence) and the average dependence between banks in a specific country with
banks in other EU countries is given. The estimation results for all combinations
of the 17 banks are given in Table 5.9 in the Appendix. The average conditional
probability of a loss of two banks given the loss of one bank is 18%. It is quite
revealing that the dependence for combinations of banks from the same country is
higher than for combinations of banks from different countries. This result supports
the findings reported by Hartmann et al. (forthcoming). Especially the dependence
among banks based within the Netherlands and France is high. The probability of
a large loss of ING given a large loss at Fortis and vice versa is 42%. The depen-
dence between ABN AMRO and ING is 37%. The dependence between the French
banks SG and BNP is also high, 44%. The same holds for combinations of German
banks and Spanish banks. The exception is the UK, where the dependence among
banks based in the UK is similar to the dependence among British banks and foreign
banks. Since the dependence among banks in the UK is low, this is probably due to
large differences in risk profiles among the UK banks. HSBC can e.g. be regarded
as an Asian bank, though it is listed in the UK.
We conclude that the probability of simultaneous losses is in some cases quite high. If
a bank realizes a loss of 5% of its market value, there is a one in five probability that a
second bank also realizes a loss. Dependence is even higher for banks within the same
country. We formally test the null-hypothesis that the dependence among banks
within a country is higher than the dependence among banks based in different EU
countries, by using the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney signed ranks test. The probability
that the hypothesis is not rejected is 0.03, if we test whether dependence among
banks within a country is similar to the dependence across borders. We therefore
conclude that the risk characteristics of the two groups are different.
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Figure 5.1: Cross-plot of returns BSCH and BBVA and idiosyncratic risk
In the following section we will see how the results hold if we leave out macroeco-
nomic risks. Thereafter, we will investigate if the results did change due to the
introduction of the euro.
5.7 Dependence and common risks
In this section the importance of macroeconomic risk factors is investigated. To
obtain the idiosyncratic firm risk, we estimate (5.17) with least squares. The least
squares estimates are given in Table 5.8 in the Appendix. The explanatory variable
is the MSCI index of the UK, Spain, the Netherlands, France, Italy and Germany. In
general the returns of banks in the EU are directly related to changes in the market
index, as one would expect from the CAPM. The parameter bi is in most cases close
to or larger than 1. This implies that changes in the market index translate into
similar or larger changes in the value of banks. A larger impact may be explained
by the leverage of banks. Banks borrow money and invest these deposits in loans
to firms. Bank equity is a buffer against losses. Large losses on the loan portfolio
directly translate into lower capital ratio’s because of this leveraged position.
It is, however, remarkable that the parameter bi is smaller than 1 for the German
banks. This can be the result of a large foreign exposure of the German banks in this
sample. The MSCI index for Germany is probably not a good proxy for the value of
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Domestic EU Domestic EU
UK 0.09 0.07 France 0.19 0.09
Spain 0.09 0.07 Germany 0.17 0.08
Netherlands 0.14 0.07 Italy 0.12 0.07
Table 5.4: Dependence and idiosyncratic risk (with low threshold)
the assets of German banks. It is a typical feature of the German banking market
that the largest banks have little small local firms in their loan portfolio. If the
loan portfolio of German banks consists of loans to foreign firms and multinationals,
there is a limited relation between the German economy and these banks. The
profitability of the largest German banks might be much more intertwined with the
global economy.
We now estimate (5.5) for the dependence between the non-macro risk or idiosyn-
cratic risks of the different banks, which we isolated via 5.17. Results are summa-
rized in Table 5.4. In this section, equation (5.5) is estimated for a much lower
threshold t than in the previous section. Since the 0.02 quantile is at the boundaries
of the ordered sample, we took t = 0.02. If we estimate (5.5) for a threshold of
0.05, the conditional probability of a simultaneous idiosyncratic loss for two banks
is close to 0, since there are hardly any simultaneous losses larger than 5%, caused
by idiosyncratic risk factors.
The dependence among the idiosyncratic risks in Table (5.4) is much lower than
the dependence among the bank returns in the previous section. Recall that the
conditional probability of a loss of two banks given the loss of one bank is 18%.
According to the results in Table (5.4), the dependence among the idiosyncratic
risks is lower. If one of the two banks realizes a loss of more than 2% due to an
idiosyncratic shock, the probability that the other bank is struck by a shock, larger
than 2%, is equal to 13%.4 However, the threshold of losses larger than 2% is low
and most dependence between the idiosyncratic risks disappears if the threshold is
raised to 5%.
We show the impact of market risk on bank returns in Figure (5.1a). In this figure
a cross-plot of the daily stock price returns of BSCH and BBVA is presented. It
4See Table (5.10) in the Appendix for individual combinations.
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Domestic EU Domestic EU
UK 0.07 0.05 France 0.27 0.09
Spain 0.19 0.05 Germany 0.20 0.06
Netherlands 0.26 0.06 Italy 0.12 0.04
Table 5.5: Dependence before EMU
is clear that there are quite some observations in the North-East and South-West
quadrant of the picture. This is due to the heavy tail characteristics of the returns.
In Figure (5.1b) a cross-plot of the idiosyncratic risk of the banks is given. The
idiosyncratic risk corresponds to the error term in the least squares estimation of
(5.17). It is revealing that there are no observations in the North-East and South-
West quadrant of the figure. Since the extreme losses are not observed in the
cross-plot of the idiosyncratic risks, this indicates that macro shocks cause most of
the losses of banks, as one should expect from the CAPM.
Interestingly, the dependence between the bank specific idiosyncratic risks for com-
binations of banks within a country is again higher than the dependence among
combinations of banks from different countries. Even though most dependence dis-
appears if we use the MSCI index as a proxy for macroeconomic risk, this proxy does
not explain the country risk completely. The higher dependence within countries
are the result of factors which are not related to the market index. An example is
the impact of regulatory changes for the financial sector. Also Gropp and Moer-
man (2004) report that macro shocks are an important determinant of risk in the
banking system, when investigating the tail risk of multiple banks. Their results are
supported by Monte Carlo simulations.
5.8 Dependence over time
To evaluate whether the dependence did change following the start of the EMU,
we estimated the failure measure before the introduction of the euro and after the
introduction of the euro. However, it should be noted that a possible increase in
dependence since January 1999 is not necessarily caused by the common currency.
In Table 5.5 we present the dependence estimates for the subsample before the intro-
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Domestic EU Domestic EU
UK 0.18 0.14 France 0.39 0.22
Spain 0.12 0.10 Germany 0.24 0.16
Netherlands 0.42 0.18 Italy 0.12 0.14
Table 5.6: Dependence since EMU
duction of the euro. In Table 5.6 the dependence estimates since the introduction of
the euro are given. The results clearly indicate that the dependence between banks
in the EU did increase since the start of EMU.
The average probability of a loss for the two banks, given that one bank realizes a
loss is 7% before the introduction of the euro. When we estimate dependence after
the introduction of the euro, the probability of a second bank realizing a loss, given
that one bank realizes a loss is higher. The average probability is then 16%. The es-
timates therefore indicate that the introduction of the common currency did have an
effect on the dependence among banks, contrary to Hartmann et al. (forthcoming).
A possible explanation for this opposing result is that we focus on a change over
time of the probabilities of a conditional loss, while Hartmann et al. (forthcoming)
test whether the tail index α is constant over time. Also Moerman (2005) inves-
tigates the dependence over time among European banks with a bivariate regime
switch model. According to that approach, there are no significant differences be-
tween banks that originate from the euro area and banks from Denmark, Sweden
or the UK. Further research is therefore needed to conclude that the increase in
dependence is caused by the start of EMU.
To improve our understanding of the change of the dependence among banks over
time, we can take a closer look at the estimation results and study the impact
on a country level. In Table 5.7 we present the increase in dependence since the
start of EMU for banks from different countries. We have first taken the average
dependence for banks within a country and for banks from different countries before
and after the introduction of the euro. Secondly, we have divided the dependence
for banks in the second sample period by the dependence in the first sample period.
The dependence among French banks and foreign banks before 1999 was 0.09, but
after 1999 the dependence was 0.22. The increase is therefore equal to a multiple of
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EU Domestic EU Domestic
UK 3.11 2.51 France 2.46 1.48
Spain 2.02 0.66 Germany 2.78 1.23
Netherlands 3.21 1.58 Italy 3.41 1.02
Table 5.7: Relative increase of dependence
2.46(0.2151/0.0874) and is more than two times higher. Similar results are obtained
for the increase in dependence in other countries.
However, it is interesting to investigate whether the dependence among banks from
different countries within the EU did increase with the same degree as the depen-
dence among banks within a country. An increase in dependence between banks
in the same country is the result of an increasingly similar risk exposure, because
of risk sharing arrangements. Apart from a similar risk exposure, an increase in
dependence among banks in different countries is the result of the harmonization of
the monetary environment for banks.
According to the results in Table 5.7, the increase in the dependence among banks
from different countries is higher than for banks which are based in the same coun-
try. The dependence among Spanish banks even declined after the introduction of
the euro. A positive result of the integration process is that banks can broaden their
credit risk exposure to other countries within the eurozone, without currency risk.
The relative exposure to domestic risks is therefore reduced, which may explain the
decreasing dependence among Spanish banks. However, the dependence between
Spanish banks and other EU banks did increase, a possible result of monetary uni-
fication. Interestingly, the results for the UK show a different picture. The increase
in dependence among UK based banks was lower than the increase in dependence
with other banks in the EU. The UK does not participate in EMU, so the increase in
dependence with domestic and foreign banks is at first sight not related to the com-
mon currency. Future research is therefore needed to fully understand the factors
contributing to the increase in dependence over time.
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5.9 Conclusion
In this chapter the downside risk dependence between banks in the EU is inves-
tigated. A better understanding of the downside risk of banks helps regulators to
evaluate regulatory policies to improve financial stability in the EU. To this end, the
downside risk of banks is modelled and the downside risk dependence between banks
within a country and across borders is analyzed. It is shown that differences in coun-
try risk reduce the likelihood of simultaneous losses between domestic and foreign
banks. A merger between banks from different countries returns a greater oppor-
tunity for risk diversification than a merger between two domestic banks. Finally,
mergers by banks based in the same country do increase systemic risk, although the
risk of the individual institutions is reduced.
In the empirical section we first estimated the dependence between banks in Europe.
Empirical evidence shows that the dependence among banks based in the same
country is higher than among banks from different countries. From a regulatory
point of view, the cross-border mergers between banks in the EU should therefore
be encouraged, since this provides better risk diversification possibilities, compared
to mergers within a country.
Secondly, we have investigated empirically the relation between macroeconomic risk
factors and downside risk. The results indicate that the risk of banks is to a high
degree determined by macroeconomic factors. This contributes to the previous
findings, which underlined that macroeconomic risks are an important source of
dependence and offer most opportunities for risk diversification.
Third, the importance of macroeconomic risk factors explains why dependence
among banks increased since the start of the EMU. Banks are now exposed to the
same interest rate risk and other economic variables in the eurozone. The downside
risk dependence may continue to increase in the following years, if the business cycle
of the countries in the EU further converges.
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5.10 Appendix
5.10.1 Estimation tail index
We have to estimate the tail index α and the scale coefficient C to obtain L(x) in
(5.4). We estimate α with the Hill (1975) estimator:
γ̂ = 1/α̂ =
1
m
m∑
j=0
ln
(
Xj
Xm+1
)
, (5.18)
where the parameter m equals the number of highest order statistics. The number m
has to be selected such that the Pareto approximation of the tail is appropriate. We
select the threshold by the bootstrap method proposed in Danielsson et al. (2001).
In Figure 3.3 the Hill plots for four firms are given. In a Hill plot one varies the
threshold Xm+1 or alternatively m, and plots γ̂ from (5.18) against m. In the Hill
plots of Figure 3.3, where γ̂ is plotted against m, one sees considerable variation if
one uses only the very top order statistics. Subsequently using more order statistics
one notices some plateaus. Increasing m even further, the Hill plots all appear to
be moving down. This is a result of the bias which kicks in when one uses too
many central order statistics. Using too few order statistics causes the variance to
dominate. Somehow one has to sail between these two vices.
The question is which threshold Xm+1 should be selected? The plots indicate that
around m = 50 the variance is comparatively low, while there is still a small bias in
the γ̂ estimates. Since similar plots appear for all the series, we fixed m at 50 for
our γ̂ estimates.
The objective of our investigation is to determine the probability that the daily
stock return of a bank or insurer is lower than a prespecified probability level, Xvar.
To estimate this probability, we use the inverse quantile estimator from De Haan et
al. (1994),
p̂ =
M
n
(
Xm+1
xvar
)γ̂(m)
. (5.19)
This estimator depends on the tail index γ, the number of higher order statistics
M , the sample size n and the level xvar. In our case xvar is chosen at 25%.
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5.10.2 Multivariate estimation
In this section we elaborate on the bivariate estimation technique employed in the
paper. We first rewrite the failure measure, turn it into an estimator and subse-
quently show how the estimator performs on simulated data en real data.
From elementary probability theory we know that P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t) = 1 −
P (max[X1, X2] > t) and P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t) = P (max[X1, X2] > t) +
P (min[X1, X2] > t). One can therefore rewrite the conditional expectation as follows
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] =
P (X1 > t) + P (X2 > t)
1− P (X1 ≤ t,X2 ≤ t)
= 1 +
P (min[X1,X2] > t)
P (max[X1, X2] > t)
.
The estimation of the probability of multiple crashes can thus be reduced to the
estimation of two univariate probabilities. This greatly facilitates the empirical
analysis, since one can proceed on basis of the previously described univariate es-
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timation methods by using the minimum and maximum return series. We use the
notation Pmin for P (min[X1,X2] > t) and the corresponding notation for the maxi-
mum. If the tail index α is identical for the minimum (αi) and maximum (αa) series,
we obtain the following non-parametric estimator5
E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = 1 +
P̂min
P̂max
. (5.20)
5.10.3 Identifying macroeconomic risk
In Table 5.8 the least squares estimates of equation (5.17) are given. All estimates
of the coefficient bi are significant at the 99% confidence interval. Statistics on the
confidence interval are therefore omitted. In the second column the estimates for
the coefficient bi are given. The estimated constant is very small and was in many
cases not significant. Because of this we do not give an economic meaning to it.
5Using (3.13) and E[κ|κ ≥ 1] = 1 +
Mmin
n
(
XM+1
xp
)α̂
i(m)
Mmax
n
(
XM+1
xp
)α̂
a(m)
= 1 + Mmin
Mmax
, which shows that the
estimator reduces to a simple counting procedure for the minima and maxima.
5. Country Risk in Banking 117
Firm R-squared Sample
HSBC 1.186 IUK + 0.00056 0.444 7-10-1992
RBS 1.218 IUK + 0.00062 0.364
BARCLAYS 1.313 IUK + 0.00043 0.444
BSCH 1.257 IES + 0.00008 0.680
BBVA 1.217 IES + 0.00018 0.712
BPE 0.641 IES + 0.00039 0.300
ING 1.349 INL + 0.00029 0.668
AAB 1.154 INL + 0.00029 0.611
FOR 1.083 INL + 0.00029 0.492
BNP 1.148 IFR + 0.00015 0.495 10-19-1993
SG 1.140 IFR + 0.00027 0.492
DB 0.993 IDE + 0.00005 0.540
COM 0.905 IDE + -0.00004 0.418
HYPO 1.006 IDE + -0.00013 0.376
UI 1.040 IIT + 0.00020 0.411
BI 1.048 IIT + 0.00018 0.347
SPI 1.033 IIT + -0.00008 0.424 4-3-1992
Bit =                          bi       *      Mct       +                Iit    (Equation 16)
Table 5.8: Regression returns on index.
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RBS 1.00 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.10
HSBC 0.10 1.00 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.07 0.11 0.06 0.07
BARCLAYS 0.23 0.10 1.00 0.13 0.15 0.19 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.19 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.14 0.15
BSCH 0.13 0.12 0.13 1.00 0.38 0.12 0.24 0.22 0.10 0.24 0.28 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.22
BBVA 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.38 1.00 0.13 0.26 0.23 0.15 0.25 0.28 0.17 0.24 0.11 0.14 0.09 0.23
BPE 0.08 0.04 0.19 0.12 0.13 1.00 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.11 0.13 0.09
ING 0.18 0.10 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.15 1.00 0.37 0.42 0.26 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.18 0.19
AAB 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.10 0.37 1.00 0.27 0.22 0.29 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.11 0.11 0.23
FOR 0.15 0.07 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.42 0.27 1.00 0.18 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13
BNP 0.18 0.13 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.10 0.26 0.22 0.18 1.00 0.44 0.28 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.20
SG 0.17 0.12 0.23 0.28 0.28 0.09 0.31 0.29 0.25 0.44 1.00 0.27 0.23 0.16 0.17 0.12 0.18
DB 0.13 0.14 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.27 0.21 0.17 0.28 0.27 1.00 0.32 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.15
COM 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.13 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.21 0.23 0.32 1.00 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.14
HYPO 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.23 0.21 1.00 0.08 0.15 0.14
UI 0.12 0.11 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.08 1.00 0.14 0.16
BI 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.18 0.11 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.14 1.00 0.13
SPI 0.10 0.07 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.09 0.19 0.23 0.13 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.16 0.13 1.00
Mean 0.14 0.10 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.11 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.16
Table 5.9: Dependence 1992-2004 t= 0.05
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RBS 1.00 0.07 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09
HSBC 0.07 1.00 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
BARCLAYS 0.14 0.07 1.00 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10
BSCH 0.07 0.05 0.07 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
BBVA 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.10 1.00 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05
BPE 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.10 0.07 1.00 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06
ING 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.07 1.00 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.07
AAB 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.16 1.00 0.11 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08
FOR 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.11 1.00 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.07
BNP 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10 1.00 0.19 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.08
SG 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.19 1.00 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.09
DB 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.11 0.12 1.00 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.10
COM 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.15 1.00 0.20 0.08 0.07 0.11
HYPO 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.15 0.20 1.00 0.08 0.09 0.10
UI 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 1.00 0.12 0.12
BI 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.12 1.00 0.11
SPI 0.09 0.05 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.11 1.00
Mean 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.08
Table 5.10: Dependence 1992-2004 idiosyncratic t= 0.02
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RBS 1.00 0.04 0.14 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.04
HSBC 0.04 1.00 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.20 0.10 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
BARCLAYS 0.14 0.04 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.03 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00
BSCH 0.03 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.25 0.17 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.13 0.08 0.13 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.04
BBVA 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.25 1.00 0.14 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.12 0.02 0.03 0.11
BPE 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.17 0.14 1.00 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03
ING 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.06 1.00 0.35 0.19 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.16 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.08
AAB 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.35 1.00 0.25 0.15 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.04
FOR 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.19 0.25 1.00 0.09 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02
BNP 0.10 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.15 0.09 1.00 0.27 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.09
SG 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.00 0.27 1.00 0.09 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.03 0.06
DB 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 1.00 0.30 0.19 0.05 0.05 0.10
COM 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.30 1.00 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.05
HYPO 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.19 0.11 1.00 0.02 0.03 0.08
UI 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.02 1.00 0.10 0.16
BI 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.10 1.00 0.11
SPI 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.05 0.08 0.16 0.11 1.00
Mean 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.07
Table 5.11: Dependence 1992-June 1998
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RBS 1.00 0.09 0.35 0.07 0.10 0.05 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.15 0.23 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.07 0.17 0.19
HSBC 0.09 1.00 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.16
BARCLAYS 0.35 0.11 1.00 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.20 0.19 0.09 0.13 0.19 0.23
BSCH 0.07 0.06 0.08 1.00 0.37 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.21
BBVA 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.37 1.00 0.00 0.27 0.29 0.10 0.23 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.24
BPE 0.05 0.17 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.06
ING 0.21 0.07 0.21 0.12 0.27 0.02 1.00 0.44 0.53 0.24 0.31 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.08 0.16 0.20
AAB 0.24 0.07 0.24 0.19 0.29 0.00 0.44 1.00 0.28 0.38 0.32 0.31 0.20 0.18 0.06 0.12 0.26
FOR 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.53 0.28 1.00 0.18 0.27 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.08 0.19 0.12
BNP 0.15 0.10 0.22 0.15 0.23 0.00 0.24 0.38 0.18 1.00 0.39 0.39 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.25
SG 0.23 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.17 0.03 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.39 1.00 0.32 0.28 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.25
DB 0.17 0.13 0.20 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.25 0.31 0.22 0.39 0.32 1.00 0.39 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.23
COM 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.39 1.00 0.17 0.14 0.22 0.22
HYPO 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.07 0.00 0.24 0.18 0.19 0.12 0.17 0.18 0.17 1.00 0.06 0.13 0.11
UI 0.07 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.06 1.00 0.14 0.12
BI 0.17 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.09 0.09 0.16 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.11 0.19 0.22 0.13 0.14 1.00 0.11
SPI 0.19 0.16 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.06 0.20 0.26 0.12 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.12 0.11 1.00
Mean 0.16 0.10 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.04 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.18
Table 5.12: Dependence 1999-2004
Chapter 6
Summary and Conclusions
In this research we have investigated the downside risk of financial institutions.
This is the primary concern of regulators of the financial sector. Regulators are
interested in the risk of large losses, threatening individual banks and insurers. The
secondary focus of regulators is the soundness of the financial system. Since the risk
that multiple banks or insurers realize a large loss, at the same time, is of interest,
we have studied the risk diversification effects of downside risk. This helps us to
understand the observed dependence between losses of multiple companies.
The intention of this research is to develop new theoretical propositions and present
empirical results, which are of interest to policymakers. To keep this work concise
and make it accessible to non-academics, some choices have been made. For ex-
ample, the degree of dependence between the returns of two firms is represented
by a probability measure and not by the parameter in a copula, which is in vogue
in academics. Propositions related to extreme value theory are formulated and the
dependence among firms is estimated in a similar way, based on similar assump-
tions. This combination of propositions and empirical results, offers an interesting
approach to study the downside risk in the financial sector.
According to the traditional industrial organization view, the financial sector can
be divided in the following subsectors: the banking sector, the insurance sector and
the reinsurance sector. Moreover, financial conglomerates providing both banking
and insurance services can be considered a subsector. The exposure to downside
risk of these subsectors in investigated in the different chapters. Chapter 1 starts
with an introduction to recent trends in the financial sector and to this research. In
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Chapter 2 references to the broader literature are given. In the following sections a
summary of the other chapters can be found.
In Chapter 3 the dependence between the downside risk of European banks and
insurers is analyzed. Since the downside risk of banks and insurers differs, an inter-
esting question from a supervisory point of view is the risk reduction that derives
from diversification within large banks and financial conglomerates. The limited
value of the normal distribution based correlation concept is discussed, and an al-
ternative measure is proposed, which better captures the downside dependence given
the fat tail property of the risk distribution. This measure is estimated and indi-
cates better diversification benefits for conglomerates versus large banks. Chapter
3 is based on joint work with De Vries and Schoenmaker (Slijkerman et al., 2005).
In Chapter 4 the relation between insurers and reinsurers is studied. Simultaneous
losses of the market value of insurers are modelled and measured, to understand
the impact of shocks on the insurance sector. The downside risk of insurers is
explicitly modelled by common and idiosyncratic risk factors. Since reinsurance is
important for the capacity of insurers, the risk dependence among European insurers
and reinsurers is measured. The results point to a relatively low insurance sector
wide risk and indicate that the dependence among insurers is higher than among
reinsurers.
In Chapter 5 the mutual relations among banks are investigated. The downside risk
of multiple combinations of banks in the EU are modelled and their downside risk
dependence is estimated. An explanation for the joint risks, based on macroeconomic
developments, is provided. The results indicate that in general the dependence
between banks based in the same country is higher and that the dependence did
increase after the introduction of the euro. Evidence shows that the dependence can
be explained by macroeconomic developments.
This thesis therefore offers a number of new insights on the risk diversification
effect of mergers in the financial sector, from both a theoretical and an empirical
perspective. The propositions in the different chapters are innovative, as is the
use of the non-parametric estimator in this context. The use of this estimator and
choice of European data provide us with new results. Moreover, different aspects
of the methodology are explored in the chapters. The robustness of the results is
shown by sampling in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, the dependence among more than
two firms is investigated. In Chapter 5, it is shown how explanatory variables can
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be used in this context and it is investigated whether the dependence has changed
over time. Moreover, in the chapters, a different policy question is addressed. The
results are useful for the design of new regulatory policies and can be the input
for future research on the diversification effects of downside risk. The framework
to disentangle the common and idiosyncratic shocks, incurred by multiple firms,
which is presented in Chapter 4, is well suited for future theoretical research. The
non-parametric estimator, which is used to estimate the probability that two firms
realize a simultaneous loss, can be used for future applied research.
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Summary in Dutch
Nederlandse samenvatting
Voor de meeste mensen in Europa is de stabiliteit van het financiële stelsel en de
stabiliteit van banken en verzekeraars vanzelfsprekend. Ze zijn gerust, doordat de
risicomanagementsystemen van deze instellingen geavanceerd zijn en doordat goed
opgeleide toezichthouders de instellingen in de gaten houden. Een gevolg van deze
aanpak is, dat faillissementen in Europa zeldzaam zijn. Toch is de uitdaging voor
toezichthouders om risico in de financiële sector te begrijpen aan het toenemen.
Twee trends in de financiële sector, die in het oog springen, zijn een toename van
grensoverschrijdende activiteiten van instellingen en een toename van de verhan-
delbaarheid van de diverse risico’s tussen de instellingen. De meeste financiële
instellingen bieden hun producten over de grens aan en investeren hun activa in
meerde landen. Verbeterde mogelijkheden om risico te beprijzen in samenhang met
een geavanceerde technologische infrastructuur ondersteunen de verhandelbaarheid
en overdracht van risico’s tussen instellingen. Bedrijven doen dit om de risico’s
waaraan zij blootgesteld staan te verminderen. Deze ontwikkeling heeft echter de
complexiteit doen toenemen van de risico’s die financiële instellingen nemen.
Het faillissement van een financiële instelling leidt tot verliezen voor consumenten
en andere belanghebbenden. Aangezien een groot verlies bij een financiële instelling
gevolgen kan hebben voor de stabiliteit van het financiële systeem, is de weder-
zijdse afhankelijkheid van instellingen het aangrijpingspunt voor het toezicht, dat
tot doel heeft de financiële stabiliteit te bevorderen. Dit is specifiek van belang in
de bancaire sector, waar het betalingsverkeer verzorgd wordt door een netwerk van
banken. Daarnaast staan financiële instellingen onder toezicht om de tegoeden van
consumenten te beschermen.
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Het eerste oogmerk van toezichthouders is om het faillissement van een bank of
verzekeraar te voorkomen. Toezichthouders zijn geïnteresseerd in de kans op een
sterke waardevermindering van de activa en in de kans op ongewoon grote ver-
plichtingen, die de soliditeit van de instellingen aantasten. Statistisch gesproken
zijn zij geïnteresseerd in de linker staart van de rendementsverdeling. Een techniek,
die gebruikt wordt om deze verdeling te beschrijven, is de zogenoemde extreme waar-
den theorie. Extreme waarden theorie kan gebruikt worden om de kans op grote
verliezen van de marktwaarde van banken en verzekeraars in kaart te brengen en
uitspraken doen over de kans op nog niet eerder waargenomen verliezen.
Het tweede oogmerk van toezichthouders is de soliditeit van het financiële systeem.
De verbanden tussen financiële instellingen kunnen er toe leiden dat grote verliezen
bij een instelling gevolgen hebben voor de concurrent. Vanwege een gelijksoor-
tige blootstelling aan risico kunnen meerdere instellingen geraakt worden door een
catastrofe. Dit draagt er toe bij, dat de verliezen tussen instellingen met elkaar
samenhangen. Een gevolg kan zijn, dat het aanbod van financiële diensten afneemt
tijdens crises, aangezien de instellingen gelijktijdig verliezen maken, waardoor hun
bereidheid om risico te nemen afneemt. Het modelleren van gelijktijdige verliezen
bij meerdere instellingen draagt bij aan het inzicht in de risico’s in de financiële
sector. Er wordt in dit onderzoek daarom gekeken naar de kans op grote verliezen
bij twee of meer banken of verzekeraars vanuit zowel een theoretische als een em-
pirische invalshoek. Zodoende brengen we in kaart, wat de kans op grote verliezen
is en welke gevolgen deze hebben voor het financiële systeem.
Het theoretisch modelleren van het neerwaartse risico verschaft nieuwe inzichten in
de gevolgen van fusies voor de robuustheid van het financiële systeem. Het is echter
interessant deze theoretische modellen te combineren met een empirische evaluatie
van de kansverdeling van verliezen in de financiële sector. Het schatten van de kans
op grote verliezen verschaft informatie over de beste manier, waarop het neerwaartse
risico gediversifieerd kan worden. Zo wordt het belang van landenrisico of sector-
risico onderzocht. De sectorrisico’s voor verzekeraars verschillen bijvoorbeeld van
de sectorrisico’s in het bankwezen.
De financiële relaties tussen verzekeraars zijn relatief beperkt vergeleken met de re-
laties, die banken met elkaar hebben op de financiële markten. Aangezien de meeste
verzekeraars echter vaak dezelfde soort activa en passiva hebben, kan dit tot een-
zelfde risicoprofiel leiden. Verzekeraars kunnen bijvoorbeeld dezelfde verplichtingen
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hebben vanwege overeenkomstige klanten of vanwege dezelfde regio’s waarin ze ac-
tief zijn. Als verzekeraars in dezelfde activa investeren, kan dit ook de bron zijn
van een overeenkomstig risicoprofiel. De herverzekeringssector staat bekend om de
mogelijkheden, die het heeft om grote catastrofes te verzekeren en om de mogelijkhe-
den, die het heeft om verzekeraars dekking te verschaffen tegen extreme verliezen.
Wanneer echter de dekking van meerdere verzekeraars tegen extreme verliezen door
dezelfde herverzekeraar verschaft wordt, zijn deze verzekeraars blootgesteld aan het
risico van faillissement van de herverzekeraar.
Het probleem van een crisis in de bancaire sector is bekend in de literatuur. Banken
zijn de hoeksteen van de financiële sector. Zij onderhouden het betalingsverkeer
en verschaffen liquiditeit aan huishoudens en bedrijven evenals leningen met een
langere looptijd. Banken zijn belangrijk voor de economische groei, aangezien ze
de handel en investeringen helpen financieren. Daarnaast verschaffen banken aan
huishoudens de mogelijkheid om te sparen. In de geschiedenis is de bancaire sector
een aantal malen door ernstige crises geraakt, zoals tijdens de “ savings and loans
crisis” in de Verenigde Staten. Vanwege de gevolgen voor de reële economie van een
crisis is de sector streng gereguleerd, zelfs op internationaal niveau door het “Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision”.
Vanuit het traditionele perspectief kan de financiële sector opgedeeld worden in de
volgende subsectoren: de verzekeringssector, de herverzekeringssector en de ban-
caire sector. Daarnaast kunnen financiële conglomeraten, die zowel bancaire als
verzekeringsproducten aanbieden, beschouwd worden als subsector. De opkomst
van financiële conglomeraten maakt het relevant, in hoeverre risico’s in de bancaire
sector en in de verzekeringssector met elkaar verband houden. Deze problematiek
is beschreven in hoofdstuk 3. Over de onderlinge afhankelijk van de verliezen van
verzekeraars tijdens crises is minder bekend. Dit onderwerp wordt besproken in
hoofdstuk 4, waarbij er aandacht zal zijn voor de wederzijdse afhankelijkheid tussen
herverzekeraars. Door de fusies tussen banken in de EU in de afgelopen jaren zijn
beleidsmakers zich meer bewust geworden van de gevolgen van risicospreiding in de
bancaire sector en de gevolgen voor de kans op grote verliezen van deze fusies. De
onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen banken wordt daarom onderzocht in hoofdstuk 5.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de onderlinge afhankelijkheid bestudeerd tussen Europese
banken en verzekeraars. Aangezien het neerwaartse risico tussen Europese banken
en verzekeraars verschilt, is het voor toezichthouders een interessante vraag, of het
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voor financiële conglomeraten mogelijk is het risico te verlagen. De beperkingen
van de correlatie coëfficiënt, een coëfficiënt die nauw samenhangt met de normale
verdeling, worden besproken en een andere maatstaf wordt geïntroduceerd, welke
beter geschikt is om de afhankelijkheid tussen extreme verliezen weer te geven. Dit
is nuttig, aangezien toezichthouders juist geïnteresseerd zijn in extreme verliezen
en de daarmee samenhangende dikstaartige verdelingsfunctie. De maatstaf wordt
vervolgens geschat. De conclusie luidt, dat de neerwaartse risico’s van banken en
verzekeraars verschillen en dat financiële conglomeraten misschien beter in staat zijn
risico’s te diversifiëren dan grote banken.
In hoofdstuk 4 wordt de afhankelijkheid tussen verzekeraars en herverzekeraars be-
sproken. De kans op een gelijktijdig groot verlies van de marktwaarde wordt gemo-
delleerd en vervolgens gemeten. Dit verschaft inzicht in de impact van catastrofes
op de verzekeringssector. Het neerwaarts risico wordt gemodelleerd, waarbij het
gemeenschappelijke risico en het idiosyncratisch risico expliciet uitgesplitst wordt.
Dit verschaft inzicht in de mate, waarin de afhankelijkheid tussen bedrijven toe-
neemt ten gevolge van een toename van gemeenschappelijk en idiosyncratisch risico.
Aangezien herverzekeraars belangrijk zijn voor de capaciteit van de Europese verze-
keringssector, wordt ook de afhankelijkheid tussen herverzekeraars en verzekeraars
geschat. De resultaten wijzen op een relatief laag sectorrisico voor verzekeraars. De
afhankelijkheid tussen herverzekeraars is echter nog lager.
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt bekeken, in hoeverre het risicoprofiel van diverse Europese
banken overeen komt. Het neerwaarts risico van meerdere Europese banken wordt
gemodelleerd, evenals de kans op meerdere verliezen bij banken op hetzelfde tijd-
stip. Het neerwaarts risico en de samenhang wordt vervolgens geschat. Een ver-
klaring voor een overeenkomstig risicoprofiel wordt gevonden in macro-economische
ontwikkelingen. De resultaten geven aan, dat over het algemeen de afhankelijkheid
tussen banken in hetzelfde land hoger is dan tussen banken uit verschillende landen.
Daarnaast geven de empirische resultaten aan dat het risicoprofiel van Europese
banken meer op elkaar is gaan lijken na de introductie van de euro. De euro hoeft
echter niet de oorzaak te zijn van de observatie, dat het neerwaartse risico van
banken meer op elkaar is gaan lijken.
Kort samengevat verschaft dit proefschrift een aantal nieuwe inzichten in de mate,
waarin het neerwaartse risico diversifieerbaar is, zowel vanuit een theoretisch als een
empirisch perspectief. Niet alleen de stellingen in de verschillende hoofdstukken
137
zijn vernieuwend, maar ook het gebruik van een niet-parametrische schatter in
deze context. Het gebruik van de niet-parametrische schatter en de keuze voor
Europese data zorgen ervoor, dat de resultaten nieuw zijn. Daarnaast worden in de
diverse hoofdstukken verschillende zaken verder uitgewerkt. De gevoeligheid van de
schatter wordt zichtbaar gemaakt door een simulatie oefening in hoofdstuk 3. In
hoofdstuk 4 komt de onderlinge afhankelijkheid tussen meer dan twee bedrijven aan
bod. In hoofdstuk 5 wordt aangegeven hoe verklarende variabelen in het empirische
raamwerk opgenomen kunnen worden. Daarnaast wordt bekeken, hoe de onder-
linge afhankelijkheid tussen instellingen verandert door de tijd heen. De resultaten
zijn relevant gegeven de consolidatie in de Europese financiële sector. Het onder-
zoek verschaft toezichthouders handvatten voor het beleid ten aanzien van fusies
in de financiële sector. Daarnaast bevat het onderzoek verschillende elementen, die
in toekomstig onderzoek naar de diversifieerbaarheid van neerwaarts risico verder
uitgewerkt kunnen worden.
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